ADSS 1.276 Secretariat of State Office, notes (1).
Reference:
AES 2892/40
Location
and date: Vatican, 04.04.1940
Summary
statement: Information about the 18.03.1940 meeting between Mussolini and Hitler. Hitler asked Mussolini to send 60 divisions
to the French border. Mussolini agreed
to enter the war in August. Italian
government is divided. Ciano defends
neutrality but his position is difficult.
Language:
Italian
Text:
There
are two minutes on the Brenner meeting, one in Italian and the other in German,
and they report the entire discussions with the exception of the conversation
between Mussolini and Hitler which tool place without witnesses (2).
M[ussolini]
repeated three times: “We are ready to march with you”. The first time H[itler] did not
understand. (M speaks German, but the
bodyguard interpreter whom H always takes along with him and whose name the
writer does not remember, was also present) (3).
H
proposed that Italy should send 60 divisions to the French frontier, not to
fight, but only to force France to shift part of their forces and in this way
to weaken their defences. According to
this plan the offensive would start on the Dutch frontier on 15 April.
M
did not agree (it is possible however, that the German may go it alone).
Nevertheless
M and H have agreed that Italy should enter the war by the beginning of
August. Italy is short of many things,
for example anti-aircraft guns, but in Munich 100 batteries are being
assembled, ready to be sent to Italy and already 20 have arrived.
The
tightening of the British blockade at this moment could hasten Italy’s entry
into the war, perhaps by June. The
blockade is a measure which M cannot tolerate.
Ciano
has called the members of his Cabinet and told them that he no longer controls
the course of events. On the other hand
the position of Ciano could be shaken any moment, if M felt that is carrying
out a personal policy.
M
would appoint him Minister of the Interior, to take him away from the Foreign
Office.
At
the beginning of the war M had a crisis of depression lasting a few months, as
at the time of the Matteotti affair, but he has now regained full activity (4).
Some
are afraid that with C[iano] as Chief of Police there is a danger of a revolt
in Italy, as the people are against war.
M, however, does not worry about the internal situation.
Anfuso
(5) will be sent as Ambassador to Berlin.
Magistrati has quarrelled with C on private matters; for this reason he
has been sent to Sofia (6).
M
told H: “Do not become more involved with Russia because Italy wants nothing to
do with Communism; and this could engager German Italian union”.
On
M’s side are: Buffarini, Renato Ricci, Starace (7): all the others, and in
particular the Service Ministers, stand by C – Cavagnari was with C in China
when he was Charge d’Affaires (8).
A
month ago C was candidate for M’s succession, and this could have happened at
any moment. In those days Prince Umberto
came to Rome and for a week he dined with C.
The King sent Acquarone around the various Ministries to obtain
information, and sent the same Acquarone (9) to C to tell him “it was not ripe”
(this phrase has never been explained).
But
now M has regained strength and controls decisions.
Alfieri
is not regarded as much of an Ambassador; he does not send reports, while
Pignatti (10) sent at least a short telegram a day to give information about
the Vatican’s mood. Alfieri sent a
report on his audience with the Holy Father after R[ibbentrop]’s visit. Among other things he wrote he said: The Holy
Father told me that having asked R about some political matters he replied that
he did not know very much about them, because the affairs of state are
personally directed by H (11).
C
has a personal liking for the Russian Charge d’Affaires and although he is no
longer received at the Palazzo Chigi they still meet on the golf course. This man has large sums of money at his
disposal and gets all he wants in the Ministries, and is very well informed. He
has been occupying this position since the time when the Ambassador, owing to
hostile demonstrations at the time of the attack on Finland, left in a great
hurry, without even calling on the King, with whom he had an appointment (12). On that occasion, though very few people knew
about it, there was even demonstrations of sympathy in front of the Finnish
Legation and the Minister carried around in triumph.
M
did not trust Welles because he had the impression that Welles came here for
personal reasons, that is, to become Foreign Minister, after the next
presidential election.
Notes:
(1)
Domenico Tardini wrote at the top of the Note: “Give to me by His Eminence on
03.03.1941”. It is reasonable to assume
the note had originally been sent to Maglione who passed it to Tardini, even though
there is nearly a year between the composition of the Note and its arrival on
Tardini’s desk.
(2)
Compare this with ADSS 1.272 n2. There
are major differences.
(3)
Possibly Eugen Dollmann (1900-1985) who had worked as a translator for
different Nazi leaders from 1934. He
held the SS rank of Obersturmbannfuhrer.
(4)
Giacomo Matteotti (1885-1924) was an outspoken anti-fascist. He was murdered on 10.06.1924 after
publishing The Fascists Exposed and publically
denouncing electoral fraud in the Italian parliament. Mussolini was widely
presumed to have had some involvement whoever peripheral, but there was
insufficient evidence to prove it.
(5)
Filippo Anfuso (1901-1963), Foreign Ministry Chief of Staff 1938-42. He was not
sent to Berlin.
(6)
Massimo Magistrati (1899-1971) Counsellor at the Italian Embassy Berlin
1933-40; transferred to Sofia 1940-43. He married Ciano’s sister Maria in 1930
(died 1939).
(7)
Guido Buffarini (1895-1945) Italian Minister of the Interior 1940-43; Renato
Ricci (1896-1956) Italian Minister of Corporations 1939-43; Achille Starace
(1889-1945) former Fascist Party Secretary 1931-39, Chief of Staff for the
Blackshirts 1940-43.
(8)
Service Ministers most likely refers to the chiefs of Italy’s armed forces.
Domenico Cavagnari (1876-1966), Chief of Staff of the Regia Marina (Italian Royal Navy) 1934-40.
(9)
Pietro d’Acquarone (1890-1948), Duke and Master of the Royal House 1934-1944.
He often acted as an intermediary for King Vittorio Emanuele and was known to
be sympathetic to anti-Fascists. He
later played a role in the dismissal of Mussolini in 1943.
(10)
Dino Alfieri (1886-1966), Italian Ambassador to the Holy See 1939-40; Bonafacio
Pignatti (1877-1957), Italian Ambassador to the Holy See 1935-39.
(11)
See DDI, Series 9, Volume 3, n536, p467.
According to Alfieri, Ribbentrop replied that he did not know anything
and that he was not competent, but not that it was Hitler who directed all the
affairs of State.
(12)
Leon Helfand (1900-1961), Soviet Charge d’Affaires in Rome 1935-40 (he defected
to the United States a few months later where he became Leon Moore); Boris
Shtein (1892-1961), Soviet Ambassador to Italy 1935-39.
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