ADSS 1.252 Orsenigo to Maglione: Sumner-Welles in Berlin

ADSS 1.252 Cesare Orsenigo, Germany, to Luigi Maglione, Sec State

Reference: Report number 344, (31.309), (AES 2167/40)

Location and date: Berlin, 04.03.1940

Summary statement: Under-Secretary of State, Sumner Welles visit to Berlin.  He met several ambassadors including the Italian.  Diplomats believe that both sides underestimate each other’s strengths and must negotiate a settlement after two years at the most in order to avoid a mass slaughter.

Language: Italian

Text:

I take the liberty of adding to what was published in the newspapers about Mr Welles’s talks in Berlin, some information less known and certainly not for the public. (1)

Mr Welles, although he had notified the American Charge d’Affaires in Berlin, Mr Alexander Kirk (2), that he was coming as a private citizen, he nevertheless saw a few diplomats with whom he was personally acquainted, such as the Ambassadors of Brazil and Argentina (3), and also called on Ambassador Attolico, who unfortunately had to receive him while in bed owing to painful heart condition: his last visit lasted for more that on hour: on the last day, Sunday, Mr Welles also met the Belgian Ambassador, Viscount Davignon, and Mr Schacht.

As to the German Government, Mr Welles first of all had talks with the Minister for Foreign Affairs (7), the Secretary of State, Dr Weizsacker, Hitler, Hess, and on Sunday from 12 to 3pm with Goring.  He also had a meeting with the Dutch Minister, but I do not think that they spoke about politics. (8)

The main themes discussed by the diplomats was: “Germany makes a mistake in underestimating the Allies but in turn the Allies make an even bigger mistake underestimating German military strength, the cohesion of the people and of the army around the Fuhrer, and in hoping to overthrow them easily and to starve them.”  They begged Mr Welles to open the eyes of the Allies so that they would not blindly go into war which will result in a terrifying slaughter and a useless destruction as it will be difficult to reach a final victory: everybody will emerge very shaken or, maybe after two years of fighting peace negotiations will be started on more or less present conditions but with two or three million men killed.  The diplomats in Berlin think that, if the Allies do not completely shut all doors, Mr Roosevelt will certainly try and approach for an understanding, when he has collected all the information brought back by Mr Welles at the end of March: some, however, think that this will be too late!  It is also said that Signor Mussolini has already offered his collaboration to Mr Roosevelt for such an initiative. 

As to the various talks which Mr Welles had with members of the German Government, it seems that he was most pleased with the on he had with the Fuhrer, and least impressed with the one with M Ribbentrop who took a boastful and menacing attitude.  It seems that the gist of Mr Welles’s general impression was summed up in his sentence: “These men carry in their heart a wish for peace, but they have not the courage to speak about it lest they are judged weak or afraid.”

The diplomats who gave me the above information asked me to pass the information on to the Holy See, pointing out the gravity of the moment, that is, the serious and imminent danger of a colossal war of uncertain result,  They hope for the collaboration of the Holy See, and they noted in this respect the less controversial and more conciliatory language adopted recently by the Catholic newspapers in Holland Belgium.

The moment seems to me also very serious and I want to lighten my responsibility, and to inform you exactly about everything, although I suppose I may not be adding anything new to what you already know.

Notes: 

(1) Benjamin Sumner Welles (1892-1962), United States Under-Secretary of State 1937-43.  FDR asked Welles to visit Italy, Germany and the UK on a fact finding mission.  Historians are divided as to the true nature of the mission, but it seems reasonable to judge that FDR wanted first hand information on the state of the Axis, the likelihood of Italy entering the war, German intentions in general, and the situation in Britain that he was keen to support with a measure of discretion.  Hitler feared Welles’ mission was an attempt to keep Italy neutral and Ribbentrop’s sudden visit to Rome on 10.03.1940 appeared to be in response to the Fuhrer’s fears.  Ribbentrop also visited Pius XII during the same trip, on 11.03.1940. See ADSS 1.257.  Welles returned to Rome and met with the pope too.  See ADSS 1.268.

See too http://bobrowen.com/nymas/Robert%20Miller%20-%20Sumner%20Welles.html (Accessed 21.08.2016)

(2) Alexander Kirk (1888-1979), United States Charge d’Affaires in Germany 1940.

(3) Cyro de Freitas Valle (1896-1969), Brazilian Ambassador to Germany 1939-42); Ricardo Olivera (1886-1949), Argentinian Ambassador to Germany 1939-43.

(4) Bernardo Attolico (1880-1942), Italian Ambassador to Germany 1935-39.  Attolico was about to leave Berlin to take up his new position as Italian Ambassador to the Holy See.

(5) Jacques Henri Davignon (1887-1965), Belgian Ambassador to Germany 1935-40.

(6) Hjalmar Schacht (1877-1970), President of the Reichsbank 1933-39, Minister of Economics 1934-37, minister without portfolio 1939-43.

(7) Joachim Ribbentrop (1893-1946), German Minister for Foreign Affairs 1938-45.

(8) Not identified.

