ADSS 1.199 Valeri to Maglione: French hopes for Italian Neutrality

ADSS 1.199 Valerio Valeri, France, to Luigi Maglione, Sec State.

Reference: Report number 9100/298, (AES 6563/39)

Location and date: Paris, 13.09.1939

Summary statement: Meeting with French Foreign Minister, George Bonnet (1889-1973).  Italian neutrality appears secure.

Language: Italian

Text:

The day before yesterday, 11 September, I asked for an audience with Minister Bonnet (1) to talk to him about various difficulties that members of this Diplomatic Corps were experiencing on account of the recent security measures, when they were away from Paris.  Many of them, in fact, go to and fro having found accommodation outside Paris.

I took advantage of this meeting to talk to him about other things.  This I reminded the Prime Minister to see that steps were taken to protect the members of religious orders at least.  M. Bonnet promised he would deal with this immediately.  I also spoke to him about those missionaries in the republic of Haiti, on whose behalf you have given me instructions, and who are in danger of being called up.  On this point too the Government will try to satisfy the wishes of the Holy See.

We went on to talk about the international situation and especially about Italy.  M. Bonnet has seen M. Poncet (2) before me and told me that the news received form him was good.  He told me that Minister Ciano had called him by telephone on 31 August to inform him about the attempt made in extremis by Mussolini (3) to call a Conference, and on that occasion he had noticed the cordial tone of the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The French Government, it seems, already realise on an assured Italian neutrality, on this subject M. Bonnet suggested I should pay no attention to what people here, who do not know the facts, are saying, namely that it would be better if Italy entered the war. (4)  “The French and British Governments are of a completely different opinion” he affirmed.  He also said that the French Government was always ready to lend a friendly ear to the requests or wishes of Italy.

For my part, I assured him that the Holy See had done and would keep on doing everything in its power to limit the conflict, as, unfortunately, it had been impossible to prevent it and that the Holy Father considered it very important that good relations exist between France and Italy.  Then, as I pointed out the possible difficulties that might have to be overcome on account of the military pact between Germany and Italy, M. Bonnet replied he did not believe that there would be any difficulties in this respect, as, from information received from well informed sources during the Salzburg talks, M. Mussolini had sustained the view that a war need not be started for three years and that, in any case, Italy would have to agree to this. (5)

I have in fact received from other sources rumours that confirm the optimistic outlook of M. Bonnet.  Nor should we forget that Italy’s intervention, which would also affect Germany’s interests, would immediately be followed by Turkey’s entry into the war, as the Turkish Ambassador gave me to understand.  Hungary also wishes to remain neutral and her Minister here would like this to be known.

Before taking me leave, I asked M. Bonnet – who in the meantime was telling me that Marshal Petain had brought very good news from Spain and that France, Spain and Italy, if united could in the future carry out a great mission – if every hope had to be abandoned of stopping the conflict already in progress.  The reply did not leave me any illusions.

Notes: 

(1) George Bonnet (1889-1973), French Foreign Minister 1938-39.

(2) Andre Francois Poncet (1887-1978), French Ambassador to Italy 1938-40.

(3) According to Ciano Diario I, pp154-57, and of reports contained in DDI, Series 8, Volume 13, pp 407, 412, it appears Lord Halifax was the person to whom Ciano communicated the plan for a conference and the official information was given by the French and British Ambassadors.  On 2 September Ciano had a telephone conversation with Bonnet, this time to launch Mussolini’s plan afresh.

(4) See DGFP, Series D, Volume 7, n438.

(5) Ibid.

ADSS 1.178 Borgongini Duca to Maglione: situation in Italy

ADSS 1.78 Francesco Borgongini Duca, Italy, to Luigi Maglione, Sec State

Reference: Report number 7147/39, (AES 6032/39)

Location and date: Rome, 01.09.1939

Summary statement: Reports meetings with Guido Buffarini – Italy will not enter the war; US Ambassador – Italy will remain neutral and eventually join the Allies; and For Min Galeazzo Ciano and Mussolini are working for peace.

Language: Italian

Text:

1.  Last Tuesday, 29 August, I had an audience with His Excellency Buffarini (1), as I said I had the honour to relate in my other reports. (2) I was able to learn from him that for the moment Italy has no intention whatsoever of entering the war, even if it breaks out, between Germany and Poland.  He agreed with me that war is won by those who keep out of out; he then added these exact words: “This time, before we enter the war, we shall ask for firm guarantees”; these words made me think that they might intend joining the war, at a later date, on the same side as in the first world war.

He added, and I do not know if that was his own thought or whether it emanated from a higher source, that Hitler did not believe in Britain and France’s intervention but that he anticipated that he would defeat Poland in three weeks.

Buffarini extolled the Holy Father saying: “He is exactly the Pope we need”.

