ADSS 1.269 Maglione to Orsenigo: conversation with Ribbentrop

ADSS 1.269 Luigi Maglione, Sec State, to Cesare Orsenigo, Germany

Reference: AES 2360/40

Location and date: Vatican, 19.03.1940

Summary statement: Maglione informs Orsenigo of his conversation with Ribbentrop.

Language: Italian

Text:

I take pleasure in sending Your Excellency, for your information and guidance , some notes on the two meetings – one in the Vatican and the other in the German Embassy to the Holy See – which the German Foreign Minister had with me on the 11.03.1940, soon after his audience with the Holy Father (1).

The Minister affirmed his pleasure, several times, in having been able to see the Holy Father and to talk with him about the religious position in Germany taking advantage of his time in Rome to settle a few questions with the Italian Government.

He also told me that he was able, during the audience, to note with great satisfaction that the Pope still has his heart in Germany, and a great wish to reach a firm and lasting agreement with Hitler.

He added that Hitler also wants a sound and lasting settlement.  He has already given proof of his goodwill by stopping, by the hundreds, the proceedings against the clergy.  But Hitler is a man with far-sighted plans and thinks more of the future than of the present.  We cannot therefore think that we can reach the desired settlement at present.  Germany is now engaged in a terrific struggle for its own existence and greatness. Hitler has all Germans on his side: their energy is devoted to the attainment of victory; it is not possible to think about other problems.  Afterwards we will negotiate.

I did not fail to point out to the Minister that religion is also concerned with the present and it is therefore not possible to set aside the current problems which hamper it and cause sorrow, pain and grace danger to souls.  Replying to one of his frequent allusions to the so-called political activity of the German clergy, I recalled to him the Holy See’s instructions on this subject, instructions which the German clergy, at least generally speaking, obey scrupulously.  If in some particular instance these instructions have not been obeyed, the only thing to do would be to inform the competent ecclesiastical authority which would immediately remedy it.  But it would be a grave error, I added, to see political motives in the overall activity of clergy and people.

From here, passing to more concrete points, I recalled the particular attention of the Minister to some of the many facts which the Church has lately been compelled to deplore: these have already been communicated to the German Embassy to the Holy See with our note of last July which so far has not been replied to, and in particular other more recent notes, as for example the closing down of Seminaries and Theological Faculties, without even informing the Holy See although this is a matter which comes under the Concordat.

Regarding Poland – as the Minister handed to me an official publication on the Polish atrocities against the Germans and mentioned the political activity of the Polish clergy – I told him that the Holy See wishes to be accurately informed and therefore they have several times asked Berlin for permission to send a trusted clergyman to Poland namely Monsignor Colli, Counsellor of the Nunciature in Germany, but until now they have not had a reply in the sense desired; and in the meantime, the various reports which circulate on the situation in Poland, some of which cannot be confuted, are becoming very distressing.  We can ask the Polish priests to abstain from creating difficulties to the occupying authority, but it is not possible to pretend that they should renounce their love of their own country.  The presence of the Holy See’s envoy, I added, would help in clearing misunderstandings and in assisting the priests in their undertaking to devote themselves exclusively to their pastoral ministry.  He could, by keeping in touch with the German authorities, give useful directives and good advice to help the Bishops to bring the religious situation back to normal.  But I only received a vague reply.

I spoke also of the necessity of helping the poor Polish population and I reminded him of the request already made for the consent of the Berlin Government for organising assistance under the control of the Holy See’s envoy in agreement with the occupying power.  But I did not get a satisfactory reply.

At Villa Bonaparte I spoke again of the advantage of having a representative of the Holy See in Warsaw, in the interest of Germany itself.  He replied that he would think about it but added explicitly that he could not promise anything.  He spoke again about Hitler’s goodwill (who is looking to the future) and about the necessity of setting aside particular questions.

Notes:

(1) ADSS 1.257, 258.

ADSS 1.260 Maglione to Orsenigo: nuncio can meet Ribbentrop in Berlin

 ADSS 1.260 Luigi Maglione, Sec State, to Cesare Orsenigo, Germany,

Reference: Telegram 166 (AES 2170/40)

Location and date: Vatican, 12.03.1940

Summary statement: The nuncio can meet Ribbentrop at the station on his return to Berlin.

Language: Italian

Text:

Coded message 375. (1) There is no objection.

Notes: 

(1) ADSS 1.256.

ADSS 1.256 Orsenigo to Maglione: Ribbentrop's visit

 ADSS 1.256 Cesare Orsenigo, Germany, to Luigi Maglione, Sec Sate

Reference: Telegram 375 (AES 2170/40)

Location and date: Berlin, (received in Rome) 11.03.1940

Summary statement: Nuncio requests instructions regarding Ribbentrop’s return.

Language: Italian

Text:

Yesterday’s coded message 165 received (1): according custom Foreign Minister must be met at station on his return.  I ask Your Eminence to give me instructions in this respect.

Notes: 

(1) ADSS 1.255.

ADSS 1.255 Maglione to Orsenigo: Ribbentrop's audience with the Pope

ADSS 1.255 Luigi Maglione, Sec State, to Cesare Orsenigo, Germany

Reference: Telegram 165 (AES 2170/40)

Location and date: Vatican, 09.03.1940

Summary statement: Ribbentrop will have an audience with the Pope on 11.03.1940.