ADSS 1.149 Orsenigo to Maglione: Hitler's reply to the UK; war imminent

ADSS 1.149 Cesare Orsenigo, Germany, to Luigi Maglione, Sec State

Reference: Telegram number 338 (AES 5871/39)

Location and date: Berlin, 29.08.1939

Summary statement: Hitler’s reply to UK proposals makes crisis worse; imminent danger of war; people nervous in Berlin.

Language: Italian

Text:

Today’s reply by Hitler to British proposals (1) is discordant in many points, so much so that acute crises are foreseen during the next negotiations with a grave danger of war.

Berlin population, which already experiences war restrictions, lack (?) food, begins to express, at least privately, disapproval … blaming delay on military actions, judging this as weakening the morale (?) of the army and strengthening the Allies, who think that the delay is due to perplexity on the Germany side, notwithstanding their declaration of superiority.

The Party too, probably is not politically and totally in agreement with the war plans.

German Foreign Secretary today told me spontaneously that the Government have appreciated the message of the Holy Father that … [words missing] to communicate this to the Holy See, almost excusing himself for not having done it before directly. (2)

I understand that the Dutch and Belgian foreign ministers called the Ambassadors of the powers directly interested in the German-Polish crisis to a meeting yesterday at their ministries. (3)  They informed them that their respective sovereigns were ready to offer their good offices towards a pacific solution if they were requested to do so, but they would not take the initiative themselves.  The news is confidential.

Notes: 

(1) The telegram only bears the date of receipt; it was most likely sent on 29.08.1939 and “today’s reply” must be the document Fuhrer and Chancellor to the British Government, DGFP, Series D, Volume 7, n421, pp 413-15.  It was handed to the British ambassador, Neville Henderson at 19.15hrs.  Therefore the telegram must have been sent some time afterwards, possibly the next day.

(2) Ernst von Weizsäcker (1882-1951), Secretary of State, German Foreign Office 1938-43, left a note referring to an interview on this date with the Nuncio who came to ask for a secret understanding regarding the conscription of priests.  He says nothing, however, of the Pope’s peace appeal. DGFP, Series D, Volume 7, n432, p 426.

(3) Eelco van Kleffens (1894-1983), Dutch Foreign Minister 1939-40 (-1946) Paul-Henri Spaak (1899-1972), Belgian Foreign Minister 1939-40 (-1949).

ADSS 1.84: Valeri to Maglione: views on current tensions from France

ADSS 1.84 Valerio Valeri, France to Luigi Maglione, Sec State.

Reference: Report 8616/216 (AES 4412/39)

Location and date: Paris, 04.07.1939

Summary statement: French public opinion has understood the Pope’s approach for peace.  Nuncio has spoken to For Off about articles in the French press critical of the Pope; expresses opinion that France and UK are not recommending moderation to Poland.  Military preparations continue in France.  France and UK had informed Germany of their intention to defend Poland.

Language: Italian

Text:

Obeying the wish expressed by your Eminence with despatch number 4036/39 of 29 June 1939 (1) to keep you informed about changes in public opinion regarding the Holy See’s action, I am pleased to tell you that lately there have been no attacks or unfavourable comments against it.  Only on the occasion of the death of Minister Ciano’s father I noted that some leftish newspapers and even La Croix have reported a telegram in which it was said the first the Holy Father then your Eminence and lastly even the Apostolic Nuncio had expressed their sympathy.  The mention of the names and their sequence was not a mere coincidence.

In any case I think that the unrest created in the political circles and in some social sectors is quietening down completely.  From my side I have continued my work of necessary clarification.  So, not later than yesterday evening I was pointing out to M. Charveriat, Political Director at the Foreign Office, how unseemly and without foundation certain comments published in some newspapers were regarding the well-known steps taken by the Holy See.  I mentioned as well the articles of the Mercure de France on the conclave and on the Holy Father Pius XII (2).  The Minister told me he had read a summary of them without understanding who could have written or fostered them or what was their aim.  I told him then that we “unfortunately” knew their source; but, as it was obvious, although he wanted to know, I claimed it was a secret I was not entitled to divulge.  I hope, however, he more or less understood whom I meant from the way I expressed myself.  In any case, I think I must write agin on this point to give more details.

I have had occasion, too, to point out to Minister Champetier de Ribes with whom I travelled last Sunday to Sens, the incongruities and contradictions of M. Pezet’s speech at the Popular Democratic Party Congress (3).

Passing on to the international situation it is necessary that I tell your Eminence that seen from here it is still very grave and that the danger of an armed conflict is becoming more probable on account of the tension regarding the Danzig issue.  On this subject, in my conversations at the Quai d’Orsay, I have had the clear confirmation that neither France nor Great Britain intend to exert any action upon Poland to induce them to use moderation and to agree to negotiate with Germany.  It has been declared that the two great Western Powers are, therefore, ready to march alongside Poland when the latter, defending her threatened rights, decides to take arms against Germany.  France and England have, therefore, placed the determining of the casus belli in the hands of Poland.