He also expressed his satisfaction with the recent measures regarding Catholic Action, a solution which corresponded in every way with his personal thoughts, because the Bishops are completely trusted by the State.

2. I could only see Ambassador Philips of the United States at 15.00hrs yesterday as he was out to luncheon. (3) I gave him Your Eminence’s note according to your orders just received from you. (4) The Ambassador thanked me for the interest taken by the Holy See in approaching him and promised me he would immediately send a telegram to Washington.  He then added the following details which I relate, although I am sure that Your Eminence has been acquainted with them by various other sources.

He told me that the previous evening, 30 August, Ciano (5) told him that all was finished. “The poor chap” continued Phillips, “was depressed”; Hitler’s ultimatum to Poland was expiring in fact that very evening; that is, the order was to send a plenipotentiary to Berlin before the evening of the 30^th.  To this ultimatum Poland had in the meantime replied with a general mobilisation.  During the conversation, Ciano phoned to Attolico (6) to ask if this plenipotentiary had arrived or not, and Attolico replied “Up to now nobody has arrived”, to which Ciano said by way of a conclusion: “There is nothing else to do”. Ambassador Phillips was saying to me that he had been agitated the entire night and the next morning he tried anxiously to find out if war had broken out; and when informed that hostilities had not started, he saw a new ray of hope, which was growing in his heart from hour to hour, “because one can see Hitler is beginning to hesitate”.

I asked him if, in his opinion, Italy would enter the war.  He replied, with certainty, in the negative and that Italy would lose no time in declaring her neutrality.  He told me also in confidence that, later on, Italy would join Britain and France.  This decision would come about as a consequence of a future ultimatum by Britain and France to Italy.  I begged to point out that this would not be a good way to reach this end, because persuasion and not violence should be used.  He relied: “I expressed myself badly in saying ‘ultimatum’, I could not find the right word”.  According to him, however, Italy will not fight for Germany.

In the end I asked him who would be in charge of the Palazzo Farnese in case of war with France, and he said: “The United States”; and that he knew this, having had the information from Ambassador Poncet (7), although the United States had not yet sent him direct instructions.

A last work. He told me confidentially that up to noon Poncet was still a pessimist.

3. Yesterday evening at 18.00hrs, I was a last received by Ciano, whom I found very depressed and tired.  He had been at the Ministry that morning since 07.00hrs and had not even gone out for lunch. (8) “I have eaten a plate of spaghetti on this table”, he said.  I enquired about the ultimatum to Poland and how it was that Hitler had not yet started hostilities.  He replied that he as well as Mussolini were fighting as lions to precent the conflict and in the morning (Thursday 31.08.1939) Italy had exerted a strong influence on Germany. (9)

I spoke to him about the last earnest appeal of the Holy Father made that very day.  He knew about it having already having spoken with Count Pignatti (10) and he told me: “Italy, of course, supports these interventions with all her power”, and he begged me to tell His Holiness that “since Salzburg [Ciano] does nothing but fight for peace”.

He explained to me also that the various measures taken in Italy did not mean a willingness to go to war and he stated that they had been taken to show that something was being done.

I asked him for how long we should remain in the tremendous suspense.  He replied: “Between today and tomorrow.”

On my way out I said: “Whatever happens I hope that Italy will not make a move”.  The Minister replied with a smile, “That is another matter; before making a move Italy will think about it very carefully, calmly and with great attention”, and he continued to smile.

Notes: 

(1) Guido Buffarini (1895-1945), Undersecretary of the Interior Ministry 1940-43.

(2) Not published in ADSS.

(3) William Phillips (1878-1968), United States Ambassador to Italy 1936-41.

(4) ADSS 1.160. Borgongini Duca had been instructed to give Phillips a copy of the Pope’s appeal.  Phillips sent it to President Roosevelt.

(5) Galeazzo Ciano (1903-1944), Italian Foreign Minister 1936-43.

(6) Bernardo Attolico (1880-1942), Italian Ambassador to Germany 1935-39.

(7) Andre Francois-Poncet (1887-1978), French Ambassador to Italy 1938-40.

(8) According to his Diary (Diario I, pp 154-55) Ciano spent the day of 31.08.1939 in fear of war breaking out between Italy and the Western Powers.

(9) This most likely refers to the communication made by the Italian Ambassador in Berlin, saying that Mussolini had got into contact with London to say that nothing could save the peace except an offer of Danzig to Germany.  Mussolini then pressed Hitler to leave time for a meeting of the interested powers.

(10) Bonifacio Pignatti (1877-1957), Italian Ambassador to the Holy See 1935-39.

