ADSS 1.252 Orsenigo to Maglione: Sumner-Welles in Berlin

ADSS 1.252 Cesare Orsenigo, Germany, to Luigi Maglione, Sec State

Reference: Report number 344, (31.309), (AES 2167/40)

Location and date: Berlin, 04.03.1940

Summary statement: Under-Secretary of State, Sumner Welles visit to Berlin.  He met several ambassadors including the Italian.  Diplomats believe that both sides underestimate each other’s strengths and must negotiate a settlement after two years at the most in order to avoid a mass slaughter.

Language: Italian

Text:

I take the liberty of adding to what was published in the newspapers about Mr Welles’s talks in Berlin, some information less known and certainly not for the public. (1)

Mr Welles, although he had notified the American Charge d’Affaires in Berlin, Mr Alexander Kirk (2), that he was coming as a private citizen, he nevertheless saw a few diplomats with whom he was personally acquainted, such as the Ambassadors of Brazil and Argentina (3), and also called on Ambassador Attolico, who unfortunately had to receive him while in bed owing to painful heart condition: his last visit lasted for more that on hour: on the last day, Sunday, Mr Welles also met the Belgian Ambassador, Viscount Davignon, and Mr Schacht.

As to the German Government, Mr Welles first of all had talks with the Minister for Foreign Affairs (7), the Secretary of State, Dr Weizsacker, Hitler, Hess, and on Sunday from 12 to 3pm with Goring.  He also had a meeting with the Dutch Minister, but I do not think that they spoke about politics. (8)

The main themes discussed by the diplomats was: “Germany makes a mistake in underestimating the Allies but in turn the Allies make an even bigger mistake underestimating German military strength, the cohesion of the people and of the army around the Fuhrer, and in hoping to overthrow them easily and to starve them.”  They begged Mr Welles to open the eyes of the Allies so that they would not blindly go into war which will result in a terrifying slaughter and a useless destruction as it will be difficult to reach a final victory: everybody will emerge very shaken or, maybe after two years of fighting peace negotiations will be started on more or less present conditions but with two or three million men killed.  The diplomats in Berlin think that, if the Allies do not completely shut all doors, Mr Roosevelt will certainly try and approach for an understanding, when he has collected all the information brought back by Mr Welles at the end of March: some, however, think that this will be too late!  It is also said that Signor Mussolini has already offered his collaboration to Mr Roosevelt for such an initiative. 

As to the various talks which Mr Welles had with members of the German Government, it seems that he was most pleased with the on he had with the Fuhrer, and least impressed with the one with M Ribbentrop who took a boastful and menacing attitude.  It seems that the gist of Mr Welles’s general impression was summed up in his sentence: “These men carry in their heart a wish for peace, but they have not the courage to speak about it lest they are judged weak or afraid.”

The diplomats who gave me the above information asked me to pass the information on to the Holy See, pointing out the gravity of the moment, that is, the serious and imminent danger of a colossal war of uncertain result,  They hope for the collaboration of the Holy See, and they noted in this respect the less controversial and more conciliatory language adopted recently by the Catholic newspapers in Holland Belgium.

The moment seems to me also very serious and I want to lighten my responsibility, and to inform you exactly about everything, although I suppose I may not be adding anything new to what you already know.

Notes: 

(1) Benjamin Sumner Welles (1892-1962), United States Under-Secretary of State 1937-43.  FDR asked Welles to visit Italy, Germany and the UK on a fact finding mission.  Historians are divided as to the true nature of the mission, but it seems reasonable to judge that FDR wanted first hand information on the state of the Axis, the likelihood of Italy entering the war, German intentions in general, and the situation in Britain that he was keen to support with a measure of discretion.  Hitler feared Welles’ mission was an attempt to keep Italy neutral and Ribbentrop’s sudden visit to Rome on 10.03.1940 appeared to be in response to the Fuhrer’s fears.  Ribbentrop also visited Pius XII during the same trip, on 11.03.1940. See ADSS 1.257.  Welles returned to Rome and met with the pope too.  See ADSS 1.268.