The Government in the meantime continues to organise with increasing speed the military and material preparation of the nation.   Plans for the evacuation of frontier zones and of city centres are ready, especially those for Paris; M. Lozé, Head of Protocol at the Quai d’Orsay (4), told me yesterday, in confidence, that the Office of the President of the Republic, the Ministries, Parliament and the Central Administration of the State are to be transferred, from the first days of the declaration of war, to the region of Tours (about 160 kms from Paris).  M. Lozé showed me the plans which the Ministry was completing regarding accommodation and arrangements for the Diplomatic Corps accredited to the President of the Republic, and also mentioned to me in which castle (about 5 kms from Tours) the Ministry intended to accommodate the Nunciature.

As well as military preparations, attention is paid to the nation’s moral preparation, and the people now show that they are ready for the trial.  To this state of mind the Government’s attitude of not leaving any stone unturned to repeat that the situation is grave has been especially noticeable and everybody has been told to be ready for the greatest of sacrifices.

Certainly the moment could not be more delicate.  It is to be hoped, however, that the prayers of the good people, the action of the Holy See and the endeavours for peace of all well-meaning people could even at this stage avert the danger of a general conflagration.

PS:  Yesterday evening the Italian Ambassador (5), who came ot see me about a flattering speech on the Italian army given by a priest of the Archdiocese of Toulouse, told me that M. Bonnet (6) had notified the German Ambassador here, not only orally but also in writing, regarding the irrevocable decision of France an Great Britain to go to the help of Poland when this nation thought it was necessary. Notwithstanding all this, the German Ambassador himself, Count von Welczeck (7), thinks that in some circles near to Hitler many people still have illusions on the eventual attitude of the two Powers.

In this way Germany would repeat, and in a greater measure, the error of judgement about the British attitude as in 1914.

In any tragic situation there is also the comic or the almost comic element.  I was informed that recently there had been underhand dealings to sell to France the 1,400 aeroplanes taken from Czechoslovakia by Germany (8).  This, while it demonstrates the irresistible power of business, shows also the extreme necessity of Germany to get hold of foreign currency.

Notes: 

(1) Not published in ADSS.

(2) ADSS 1.68 n2. Emile Charveriat (1889-1964) Political Director, French Foreign Office 1937-40.

(3) ibid. Auguste Champetier de Ribes (1882-1947), Christian Democrat Deputy and Senator 1924-40.

(4) Maurice Lozé (??), Assistant Chief of Protocol of the French Foreign Office 1937-41.

(5) Raffaele Guariglia (1889-1970), Italian Ambassador to France 1937-40.

(6) Georges Bonnet (1889-1957), French Foreign Minister 1938-39.

(7) Johannes von Welczeck (1878-1972), German Ambassador to France 1936-39, DGFP, Series D, Volume 6, n602.  Note of the French Government, and ibid nn 603, 692-94.

(8) See DDI, Series 8, Volume 12, nn312, 361.  Ernst Weizsäcker denied any sale to France to Bernardo Attolico (1880-1942) Italian Ambassador to Germany 1935-39.

ADSS 1.79; 1.80 Maglione to Cortesi and Orsenigo: calming tensions

ADSS 1.79 Luigi Maglione, Sec State, to Filippo Cortesi, Poland.

Reference: Telegram 36 (AES 4182/39)

Location and date: Vatican, 01.07.1939

Summary statement: Dispatch of ADSS 1.78.

Language: Italian

Text:

Telegram as per ADSS 1.78.

ADSS 1.80 Luigi Maglione, Sec State, to Cesare Orsenigo, Germany.

Reference: AES 4119/39

Location and date: Vatican, 01.07.1939

Summary statement: Advises Orsenigo of advice of prudence sent to Warsaw and Hlond.  Hope that the German gov’t will do likewise.

Language: Italian

Text:

Having noted that Baron von Weizsäcker mentioned to you “the moderating influence that could be exerted on the Polish population by the Catholic clergy” (1) I think it right to inform you that the Holy See has repeatedly taken action in this sense.  Even recently, namely on 16 June 1939 (2), by august order of His Holiness, I instructed his Excellency, Monsignor Cortesi, Apostolic Nuncio in Warsaw, to renew the recommendations already made to the Polish Government.  On the 22 June the Nuncio communicated to me the reply given by his Excellency, the Minister for Foreign Affairs (3), who told him that “Poland will maintain the prudent and moderate attitude observed so far notwithstanding the numerous incidents intentionally provoked by the other side.”

In addition, the August Pontiff, wishing not to miss an opportunity to do something on behalf of peace, has instructed me immediately to invite the Apostolic Nuncio in Warsaw to beg Cardinal Hlond to do his utmost that the Polish clergy should exhort a moderating influence on the faithful. (4)

I need not add that the Holy See is certain that for her part Germany will remain calm and prudent as is required at such a delicate moment.

Notes: 

(1) ADSS 1.71.  Ernst von Weizsäcker (1882-1952), German Secretary of State, Foreign Office 1938-1943. 

(2) ADSS 1.64.  Filippo Cortesi (1876-1947), Nuncio to Poland 1936-47.

(3) ADSS 1.70.  Józef Beck (1894-1944), Polish Foreign Minister 1932-39.

(4) ADSS 1.78.  August Hlond (1881-1948), Primate of Poland and Cardinal Archbishop of Poznan 1926-46.