ADSS 1.249 Maglione: notes on Italy and France

ADSS 1.249 Luigi Maglione, Sec State, notes

Reference: AES St Ecc 611, hand written

Location and date: Vatican, 28.02.1940

Summary statement: An improved relation between Italy and France; but naval contract between Italy and UK is cancelled.

Language: Italian

Text:

From a reliable source:

Relations between Italy and France have become more friendly (1): the contract for the sale of 400 Caproni (bombers supplied as training places) has been completed during these last few days and the same has happened regarding the supply of 600,000 camp blankets.

Both contracts have been suspended.

The negotiations with Great Britain for building in Italy 36 cargo ships have been broken.  The British Government should have supplied the materials.

London was also offering contracts for supplies worth a billion; even the discussions regarding these offers have been broken off.

M. Bastianini (2), who is opposed to war, came out beaming, from a conversation with the Duce (yesterday or the day before).

Count Ciano is more optimistic than ever.

Notes: 

(1) At the same time, in a report dated 24.02.1940, Raffaele Guariglia (1889-1970) Italian Ambassador to France (and later to Vichy) (1937-42), sent a long message in which he was re-examining the whole question of Franco-Italian relations.  He concluded by pointing to the opportunity for Italy to arrive at an agreement with France.  Such an arrangement, in his opinion, could not be badly interpreted by Germany and would be useful to Italy, no matter what the issue of the war. See DDI, Series 9, Volume 3, n377, pp320-27.

(2) Giuseppe Bastianini (1899-1961), Italian Ambassador to UK 1939-40.

ADSS 1.218 Sec State to British Legation: summary of August 1939

ADSS 1.218 Secretariat of State to the British Legation

Reference: AES 8223/39

Location and date: Vatican, 13.11.1939

Summary statement: Details of steps taken in August 1939 with Warsaw in favour of peace.

Language: Italian

Text:

Draft 1

Minister Beck (1), contrary to what had been suggested to him by Mr Howard Kennard, Ambassador of Great Britain to Warsaw (2), did not let the Holy See know that he was prepared to consider an exchange of populations and also to accept neutral observers in order to demonstrate that German accusations of maltreatments were unfounded; in fact M. Beck did not even accept proposals suggested by the Holy See on this subject:

In fact:

1. On 15 August, His Excellency, the Cardinal Secretary of State requested Monsignor Cortesi, Apostolic Nuncio in Warsaw, to ask the Polish Government if it thought that the Secretariat of State could make some approach and if so what, to precent the situation getting worse. (3) Mons Cortesi, spoke on this subject to the Foreign Under-Secretary (4) who was not able to give a precise answer, although he stated that there was the possibility of a peaceful understanding. (5)

2. On 26 August, His Eminence the Cardinal Secretary of State, having heard that it could be helpful if Poland, following an invitation from the Holy See, declared itself ready to prevent the alleged maltreatment of citizens of German nationality, if Germany, for its part, would make the same promise regarding the Polish people in German territory, instructed the Apostolic Nuncio in Warsaw to put this suggestion before the Polish Government asking if such a declaration on the part of the Polish Government could be brought to the knowledge of the German Government through the Apostolic Nuncio in Berlin. (6)

M. Beck, replying to the communication of Mons Cortesi, expressed fear that the Germans would take advantage of the above-mentioned Polish declaration as a confirmation of the alleged persecutions of the German minority, and suggested, as a better solution, the idea of an invitation of the Holy See to the Polish and German Governments to check the excitement created in their respective countries regarding the situation of the minorities (27 August). (7)

3. On 31 August the Cardinal Secretary of State instructed the Apostolic Nuncio in Warsaw to give the Polish Government the opportunity to accept an international control on the alleged persecution of the German minority. (8)

Owing to the outbreak of hostilities the proposal had no sequel.

Draft II

Concern of the Holy See to avoid the question of the minorities being used as a pretext for war between Germany and Poland.