See too http://bobrowen.com/nymas/Robert%20Miller%20-%20Sumner%20Welles.html (Accessed 21.08.2016)

(2) Alexander Kirk (1888-1979), United States Charge d’Affaires in Germany 1940.

(3) Cyro de Freitas Valle (1896-1969), Brazilian Ambassador to Germany 1939-42); Ricardo Olivera (1886-1949), Argentinian Ambassador to Germany 1939-43.

(4) Bernardo Attolico (1880-1942), Italian Ambassador to Germany 1935-39.  Attolico was about to leave Berlin to take up his new position as Italian Ambassador to the Holy See.

(5) Jacques Henri Davignon (1887-1965), Belgian Ambassador to Germany 1935-40.

(6) Hjalmar Schacht (1877-1970), President of the Reichsbank 1933-39, Minister of Economics 1934-37, minister without portfolio 1939-43.

(7) Joachim Ribbentrop (1893-1946), German Minister for Foreign Affairs 1938-45.

(8) Not identified.

ADSS 1.192 Maglione notes: review of the current situation

ADSS 1.192 Luigi Maglione, Sec State, notes.

Reference: AES 6480/39

Location and date: Vatican, 06.09.1939

Summary statement: Hitler did not believe France and UK would stand firm.  Explains his lack of interest in Italian help.  Situation between Rome and Berlin is very tense; Berlin accuses Rome of treason; necessary for Mussolini to remain neutral.

Language: Italian

Text:

Most Secret

Urgent

Monsignor X, who arrived today from Berlin, tells me that Hitler hoped up to the last moment to force Poland to surrender through threats.  Polish resistance and the firmness of Great Britain and France have upset he: he hoped to obtain everything, as he had on precious occasions, without bloodshed, as he believed that the determination of Great Britain and France was only a bluff. (1)

As he was convinced of this, and also because the Italians had made it known while in Salzburg that they did not have any intention of throwing themselves into such an adventure, Hitler wrote to Mussolini that his military intervention was not required. (2) Now, however, according to what was confided to the same X by the courier of the Italian cabinet, it seems that Hitler has written to Mussolini to obtain Italy’s military assistance (3) pointing out to him the fall of Nazism in Germany meant the end of Fascism in Italy. (4)

In Berlin, they speak openly of the new Italian treason.  The relations between the Italian Embassy and the Chancellery have become cold and almost tense. (4) Ambassador Attolico has announced his intention of going on leave, as at present he has nothing to do in Berlin.

Numerous German Army units are setting off in the direction of the Brenner Pass.

I think that we should be careful and urge Mussolini to keep steady and to avoid intervention: we must insist that he should preserve the state of neutrality.

Notes: 

(1) According to a note sent from Rome by the German Ambassador to the Quirinal, the general opinion in Rome was that Hitler and Ribbentrop thought they could conquer Poland with out firing a shot.  DGFP, Series 3, Volume 7, n438.  Further, in his final order for the invasion of Poland Hitler ordered that Germany would not make any attack on the west – any action must come from France or Britain.  He emphasised this further stating “on land, the German western frontier is not to be crossed at any point without my express permission”. Ibid, n493.

(2) DGFP, ibid, n500.

(3) Mussolini made an offer to send 80,000 Italian troops and a “considerable number of workers” immediately. DGFP, ibid., n507.  At the same time the Duce’s ministers were working to try and reach a compromise that would avoid a continental war. DGFP, ibid, n535. Compare this with Hitler’s letter to Mussolini of 03.09.1939.  DDI, Series 9, Volume 13, n639.

(4) DGFP, ibid, n565.

(5) Mussolini was only officially informed of Germany’s invasion in a telegram sent by Hitler at 12.45hrs some seven hours after the invasion began. DGFP, ibid., n504.

