ADSS 1.218 Sec State to British Legation: summary of August 1939

ADSS 1.218 Secretariat of State to the British Legation

Reference: AES 8223/39

Location and date: Vatican, 13.11.1939

Summary statement: Details of steps taken in August 1939 with Warsaw in favour of peace.

Language: Italian

Text:

Draft 1

Minister Beck (1), contrary to what had been suggested to him by Mr Howard Kennard, Ambassador of Great Britain to Warsaw (2), did not let the Holy See know that he was prepared to consider an exchange of populations and also to accept neutral observers in order to demonstrate that German accusations of maltreatments were unfounded; in fact M. Beck did not even accept proposals suggested by the Holy See on this subject:

In fact:

1. On 15 August, His Excellency, the Cardinal Secretary of State requested Monsignor Cortesi, Apostolic Nuncio in Warsaw, to ask the Polish Government if it thought that the Secretariat of State could make some approach and if so what, to precent the situation getting worse. (3) Mons Cortesi, spoke on this subject to the Foreign Under-Secretary (4) who was not able to give a precise answer, although he stated that there was the possibility of a peaceful understanding. (5)

2. On 26 August, His Eminence the Cardinal Secretary of State, having heard that it could be helpful if Poland, following an invitation from the Holy See, declared itself ready to prevent the alleged maltreatment of citizens of German nationality, if Germany, for its part, would make the same promise regarding the Polish people in German territory, instructed the Apostolic Nuncio in Warsaw to put this suggestion before the Polish Government asking if such a declaration on the part of the Polish Government could be brought to the knowledge of the German Government through the Apostolic Nuncio in Berlin. (6)

M. Beck, replying to the communication of Mons Cortesi, expressed fear that the Germans would take advantage of the above-mentioned Polish declaration as a confirmation of the alleged persecutions of the German minority, and suggested, as a better solution, the idea of an invitation of the Holy See to the Polish and German Governments to check the excitement created in their respective countries regarding the situation of the minorities (27 August). (7)

3. On 31 August the Cardinal Secretary of State instructed the Apostolic Nuncio in Warsaw to give the Polish Government the opportunity to accept an international control on the alleged persecution of the German minority. (8)

Owing to the outbreak of hostilities the proposal had no sequel.

Draft II

Concern of the Holy See to avoid the question of the minorities being used as a pretext for war between Germany and Poland.

1. On 14 August 1939, the Holy See received news that Germany was massing troops at the Polish border and that the situation was getting worse. (9) The Cardinal Secretary of State immediately instructed the apostolic Nuncio in Warsaw to ask the Polish Government if it thought that the Secretary of State could take some initiative and, eventually, to suggest one (15 August). (10)

Mons Cortesi conferred on the subject with the Foreign Under-Secretary, but the latter was not able to give a precise answer, although he affirmed that there was a possibility of a peaceful understanding (18 August). (11)

2. On 26 August the Cardinal Secretary of State received a communication from a reliable source that war was approaching and that it was opportune to make a new attempt for averting it: perhaps it might help if Poland, accepting suggestion of the Holy See, declared itself ready to prevent the alleged persecutions , and if Germany, for its part, undertook the same commitment regarding the Polish people in German territory. (12) Immediately, on the same day, the Apostolic Nuncio in Warsaw was instructed to submit the matter to the Polish Government asking if such a declaration on the part of the Polish Government could be made know to the German Government through the Apostolic Nuncio. (13)

Mons Cortesi immediately informed Minister Beck about the proposal, but the Minister expressed the fear that the Germans could take advantage of the possible Polish declaration as if it were an admission of the alleged persecutions of the German minority, and suggested, as another solution, the idea of an invitation by the Holy See to the Polish and German Governments to check the excitement created in their respective countries regarding the position of the minorities (27 August). (14)

3. On 28 August the idea was put forward to the Holy See to ask the German and Polish Governments what measure they thought was necessary to guarantee the situation of the minorities. (15)

The Apostolic Nuncio in Berlin was informed immediately about this proposal (29 August) (16), but he replied that he considered that the German Government thought it impossible to guarantee the protection of the minorities unless an international control was set up (30 August). (17)

4. Following this communication the Cardinal Secretary of State instructed the Papal (?) Nuncio in Warsaw to submit for the consideration of the Polish Government, the opportunity of accepting international control over the alleged persecution of the German minority (31 August). (18)

War broke out and the initiative was abandoned.