ADSS 1.56 Borgongini Duca to Maglione: fears of war

ADSS 1.56 Francesco Borgongini Duca (1), Italy to Luigi Maglione, Sec State

Reference: Report 6941, (AES 3529/39)

Location and date: Rome, 03.06.1939

Summary statement:  Conversation with the Turkish Ambassador to Italy, fear that war could occur within 3 months

Language: Italian

Text:

During the last week in May I had many contacts with the principal Ambassadors of this Diplomatic Corps, especially with Sir Percy Loraine, British Ambassador, Francois-Poncet, French Ambassador and Huseyin Ragip Baydurm Turkish Ambassador. (2)

During a luncheon at the Turkish Embassy on 31 May the Ambassador, after having assured me that on the next day he would send the file regarding the registration of the Holy See’s properties in Istanbul to Ankara (about which I did not forget to recommend what your Eminence instructed me in the message of 22 May, Number 1608) (3), told me that, in his opinion, the situation was greatly improved, because through the various agreements between the democratic countries, the balance of power had been re-established between the two sides into which Europe was divided.  He, too, believed that the danger of war had been pushed back two or three months.  He also agreed with me that the Polish Corridor, where it is difficult to suggest a solution, which would satisfy both parties, is the greatest stumbling block.

Arab feelings, as expressed to me by the Iraq minister and Legation Secretary, are the following: Italy and Germany are in a state of absolute inferiority as Franco-British and Russian forces are drawing closer together.  I had the impression that Iraq was also leaning towards Great Britain.

More interesting appeared to be some confidential communications made to me by the new British Ambassador on 20 May, when I went to return his first visit.  He spoke at length about the Franco-Turkish Treaty on the Sanjak.) (4) The Ambassador is a specialist on this subject having been High Commissioner in Egypt and the Ambassador to Ankara until his appointment in Rome.)

He told me that he does not understand why Turkey accepted the Sanjak where the majority of the population is Christian and Arab and not Turkish, especially if one bears in mind that the Kemal Pasha’s revolution and the oath given by the Turkish Constituent Assembly had explicitly declared that the New Turkey, contrary to Ottoman Empire policy, wanted to rule only on Turkish territories. (5) But the Ambassador was aware of the great material advantage to Turkey to have the port of Alexandretta, which is the only one on the coast.  It is clear that Ismet is somewhat modifying Kemal Pasha’s policy and returning to the Islamic Ottoman policy with the evident intention of reaching Haleb. (6)

I asked the British Ambassador if the Christian people’s uneasiness for the Turk’s entry into Sanjak was not well founded; the Armenians, who live there in about thirty mountain villages and, as is well know, fought against the Turks in the great War, would be exposed to reprisals as was the case in Cilicia when France ceded it to Turkey who in turn promptly massacred all Armenians living there.

The Ambassador replied that after the separation between State and Caliphate proclaimed by Kemal Pasha the various religions live peacefully on Turkish soil and therefore he thought it very unlikely that the same incident would occur again; to which statement I took the liberty of raising my doubts especially after having heard the confidential report of Monsignor Peter Kedidjian, Vicar General of the Armenian Patriarchate, on the flight of eminent Armenians to Syria following the advance of the Turks in the territory and their first hostile acts against the Armenian clergy. (7)

I had occasion to speak to Francois-Poncet during the dinner given at Palazzo Farnese on 1 June, where the only Italians invited were Baron Aloisi and ex-Ambassador De Martino and their wives. (8)

I wanted to know if certain rumours regarding recent secret contacts between France and Italy were true; the supposition arising from the presence in Paris of Senator Volpi. (9)

He replied that there is no new development or at least not an important one; twice Foreign Minister Ciano, who had been courteous to him, had recently received him but it cannot be said that real and proper negotiations have taken place.  He added that the Italian Authorities show a stiff attitude towards him contrary to the practice of the German Authorities in Berlin. (10)

He also affirmed that the general situation has really improved and one can expect that there will not be any shocks until the end of the harvest.  Mussolini’s speech in Turin was a moderate one, but the words pronounced shortly after in front of the students of Turin could be defined as alarming. (11)

The new Brazilian Ambassador, Senor Pietro Leao Velloso, told me – during his first official call on me yesterday – that he had been received by Mussolini, who told him that he wants to supply the Italian people with coffee and wishes that the negotiations now taking place in Rio de Janeiro between the Italian Ambassador and the Brazilian Government should be concluded as quickly as possible, and as satisfactorily as the trade agreement with Argentina had been concluded. (12) Italy proposes to exchange Brazilian coffee with Italian manufactured goods.  The ambassador, although favourably inclined towards Italy, points out that Brazil too, is a poor country and needs gold and foreign currency more than manufactured goods, in order to meet its commitments with other nations; however, a solution will be found.