ADSS 1.178 Borgongini Duca to Maglione: situation in Italy

ADSS 1.78 Francesco Borgongini Duca, Italy, to Luigi Maglione, Sec State

Reference: Report number 7147/39, (AES 6032/39)

Location and date: Rome, 01.09.1939

Summary statement: Reports meetings with Guido Buffarini – Italy will not enter the war; US Ambassador – Italy will remain neutral and eventually join the Allies; and For Min Galeazzo Ciano and Mussolini are working for peace.

Language: Italian

Text:

1.  Last Tuesday, 29 August, I had an audience with His Excellency Buffarini (1), as I said I had the honour to relate in my other reports. (2) I was able to learn from him that for the moment Italy has no intention whatsoever of entering the war, even if it breaks out, between Germany and Poland.  He agreed with me that war is won by those who keep out of out; he then added these exact words: “This time, before we enter the war, we shall ask for firm guarantees”; these words made me think that they might intend joining the war, at a later date, on the same side as in the first world war.

He added, and I do not know if that was his own thought or whether it emanated from a higher source, that Hitler did not believe in Britain and France’s intervention but that he anticipated that he would defeat Poland in three weeks.

Buffarini extolled the Holy Father saying: “He is exactly the Pope we need”.

He also expressed his satisfaction with the recent measures regarding Catholic Action, a solution which corresponded in every way with his personal thoughts, because the Bishops are completely trusted by the State.

2. I could only see Ambassador Philips of the United States at 15.00hrs yesterday as he was out to luncheon. (3) I gave him Your Eminence’s note according to your orders just received from you. (4) The Ambassador thanked me for the interest taken by the Holy See in approaching him and promised me he would immediately send a telegram to Washington.  He then added the following details which I relate, although I am sure that Your Eminence has been acquainted with them by various other sources.

He told me that the previous evening, 30 August, Ciano (5) told him that all was finished. “The poor chap” continued Phillips, “was depressed”; Hitler’s ultimatum to Poland was expiring in fact that very evening; that is, the order was to send a plenipotentiary to Berlin before the evening of the 30^th.  To this ultimatum Poland had in the meantime replied with a general mobilisation.  During the conversation, Ciano phoned to Attolico (6) to ask if this plenipotentiary had arrived or not, and Attolico replied “Up to now nobody has arrived”, to which Ciano said by way of a conclusion: “There is nothing else to do”. Ambassador Phillips was saying to me that he had been agitated the entire night and the next morning he tried anxiously to find out if war had broken out; and when informed that hostilities had not started, he saw a new ray of hope, which was growing in his heart from hour to hour, “because one can see Hitler is beginning to hesitate”.

I asked him if, in his opinion, Italy would enter the war.  He replied, with certainty, in the negative and that Italy would lose no time in declaring her neutrality.  He told me also in confidence that, later on, Italy would join Britain and France.  This decision would come about as a consequence of a future ultimatum by Britain and France to Italy.  I begged to point out that this would not be a good way to reach this end, because persuasion and not violence should be used.  He relied: “I expressed myself badly in saying ‘ultimatum’, I could not find the right word”.  According to him, however, Italy will not fight for Germany.

In the end I asked him who would be in charge of the Palazzo Farnese in case of war with France, and he said: “The United States”; and that he knew this, having had the information from Ambassador Poncet (7), although the United States had not yet sent him direct instructions.

A last work. He told me confidentially that up to noon Poncet was still a pessimist.

3. Yesterday evening at 18.00hrs, I was a last received by Ciano, whom I found very depressed and tired.  He had been at the Ministry that morning since 07.00hrs and had not even gone out for lunch. (8) “I have eaten a plate of spaghetti on this table”, he said.  I enquired about the ultimatum to Poland and how it was that Hitler had not yet started hostilities.  He replied that he as well as Mussolini were fighting as lions to precent the conflict and in the morning (Thursday 31.08.1939) Italy had exerted a strong influence on Germany. (9)

I spoke to him about the last earnest appeal of the Holy Father made that very day.  He knew about it having already having spoken with Count Pignatti (10) and he told me: “Italy, of course, supports these interventions with all her power”, and he begged me to tell His Holiness that “since Salzburg [Ciano] does nothing but fight for peace”.