The conclusion to be drawn form what is said above, is that M. Beck did not accept the suggestion put forward to him by Mr Howard Kennard, Ambassador of Great Britain, on 27 August, that is, to inform the Holy Father that he was prepared to consider an exchange of populations and to accept neutral observers with the aim of demonstrating that the German accusations regarding the persecutions had no foundation in truth. (See Documents concerning German-Polish Relations and the outbreak of hostilities between Great Britain and Germany on 3 September, 1939, p124, number 72) (19)

Notes:  

(1) Jozef Beck (1894-1944), Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs 1932-39.

(2) Howard Kennard (1878-1955), British Ambassador to Poland 1937-39.

(3) ADSS 1.95

(4) Miroslaw Arciszewski (1892-1963), Polish Under-Secretary Foreign Affairs 1938-39.

(5) ADSS 1.102

(6) ADSS 1.133. Cesare Orsenigo (1873-1946), Nuncio to Germany 1930-45.

(7) ADSS 1.136

(8) ADSS 1.161

(9) ADSS 1.94

(10) ADSS 1.95

(11) ADSS 1.102

(12) ADSS 1.123

(13) ADSS 1.133
(14) ADSS 1.135

(15) ADSS 1.141

(16) ADSS 1.146

(17) ADSS 1.150

(18) ADSS 1.168

(19) Published London, HMSO 1939 (http://www.allworldwars.com/The%20British%20War%20Blue%20Book%201939.html).

Sir H. Kennard to Viscount Halifax (received 5:05 p. m.).

(Telegraphic.) Warsaw, August 27, 1939.
Your telegrams of 25th and 26th August.[Nos. 70 and 71.]
I discussed questions of exchange of populations and neutral observers with M. Beck this morning.
2. As regards first, he said that in principle he saw no objection and was prepared to convey to German Government that he was ready to consider such a proposal, possibly not directly to State Secretary, but in such a manner that he was sure it would reach the highest authorities.
3. As regards question of neutral observers, he had again consulted President of the Council, but he would let me know his decision in the course of the day.
4. As he told me that the Pope had during the night, through the Nuncio, asked if there was anything he could do, I suggested to M. Beck that he should inform His Holiness that he was prepared to consider an exchange of populations and also use of neutral observers in order to demonstrate that German accusations of maltreatment were completely without foundation. The Pope could then communicate these proposals to the German Government with approval of Polish Government. M. Beck seemed to consider this favourably and promised he would give it his immediate consideration. I warned him that there was no time to lose.
5. As regards Danzig, M. Beck did not from his latest information anticipate fait accompli there to-day or in very immediate future. For the moment all was quiet there as far as he knew.
6. I again emphasised to his Excellency importance of his giving sufficient warning to His Majesty's Government of any action which Polish Government or army contemplated taking as result of any fait accompli at Danzig. His Excellency again promised to do this, though he made reservation that situation might arise where immediate action would be necessary.

ADSS 1.212 Valeri to Maglione: HItler's "peace offensive"

ADSS 1.212 Valerio Valeri, France, to Luigi Maglione, Sec State

Reference: Report number 9207/323, (AES 7030/39)

Location and date: Paris, 29.09.1939

Summary statement: Hitler’s ‘peace offensive’: possibilities for an independent Czechoslovakia and a reduced Poland.

Language: Italian

Text:

Hitler’s peace offensive recurs as subject of conversation in political circles here.  According to some people the proposals that he would make would be very wide and would include, amongst other things, the restitution of independence to Czechoslovakia.  Regarding Poland, Germany would keep Danzig, the Corridor, Upper Silesia and would be in favour of the reconstitution of a reduced Poland. (1)

It seems, however, that much will depend upon the results of the present conversations in Moscow, which are still enveloped in mystery.  In any case, it is interesting to note that inside the Socialist Party here, which now has been reinforced from the ranks of the dissolved Communist party, there are various currents, one of which – led by M. Faure – would be inclined to examine the above peace offensive. (2)

All this does not slacken the war rhythm and the preparations for war operations.  In the East, troops are under the supreme command of General Weygand (3) and more sailings are taking place from Marseilles.  It seems that general opinion is less optimistic about Turkey’s attitude and precautionary measures are being taken.  Regarding Italy, anyway up to this moment thank God, forecasts remain good and it has even been reported here that Italy has been selling some aeroplanes, or at least engines, to France.

Notes: 

(1) Hitler addressed the Reichstag on 06.10.1939 delivering “Peace Terms”.

(2) Paul Faure, (1878-1960), leader of the French Section of the Workers’ International between the wars.  The French Communist Party was banned in July 1939 just before the German-Soviet Pact of August.  Prime Ministers Eduoard Daladier and Neville Chamberlain comprehensively rejected Hitler’s peace proposals on 12.10.1939.