The Ambassador, proceeding to describe the international satiation, then said: “Gold production in the world is 1,200 millions; the among of gold which entered the United States during last year was – if I understood correctly – 1,800 millions, that is 35% more than the total production.”  Which proves that there are countries dying of starvation and countries dying of indigestion and, according to his opinion, the abnormal gold circulation can be compared with the abnormal blood circulation in the individual; hypertension is also deadly.

I send these items of news to your Eminence in the form in which they were collected by me, leaving the responsibility to their authors, and your Eminence will give them the value they deserve.

Notes:

(1) Francesco Borgongini Duca (1884-1954), Nuncio to Italy 1929-53.

(1) Percy Lorraine (1880-1961), British Ambassador to Italy 1939-40; Andre Francois-Poncet (1887-1978), French Ambassador to Italy 1938-40; Huseyin Ragip Baydur (1890-1955) Turkish Ambassador to Italy 1934-43.

(2) Not published in ADSS.

(3) The Franco-Turkish Treaty or the Franco-Turkish Agreement of Ankara of 20.10.1921 ended the short war between French imperial troops in Syria and Turkish forces engaged in the war of independence that marked the end of the Ottoman Empire.  Under provisions made in the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 France was to be given control of Ottoman Syria and southern Anatolia.  France also agreed to support the Armenians against the Turks.  French troops along with Colonial soldiers and a French Armenian Legion fought in different parts of Turkey from May 1920 to October 1921.  Surprised at the strength of Turkish resistance, France eventually withdrew from areas claimed by the Turks, especially the region of Cilicia with its ancient Armenian Christian community.  Turkey agreed to respect the French occupation of Syria and France agreed to respect Turkish sovereignty.  The Alexandretta Sanjak, with its large Christian minority, was incorporated into the French Mandate but in 1936 a growing pro-Turkish group alongside a Syrian independence movement led to a league of Nations intervention granting the Sanjak autonomy within the Mandate but with links to both France and Turkey on matters of defence.  The Turkish government encouraged the migration of thousands of Turks into the Sanjak prior to the election of July 1938, effectively creating a Turkish majority.  On 02.09.1938 the newly elected assembly proclaimed the Sanjak as Hatay State and sought incorporation with Turkey. Hatay became a province of Turkey on 29.06.1939.  Thousands of Arabs and Armenians, fled to Syria.

(4) Kemal Attaturk (1881-1938), founder of the Republic of Turkey.  Attaturk argued, using the pseudo-scientific Sun Language Theory, popular in the 1930s, that Hatay had been a Turkish homeland for over 4,000 years.

(5) Mustafa İsmet İnönü (1884-1973), second President of Turkey, 1938-1950.  Much of the Province of Haleb, or Halep (Aleppo) was annexed to Turkey after the First World War and during the Turkish War of Independence.

(6)

(7) Pompeo Aloisi (1875-1949) former Italian Foreign Minister 1932-36; Giacomo De Martino (1868-1957), former Italian ambassador to Germany, Britain, Japan and the USA between 1919-32.

(8) Giuseppe Volpi (1877-1947), president of Confindustria (Fascist Confederation of Italian Industry) 1934-43.

(9) Francois-Poncet mentions this in him memoirs Souvenirs d’une Ambassade a Berlin, p 340.

(10) 10.05.1939.

(11) Pedro Leao Veloso (1887-1947), Brazilian Ambassador to Italy 1939-44.

ADSS 1.53 Maglione notes: Mussolini a moderating influence on Hitler

ADSS 1.53 Luigi Maglione, Sec State, Notes.

Reference: AES 2992/39

Location and date: Vatican, 29.05.1939

Summary statement: Mussolini could be a moderating influence on Hitler. Maglione has urged the French ambassador to find an amicable settlement over French-Italian differences. (1)

Language: Italian

Text:

For the sake of peace it would be very helpful if the Head of the Italian Government, Mussolini, would use his great influence with Chancellor Hitler and the German Government to ensure that the Danzig question is dealt with calmly, especially on account of the very delicate international situation.

The Cardinal Secretary of State of His Holiness has, by order of the Holy Father, repeatedly recommended to the French Ambassador to the Holy See (2), to beg his Government to do everything possible to settle the outstanding issues between Italy and France by proper negotiations in a friendly way. (3)

Notes: 

(1) On top of this note Domenico Tardini wrote: “30.05.1939.  Today Fr Tacchi Venturi SJ was received by the Holy Father.  This note was given to him by the Holy Father to be delivered to Mussolini.”  See ADSS 1.58n1.  Tacchi Venturi makes mention of the audience with Pius XII on 30.05.1939.

(2) Andre Francois-Poncet (1887-1978), French Ambassador to the Holy See 1938-40.

(3) See ADSS 1.50.  Other communications must have taken place but no records have been found in ASV.