He explained to me also that the various measures taken in Italy did not mean a willingness to go to war and he stated that they had been taken to show that something was being done.

I asked him for how long we should remain in the tremendous suspense.  He replied: “Between today and tomorrow.”

On my way out I said: “Whatever happens I hope that Italy will not make a move”.  The Minister replied with a smile, “That is another matter; before making a move Italy will think about it very carefully, calmly and with great attention”, and he continued to smile.

Notes: 

(1) Guido Buffarini (1895-1945), Undersecretary of the Interior Ministry 1940-43.

(2) Not published in ADSS.

(3) William Phillips (1878-1968), United States Ambassador to Italy 1936-41.

(4) ADSS 1.160. Borgongini Duca had been instructed to give Phillips a copy of the Pope’s appeal.  Phillips sent it to President Roosevelt.

(5) Galeazzo Ciano (1903-1944), Italian Foreign Minister 1936-43.

(6) Bernardo Attolico (1880-1942), Italian Ambassador to Germany 1935-39.

(7) Andre Francois-Poncet (1887-1978), French Ambassador to Italy 1938-40.

(8) According to his Diary (Diario I, pp 154-55) Ciano spent the day of 31.08.1939 in fear of war breaking out between Italy and the Western Powers.

(9) This most likely refers to the communication made by the Italian Ambassador in Berlin, saying that Mussolini had got into contact with London to say that nothing could save the peace except an offer of Danzig to Germany.  Mussolini then pressed Hitler to leave time for a meeting of the interested powers.

(10) Bonifacio Pignatti (1877-1957), Italian Ambassador to the Holy See 1935-39.

ADSS 1.127 Tardini notes: telegram for Poland under draft

ADSS 1.127 Domenico Tardini, notes.

Reference: AES 6817/39

Location and date: Vatican, 26.08.1939

Summary statement: Telegram to Poland being drafted. Mussolini is trying to stop Hitler moving to war.

Language: Italian

Text:

09.00. The Holy Father gave me the text of the despatch to be sent in code to Warsaw. (“if Poland made some concession regarding Danzig, a way to east the tension could be opened …”) (1)

11.30.  The Italian Ambassador calls. (2) He tells me that the Foreign Minister (3) is doing his utmost to induce Mussolini to make Hitler understand the difficulty of following him in a war.  The Ambassador mentions a telegram prepared yesterday by Ciano, which at first Mussolini did not want to sign.  Then – the Ambassador infers from the improved news appearing in the newspapers – he signed it.  Attolico (4) then, would take up from there.  The Ambassador admits that the present difficulties to unhitch oneself now, because for one thing Italy would remain isolated and in a difficult position.  He insists that one must work on Poland (5).  I assured him that the Holy See is doing everything possible.

Notes: 

(1) ADSS 1.128.

(2) Bonifacio Pignatti (1877-1957), Italian Ambassador to the Holy See 1935-39.

(3) Galeazzo Ciano (1903-1944), Italian Foreign Minister 1936-43.

(4) Bernardo Attolico (1880-1942), Italian Ambassador to Germany 1935-39. Later Italian Ambassador to the Holy See 1940-42.

(5) See DDI, Series 8, Volume 13.  The day before Attolico had urged Ciano to pressure Mussolini to intervene with Hitler.  “Situation is … very grave … Only a direct personal action by the Duce on the Fuhrer can bring results.” N236, p 157.  Attolico had already telegraphed that, if Poland did not give in, war was inevitable. DDI, series 8, Volume 13, n214, p 139.