1. On 14 August 1939, the Holy See received news that Germany was massing troops at the Polish border and that the situation was getting worse. (9) The Cardinal Secretary of State immediately instructed the apostolic Nuncio in Warsaw to ask the Polish Government if it thought that the Secretary of State could take some initiative and, eventually, to suggest one (15 August). (10)

Mons Cortesi conferred on the subject with the Foreign Under-Secretary, but the latter was not able to give a precise answer, although he affirmed that there was a possibility of a peaceful understanding (18 August). (11)

2. On 26 August the Cardinal Secretary of State received a communication from a reliable source that war was approaching and that it was opportune to make a new attempt for averting it: perhaps it might help if Poland, accepting suggestion of the Holy See, declared itself ready to prevent the alleged persecutions , and if Germany, for its part, undertook the same commitment regarding the Polish people in German territory. (12) Immediately, on the same day, the Apostolic Nuncio in Warsaw was instructed to submit the matter to the Polish Government asking if such a declaration on the part of the Polish Government could be made know to the German Government through the Apostolic Nuncio. (13)

Mons Cortesi immediately informed Minister Beck about the proposal, but the Minister expressed the fear that the Germans could take advantage of the possible Polish declaration as if it were an admission of the alleged persecutions of the German minority, and suggested, as another solution, the idea of an invitation by the Holy See to the Polish and German Governments to check the excitement created in their respective countries regarding the position of the minorities (27 August). (14)

3. On 28 August the idea was put forward to the Holy See to ask the German and Polish Governments what measure they thought was necessary to guarantee the situation of the minorities. (15)

The Apostolic Nuncio in Berlin was informed immediately about this proposal (29 August) (16), but he replied that he considered that the German Government thought it impossible to guarantee the protection of the minorities unless an international control was set up (30 August). (17)

4. Following this communication the Cardinal Secretary of State instructed the Papal (?) Nuncio in Warsaw to submit for the consideration of the Polish Government, the opportunity of accepting international control over the alleged persecution of the German minority (31 August). (18)

War broke out and the initiative was abandoned.

The conclusion to be drawn form what is said above, is that M. Beck did not accept the suggestion put forward to him by Mr Howard Kennard, Ambassador of Great Britain, on 27 August, that is, to inform the Holy Father that he was prepared to consider an exchange of populations and to accept neutral observers with the aim of demonstrating that the German accusations regarding the persecutions had no foundation in truth. (See Documents concerning German-Polish Relations and the outbreak of hostilities between Great Britain and Germany on 3 September, 1939, p124, number 72) (19)

Notes:  

(1) Jozef Beck (1894-1944), Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs 1932-39.

(2) Howard Kennard (1878-1955), British Ambassador to Poland 1937-39.

(3) ADSS 1.95

(4) Miroslaw Arciszewski (1892-1963), Polish Under-Secretary Foreign Affairs 1938-39.

(5) ADSS 1.102

(6) ADSS 1.133. Cesare Orsenigo (1873-1946), Nuncio to Germany 1930-45.

(7) ADSS 1.136

(8) ADSS 1.161

(9) ADSS 1.94

(10) ADSS 1.95

(11) ADSS 1.102

(12) ADSS 1.123

(13) ADSS 1.133
(14) ADSS 1.135

(15) ADSS 1.141

(16) ADSS 1.146

(17) ADSS 1.150

(18) ADSS 1.168

(19) Published London, HMSO 1939 (http://www.allworldwars.com/The%20British%20War%20Blue%20Book%201939.html).

Sir H. Kennard to Viscount Halifax (received 5:05 p. m.).

(Telegraphic.) Warsaw, August 27, 1939.
Your telegrams of 25th and 26th August.[Nos. 70 and 71.]
I discussed questions of exchange of populations and neutral observers with M. Beck this morning.
2. As regards first, he said that in principle he saw no objection and was prepared to convey to German Government that he was ready to consider such a proposal, possibly not directly to State Secretary, but in such a manner that he was sure it would reach the highest authorities.
3. As regards question of neutral observers, he had again consulted President of the Council, but he would let me know his decision in the course of the day.
4. As he told me that the Pope had during the night, through the Nuncio, asked if there was anything he could do, I suggested to M. Beck that he should inform His Holiness that he was prepared to consider an exchange of populations and also use of neutral observers in order to demonstrate that German accusations of maltreatment were completely without foundation. The Pope could then communicate these proposals to the German Government with approval of Polish Government. M. Beck seemed to consider this favourably and promised he would give it his immediate consideration. I warned him that there was no time to lose.
5. As regards Danzig, M. Beck did not from his latest information anticipate fait accompli there to-day or in very immediate future. For the moment all was quiet there as far as he knew.
6. I again emphasised to his Excellency importance of his giving sufficient warning to His Majesty's Government of any action which Polish Government or army contemplated taking as result of any fait accompli at Danzig. His Excellency again promised to do this, though he made reservation that situation might arise where immediate action would be necessary.

ADSS 1.192 Maglione notes: review of the current situation

ADSS 1.192 Luigi Maglione, Sec State, notes.

Reference: AES 6480/39

Location and date: Vatican, 06.09.1939

Summary statement: Hitler did not believe France and UK would stand firm.  Explains his lack of interest in Italian help.  Situation between Rome and Berlin is very tense; Berlin accuses Rome of treason; necessary for Mussolini to remain neutral.

Language: Italian

Text:

Most Secret

Urgent

Monsignor X, who arrived today from Berlin, tells me that Hitler hoped up to the last moment to force Poland to surrender through threats.  Polish resistance and the firmness of Great Britain and France have upset he: he hoped to obtain everything, as he had on precious occasions, without bloodshed, as he believed that the determination of Great Britain and France was only a bluff. (1)

As he was convinced of this, and also because the Italians had made it known while in Salzburg that they did not have any intention of throwing themselves into such an adventure, Hitler wrote to Mussolini that his military intervention was not required. (2) Now, however, according to what was confided to the same X by the courier of the Italian cabinet, it seems that Hitler has written to Mussolini to obtain Italy’s military assistance (3) pointing out to him the fall of Nazism in Germany meant the end of Fascism in Italy. (4)

In Berlin, they speak openly of the new Italian treason.  The relations between the Italian Embassy and the Chancellery have become cold and almost tense. (4) Ambassador Attolico has announced his intention of going on leave, as at present he has nothing to do in Berlin.

Numerous German Army units are setting off in the direction of the Brenner Pass.

I think that we should be careful and urge Mussolini to keep steady and to avoid intervention: we must insist that he should preserve the state of neutrality.

Notes: 

(1) According to a note sent from Rome by the German Ambassador to the Quirinal, the general opinion in Rome was that Hitler and Ribbentrop thought they could conquer Poland with out firing a shot.  DGFP, Series 3, Volume 7, n438.  Further, in his final order for the invasion of Poland Hitler ordered that Germany would not make any attack on the west – any action must come from France or Britain.  He emphasised this further stating “on land, the German western frontier is not to be crossed at any point without my express permission”. Ibid, n493.

(2) DGFP, ibid, n500.

(3) Mussolini made an offer to send 80,000 Italian troops and a “considerable number of workers” immediately. DGFP, ibid., n507.  At the same time the Duce’s ministers were working to try and reach a compromise that would avoid a continental war. DGFP, ibid, n535. Compare this with Hitler’s letter to Mussolini of 03.09.1939.  DDI, Series 9, Volume 13, n639.

(4) DGFP, ibid, n565.

(5) Mussolini was only officially informed of Germany’s invasion in a telegram sent by Hitler at 12.45hrs some seven hours after the invasion began. DGFP, ibid., n504.

ADSS 1.186 Orsenigo to Maglione: the view from Germany

ADSS 1.186 Cesare Orsenigo, Germany, to Luigi Maglione, Sec State

Reference: Report Number 131 (28.447), (AES 6268/39)

Location and date: Berlin, 04.09.1939

Summary statement: Germany has tried to apply to Poland the same methods used with Czechoslovakia, trying to make her capitulate through negotiations.  Italy also attempts a last move in favour of peace and will not go to war.

Language: Italian

Text:

It is my duty to acquaint Your Eminence how the negotiations between Germany and Poland have taken place, according to information gathered by the Diplomatic Corps on the spot.

The fact of having dealt all the time through Great Britain, and never directly with Poland, has cause uncertain communications of which the Germans took advantage with great skill.