(3) Maxime Weygand, (1867-1965), had been called out of retirement to active service in August 1939 and appointed Commander in Chief for the Orient Theatre of Operations.

Chamberlain’s Speech on The Peace Offensive 12th October 1939

https://ww2memories.wordpress.com/2011/09/16/chamberlains-speech-on-the-peace-offensive-12th-october-1939/

Posted on September 16, 2011by Carolyn Maybray-Seymour

On October 12th the Prime Minister made his eagerly awaited statement in the House of Commons in reply to the “peace proposals” put forward by Hitler on October 6th.  The most important passage of Mr Chamberlain’s speech – in which he declared that “Acts, not words alone” must be forthcoming – are reproduced below.

The Prime Minister began by saying that consultations had taken place with the French and the Dominion Governments regarding the terms of Herr Hitler’s speech.  After summing up the vain efforts of the British Government to preserve peace, Mr Chamberlain continued:

“On September 1st Herr Hitler violated the Polish frontier and invaded Poland, bearing down by force of arms and machinery the resistance of the Polish nation and army.  As attested by neutral observers, Polish town and villages were bombed and shelled into ruins; and civilians were slaughtered wholesale, in contravention, at any rate in the later stages, of all the undertakings of which Herr Hitler now speaks with pride as though he has fulfilled them.
“It is after this wanton act of aggression, which has cost so many Polish and German lives, sacrificed to satisfy his own insistence on the use of force, that the German Chancellor now puts forward proposals. If there existed any expectations that in these proposals would be included some attempt to make amends for the grievous crime against humanity, following so soon upon the violation of the rights of the Czechoslovakian nation, it has been doomed to disappointment. The Polish State and its leaders are covered with abuse. What the fate of that part of Poland which Herr hitler describes as the German Sphere of interest it to be does not clearly emerge from his speech, but it is evident that he regards it as a matter for the consideration of Germany along, to be settled solely in accordance with German interests.
“We must take it, then, that the proposals which the German Chancellor puts forward for the establishment of what he calls ‘the certainty of European security’ are to be based on recognition of his conquests and his right to do what he pleases with the conquered. It would be impossible for Great Britain to accept any such basis without forfeiting her honour and abandoning her claim that international disputes should be settled by discussion and not by force.
“The passages in the speech designed to give fresh assurances to Herr Hitler’s neighbours I pass over, since they will know what value should be attached to them by reference to the similar assurances he has given in the past. It would be easy to quote sentences from his speeches in 1935, 1936 and 1938 stating in the most definite terms his determination not to annex Australia or conclude an Anschluss with her, not to fall upon Czechoslovakia, and not to make any further territorial claims in Europe after the Sudetenland question had been settled after in September’s 1938. Nor can we pass over Herr Hitler’s radical departure from the long professed principles of his policy and creed, as instanced by the inclusion in the German Reich of many millions of Poles and Czechs, despite his repeated professions to the contrary, and by the pact with the Soviet Union concluded after his repeated and violent denunciations of Bolshevism.

“This repeated disregard for his word and these sudden reversals of policy bring me to the fundamental difficulty in dealing with the wider proposals in the German Chancellor#s speech. The plain truth is that, after our past experience it is no longer possible to rely upon the unsupported word of the present German Government. It is no part of our policy to exclude from her rightful place in Europe, a Germany which will live in amity and confidence with other nations. On the contrary, we believe that no effective remedy can be found for the world’s ills that does not take account of the just claims and needs of all countries, and whenever the time may come to draw the lines of a new peace settlement, his Majesty’s Government would feel that the future would hold little hope unless such a settlement could be reached through negotiation and agreement.
“It was not, therefore, with any vindictive purpose that we embarked on war, but simply in defence of freedom. It is not alone the freedom of the small nations that is at stake; there is also in jeopardy the peaceful existence of Great Britain, the Dominions, India, the rest of the British Empire, France and indeed of all freedom-loving countries.  His Majesty’s Government know all to well that in modern war between great Powers victor and vanquished must alike suffer cruel loss. But surrender to wrongdoing would spell the extinction of all hope, and the annihilation of all those value of life which have through centuries been at once the mark and inspiration of human progress.  We seek no material advantage for ourselves; we desire nothing from the German people, which would affect their self-respect. We are not aiming only at victory, but rather looking beyond it to the laying of a foundation of a better international system which would mean that war is not to be the inevitable lot of every succeeding generation.
“I am certain that all the Peoples of Europe, including the people of Germany, long for peace – a peace which will enable them to live their lives without fear, and to devote their energies and their gifts to the development of their culture, the pursuit of their ideals, and the improvement of their material prosperity. The peace which we are determined to secure, however, must be a real and settled peace – not an uneasy truce interrupted by constant alarms and repeated threats.