Language: Italian

Text:

German Ambassador (1) here has requested audience Holy Father for Minister Foreign Affairs Ribbentrop.  Audience will take pace Monday 11 March at 09.30. (2)

Notes: 

(1) Diego von Bergen (1872-1944), German Ambassador to the Holy See 1920-43.

(2) ADSS 1.254

ADSS 1.252 Orsenigo to Maglione: Sumner-Welles in Berlin

ADSS 1.252 Cesare Orsenigo, Germany, to Luigi Maglione, Sec State

Reference: Report number 344, (31.309), (AES 2167/40)

Location and date: Berlin, 04.03.1940

Summary statement: Under-Secretary of State, Sumner Welles visit to Berlin.  He met several ambassadors including the Italian.  Diplomats believe that both sides underestimate each other’s strengths and must negotiate a settlement after two years at the most in order to avoid a mass slaughter.

Language: Italian

Text:

I take the liberty of adding to what was published in the newspapers about Mr Welles’s talks in Berlin, some information less known and certainly not for the public. (1)

Mr Welles, although he had notified the American Charge d’Affaires in Berlin, Mr Alexander Kirk (2), that he was coming as a private citizen, he nevertheless saw a few diplomats with whom he was personally acquainted, such as the Ambassadors of Brazil and Argentina (3), and also called on Ambassador Attolico, who unfortunately had to receive him while in bed owing to painful heart condition: his last visit lasted for more that on hour: on the last day, Sunday, Mr Welles also met the Belgian Ambassador, Viscount Davignon, and Mr Schacht.

As to the German Government, Mr Welles first of all had talks with the Minister for Foreign Affairs (7), the Secretary of State, Dr Weizsacker, Hitler, Hess, and on Sunday from 12 to 3pm with Goring.  He also had a meeting with the Dutch Minister, but I do not think that they spoke about politics. (8)

The main themes discussed by the diplomats was: “Germany makes a mistake in underestimating the Allies but in turn the Allies make an even bigger mistake underestimating German military strength, the cohesion of the people and of the army around the Fuhrer, and in hoping to overthrow them easily and to starve them.”  They begged Mr Welles to open the eyes of the Allies so that they would not blindly go into war which will result in a terrifying slaughter and a useless destruction as it will be difficult to reach a final victory: everybody will emerge very shaken or, maybe after two years of fighting peace negotiations will be started on more or less present conditions but with two or three million men killed.  The diplomats in Berlin think that, if the Allies do not completely shut all doors, Mr Roosevelt will certainly try and approach for an understanding, when he has collected all the information brought back by Mr Welles at the end of March: some, however, think that this will be too late!  It is also said that Signor Mussolini has already offered his collaboration to Mr Roosevelt for such an initiative. 

As to the various talks which Mr Welles had with members of the German Government, it seems that he was most pleased with the on he had with the Fuhrer, and least impressed with the one with M Ribbentrop who took a boastful and menacing attitude.  It seems that the gist of Mr Welles’s general impression was summed up in his sentence: “These men carry in their heart a wish for peace, but they have not the courage to speak about it lest they are judged weak or afraid.”

The diplomats who gave me the above information asked me to pass the information on to the Holy See, pointing out the gravity of the moment, that is, the serious and imminent danger of a colossal war of uncertain result,  They hope for the collaboration of the Holy See, and they noted in this respect the less controversial and more conciliatory language adopted recently by the Catholic newspapers in Holland Belgium.

The moment seems to me also very serious and I want to lighten my responsibility, and to inform you exactly about everything, although I suppose I may not be adding anything new to what you already know.

Notes: 

(1) Benjamin Sumner Welles (1892-1962), United States Under-Secretary of State 1937-43.  FDR asked Welles to visit Italy, Germany and the UK on a fact finding mission.  Historians are divided as to the true nature of the mission, but it seems reasonable to judge that FDR wanted first hand information on the state of the Axis, the likelihood of Italy entering the war, German intentions in general, and the situation in Britain that he was keen to support with a measure of discretion.  Hitler feared Welles’ mission was an attempt to keep Italy neutral and Ribbentrop’s sudden visit to Rome on 10.03.1940 appeared to be in response to the Fuhrer’s fears.  Ribbentrop also visited Pius XII during the same trip, on 11.03.1940. See ADSS 1.257.  Welles returned to Rome and met with the pope too.  See ADSS 1.268.

See too http://bobrowen.com/nymas/Robert%20Miller%20-%20Sumner%20Welles.html (Accessed 21.08.2016)

(2) Alexander Kirk (1888-1979), United States Charge d’Affaires in Germany 1940.

(3) Cyro de Freitas Valle (1896-1969), Brazilian Ambassador to Germany 1939-42); Ricardo Olivera (1886-1949), Argentinian Ambassador to Germany 1939-43.

(4) Bernardo Attolico (1880-1942), Italian Ambassador to Germany 1935-39.  Attolico was about to leave Berlin to take up his new position as Italian Ambassador to the Holy See.

(5) Jacques Henri Davignon (1887-1965), Belgian Ambassador to Germany 1935-40.

(6) Hjalmar Schacht (1877-1970), President of the Reichsbank 1933-39, Minister of Economics 1934-37, minister without portfolio 1939-43.

(7) Joachim Ribbentrop (1893-1946), German Minister for Foreign Affairs 1938-45.

(8) Not identified.