It seems that the German plan was identical with the one already used with Austria and in the case of the Sudetenland and Prague:  to terrorise everybody to the point that it is almost a duty of conscience  … to give in, in order to not to provoke a catastrophe!  Poland had seen the trick very clearly and with great pride decided not to be taken in at any price: in this way many explain her resolve to avoid any attempt at direct negotiations.  The German plan to have a negotiator in Berlin, and then … to move triumphantly into Danzig and along the Corridor the next day, could not be carried out: this resistance which offended, indeed increased, German arrogance, forced the two Berliners (Hitler and Ribbentrop) to lose their nerve when they were already dictating – with conquerors’ airs – harsh conditions on a Polish nation not yet vanquished!  The Polish negotiator, invited to appear in Berlin within 24 hours, and who after 48 hours, was not present nor announced, gave the pretext that this was an offence to the great German nation.  Some diplomats asked themselves this question: “Why did Germany, who was the claiming nation, not send her own negotiator to Warsaw, at least to hear at what price the desired transfer could be negotiated?”

Other diplomats suggested that – in view of the tremendous disaster – Poland could have appointed a very able negotiator with strict instructions and then send him at least up to the border.

With the failure of this old and now worn-out plan of bloodless conquest through panic and terrorism, Germany decided to resort to violence.

The attach motivated by the bad treatment of German minorities, which had been planned for 26 August, and which only the Italian hesitancy had delayed, was decided on for 1 September, on the pretext this time that Poland had not obeyed the German order to send a negotiator.  To cover up this move and to give a lead to the country’s internal opinion, a so-called project of negotiations was prepared.  As the plan was meant to be discarded, it was composed in mild tones and was communicated to the British Ambassador, that is, Ribbentrop read it to him Wednesday night, but a written copy was refused, although requested. (1)

The report of the existence of such a plan arrived in London on Thursday morning, but not the text; the same information must have been sent to Warsaw, but not the text which never left Ribbentrop’s hands: the phrase of the German communiqué, namely, that “the plan for the discussion was communicated to the British Minister” must be understood in the above sense, and the phrase used also by some Catholic newspapers: “Hitler’s proposals were rejected by Britain and Poland” is equivocal, to say the least: the request for a negotiator was dropped by Poland, but no other concrete request was rejected, especially as none was made.  Thursday evening, at 21.00hrs, the radio stations broadcast the sixteen points prepared – so it was said then – for the discussion with the negotiator, but the listeners were given to understand that they were now superseded; the broadcast was only intended to create the myth of German magnanimity personified by the German Führer.

It has come to my attention that yesterday – under the auspices of Italy – a new attempt in favour of peace has taken place under this formula: “Suspension of hostilities, everybody remaining at their positions and an international conference”. (2)

A long discussion between the Ambassadors and Hitler took place: France was agreeable, Hitler accepted, but Britain refused.  By now the die was cast and Chamberlain had said that the fight was not against the German people but against Nazism.

The diplomats feel they have done everything possible to avoid this enormous disaster but they now remark that perhaps Providence had other plans.  Italy has worked with all energy possible and it seems now that she will not dare to enter the war, knowing that she has got thousands of miles of frontier, completely exposed to the guns of the British, French and Greek fleets.  This news about the last attempts in favour of peace is still secret here.

Notes: 

(1) Neville Henderson, (1882-1942), UK Ambassador to Germany 1937-39, recounted the meeting with Ribbentrop: “He produced a document of a certain length which he read to me in German, or more exactly he poured out as quickly as possible, in a tone of extreme exasperation. Of the sixteen articles which composed it I could grasp the sense of five or six”. Two Years with Hitler, p289.  Henderson asked for a copy of the document in order to study it.  Ribbentrop “categorically refused, threw the paper on the table with a disdainful gesture that it was now superseded, as no Polish emissary had arrived in Berlin by midnight”.  See too DBFP, Series 3, Volume 7, n715.

(2) On 02.09.1939 at 10.00hrs Bernardo Attolico (1880-1942), Italian Ambassador to Germany (1935-39) sent a note to the German Foreign Office proposing, once more, the idea for a conference. (DDI, Series 8, Volume 13, n571.)  Hitler did not reject the proposal immediately. (DDI, ibid, n581; DBFP, Series 3, Volume 7, nn 709, 710)