“What stands in the way of such a peace? It is the German Government, and the German Government alone, for it is they who by repeated acts of aggression have robbed all Europe of tranquility and implanted in the ears of all their neighbours an ever-present sense of insecurity and fear.  I would sum up the attitude of his Majesty’s government as follows:
Herr Hitler rejected all suggestions for peace until he has overwhelmed Poland, as he had previously overthrown Czechoslovakia. Peace conditions cannot be acceptable which begin by condoning aggression.  The Proposals in the German Chancellor’s speech are vague and uncertain, and contain no suggestion for righting the wrongs done to Czechoslovakia and to Poland.  Even if Herr Hitler’s proposals were more closely defined and contained suggestions to right these wrongs, it would still ne necessary to ask by what practical means the German Government intend to convince the world that aggression will cease and that pledges will be kept. Past experience has shown that no reliance can be placed upon the promises of the present German Government. According , acts – not words alone – must be forthcoming before we, the British Peoples, and France, our gallant and trusted Ally, would be justified in ceasing to wage war to the utmost of our strength.
“Only when world confidence is restored will it be possible to find – as we would wish to do with the aid of all who show good will solutions of those questions which disturb the world, which stand in the way of disarmament, retard the restoration of trade, and prevent the improvement of the well-being of the Peoples.
“The issue is therefore plain. Either the German Government must give convincing proof of all sincerity of their desire for peace by definite acts and by the provision of effective guarantees of their intention to fulfill their undertakings, or we must preserver in our duty to the end. It is for Germany to make her choice.”

ADSS 1.165, 166, 167 Cortesi - Maglione - Cortesi: last attempts to avoid war

 ADSS 1.165 Filippo Cortesi, Poland, to Luigi Maglione, Sec State.

Reference: Telegram number 37, (AES 5880/39)

Location and date: Warsaw, 31.08.1939

Summary statement: Hesitates to ask President for a declaration over Danzig and the opening of negotiations.

Language: Italian

Text:

Coded message Number 46 (1) received: I am prepared to follow order, but I think it my duty to say:

1) Audience with President of Republic (2) … following protocol must be asked for through Ministry of Foreign Affairs stating subject.

2) President of Republic only represents Poland nominally and cannot inspire confidence without embarrassing Government.

3) Audience of Apostolic Nuncio with President of Republic owing to extreme tension will be full of significance and will be interpreted as an attempt to obtain concessions in favour of Germany.

4) President of Republic has no effective direction of affairs and will submit all to Council of Ministers.

5) Owing to known categorical statements and almost complete army mobilisation my humble opinion Government will find impossible accept suggestion: only way could be mediation.

Will inform tomorrow morning Warsaw Cardinal Archbishop Poznan (3) and Archbishop Krakow (4).

Notes: 

(1) ADSS 1.153.

(2) Ignacy Moscicki (1867-1946), President of Poland 1926-39.

(3) August Hlond (1881-1948), Cardinal Archbishop of Poznan, Primate of Poland 1926-46.

(4) Adam Sapieha (1867-1951), Archbishop of Krakow 1911-51.

ADSS 1.166 Luigi Maglione, Sec State, to Filippo Cortesi, Poland.

Reference: Telegram number 47, (AES 5881/39)

Location and date: Vatican, 31.08.1939

Summary statement: Instructed to present the proposal to Polish president

Language: Italian

Text:

Coded message Number 36 received. (1) Your Excellency will urgently communicate my message Number 46 (2) to the Government instead of the President explaining clearly that only motive Holy See’s step is very high affection toward Poland and fear war danger.

Notes: 
(1) It seems that the reference should have been to Telegram number 37, ADSS 1.165, instead of 36, ADSS 1.143.

(2) ADSS 1.153.

ADSS 1.167 Luigi Maglione, Sec State, to Filippo Cortesi, Poland.

Reference: Telegram number 48, (AES 5882/39)

Location and date: Vatican, 31.08.1939

Summary statement: Suggested from many sources that Poland accepts an international control commission on the fate of German minorities; nuncio is requested to bring this to the attention of the Gov’t.

Language: Italian

Text:

From many sides comes the insistent suggestion that it would be advisable to induce Poland to accept international control regarding the alleged hardship of German minorities.

Your Excellency should arrange to submit this for the consideration of the Government.

Notes: