Sunday, August 16, 2015

ADSS 1.84: Valeri to Maglione: views on current tensions from France


ADSS 1.84 Valerio Valeri, France to Luigi Maglione, Sec State.

Reference: Report 8616/216 (AES 4412/39)

Location and date: Paris, 04.07.1939

Summary statement: French public opinion has understood the Pope’s approach for peace.  Nuncio has spoken to For Off about articles in the French press critical of the Pope; expresses opinion that France and UK are not recommending moderation to Poland.  Military preparations continue in France.  France and UK had informed Germany of their intention to defend Poland.

Language: Italian

Text:

Obeying the wish expressed by your Eminence with despatch number 4036/39 of 29 June 1939 (1) to keep you informed about changes in public opinion regarding the Holy See’s action, I am pleased to tell you that lately there have been no attacks or unfavourable comments against it.  Only on the occasion of the death of Minister Ciano’s father I noted that some leftish newspapers and even La Croix have reported a telegram in which it was said the first the Holy Father then your Eminence and lastly even the Apostolic Nuncio had expressed their sympathy.  The mention of the names and their sequence was not a mere coincidence.

In any case I think that the unrest created in the political circles and in some social sectors is quietening down completely.  From my side I have continued my work of necessary clarification.  So, not later than yesterday evening I was pointing out to M. Charveriat, Political Director at the Foreign Office, how unseemly and without foundation certain comments published in some newspapers were regarding the well-known steps taken by the Holy See.  I mentioned as well the articles of the Mercure de France on the conclave and on the Holy Father Pius XII (2).  The Minister told me he had read a summary of them without understanding who could have written or fostered them or what was their aim.  I told him then that we “unfortunately” knew their source; but, as it was obvious, although he wanted to know, I claimed it was a secret I was not entitled to divulge.  I hope, however, he more or less understood whom I meant from the way I expressed myself.  In any case, I think I must write agin on this point to give more details.

I have had occasion, too, to point out to Minister Champetier de Ribes with whom I travelled last Sunday to Sens, the incongruities and contradictions of M. Pezet’s speech at the Popular Democratic Party Congress (3).

Passing on to the international situation it is necessary that I tell your Eminence that seen from here it is still very grave and that the danger of an armed conflict is becoming more probable on account of the tension regarding the Danzig issue.  On this subject, in my conversations at the Quai d’Orsay, I have had the clear confirmation that neither France nor Great Britain intend to exert any action upon Poland to induce them to use moderation and to agree to negotiate with Germany.  It has been declared that the two great Western Powers are, therefore, ready to march alongside Poland when the latter, defending her threatened rights, decides to take arms against Germany.  France and England have, therefore, placed the determining of the casus belli in the hands of Poland.

The Government in the meantime continues to organise with increasing speed the military and material preparation of the nation.   Plans for the evacuation of frontier zones and of city centres are ready, especially those for Paris; M. Lozé, Head of Protocol at the Quai d’Orsay (4), told me yesterday, in confidence, that the Office of the President of the Republic, the Ministries, Parliament and the Central Administration of the State are to be transferred, from the first days of the declaration of war, to the region of Tours (about 160 kms from Paris).  M. Lozé showed me the plans which the Ministry was completing regarding accommodation and arrangements for the Diplomatic Corps accredited to the President of the Republic, and also mentioned to me in which castle (about 5 kms from Tours) the Ministry intended to accommodate the Nunciature.

As well as military preparations, attention is paid to the nation’s moral preparation, and the people now show that they are ready for the trial.  To this state of mind the Government’s attitude of not leaving any stone unturned to repeat that the situation is grave has been especially noticeable and everybody has been told to be ready for the greatest of sacrifices.

Certainly the moment could not be more delicate.  It is to be hoped, however, that the prayers of the good people, the action of the Holy See and the endeavours for peace of all well-meaning people could even at this stage avert the danger of a general conflagration.

PS:  Yesterday evening the Italian Ambassador (5), who came ot see me about a flattering speech on the Italian army given by a priest of the Archdiocese of Toulouse, told me that M. Bonnet (6) had notified the German Ambassador here, not only orally but also in writing, regarding the irrevocable decision of France an Great Britain to go to the help of Poland when this nation thought it was necessary. Notwithstanding all this, the German Ambassador himself, Count von Welczeck (7), thinks that in some circles near to Hitler many people still have illusions on the eventual attitude of the two Powers.

In this way Germany would repeat, and in a greater measure, the error of judgement about the British attitude as in 1914.

In any tragic situation there is also the comic or the almost comic element.  I was informed that recently there had been underhand dealings to sell to France the 1,400 aeroplanes taken from Czechoslovakia by Germany (8).  This, while it demonstrates the irresistible power of business, shows also the extreme necessity of Germany to get hold of foreign currency.


Notes: 
(1) Not published in ADSS.
(2) ADSS 1.68 n2. Emile Charveriat (1889-1964) Political Director, French Foreign Office 1937-40.
(3) ibid. Auguste Champetier de Ribes (1882-1947), Christian Democrat Deputy and Senator 1924-40.
(4) Maurice Lozé (??), Assistant Chief of Protocol of the French Foreign Office 1937-41.
(5) Raffaele Guariglia (1889-1970), Italian Ambassador to France 1937-40.
(6) Georges Bonnet (1889-1957), French Foreign Minister 1938-39.
(7) Johannes von Welczeck (1878-1972), German Ambassador to France 1936-39, DGFP, Series D, Volume 6, n602.  Note of the French Government, and ibid nn 603, 692-94.

(8) See DDI, Series 8, Volume 12, nn312, 361.  Ernst Weizsäcker denied any sale to France to Bernardo Attolico (1880-1942) Italian Ambassador to Germany 1935-39.

ADSS 1.83 Domenico Tardini, notes on threat of war


ADSS 1.83 Domenico Tardini, notes.

Reference: AES 4264/39 – handwritten notes

Location and date: Vatican, 04.07.1939

Summary statement: UK Minister, informed Maglione that Italy is mistaken if it thinks the UK will not go to war if Hitler occupies Danzig.  Maglione passed on the information to the Italian Ambassador to Holy See.

Language: Italian

Text:

Last Friday (1), the British Minister (2) told his Eminence that the Italian Foreign Office is probably making a mistake to think that if Hitler occupies Danzig Great Britain will not intervene.  The Minister emphasised instead that should this take place Britain will go to war. (3) Yesterday his Eminence summoned the Italian Ambassador (4) and communicated the British decision to him (5).


Notes: 
(1) 30.06.1939.
(2) D’Arcy Osborne (1884-1964), British Minister to the Holy See 1936-47.
(3) DPFP, Series 3, Volume 6, n275, p304, n2: Osborne reports to Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax a conversation with Cardinal Maglione, which seems to be the one of 30.06.1939.
(4) Bonifacio Pignatti (1877-1957) Italian Ambassador to the Holy See 1935-39.

(5) See Documenti Diplomatici Italiani, Series 8, Volume 12, n442, p337.  Pignatti reported the conversation to Ciano.

ADSS 1.82 Pacini to Maglione: Instructions received and executed

ADSS 1.82 Alfredo Pacini, Chargé d’Affaires, Warsaw Nunciature (1), to Luigi Maglione, Sec State.

Reference: Telegram 26 (AES 4182/39)

Location and date: Warsaw, 03.07.1939.

Summary statement: Nunciature has carried out instructions.

Language: Italian

Text:

I have carried out the orders contained in coded telegram Number 36. (2)


Notes: 
(1) Alfredo Pacini (1888-1967), Chargé d’affaires, Warsaw 1935-1944
(2) ADSS 1.78, 79.


ADSS 1.81Borgonginie Duca to Maglione: Italian view on current tensions

 ADSS 1.81 Francesco Borgongini Duca, Italy, to Luigi Maglione, Sec State.

Reference: Report number 7009 (AES 4248/39)

Location and date: Rome, 01.07.1939

Summary statement: Italian For Min, Ciano, talked about his father’s death.  Borgongini Duca spoke about Holy See steps with the Polish gov’t; expects Italy to exert a moderating influence on Hitler; Ciano re-assured Vatican that Germany will not move without Italy –which does not want war.  Ciano also promised to use his influence to calm the anti-religious attitude in Germany.  On the contrary, US Ambassador thinks the situation very grave.

Language: Italian

Text:

After the audience that the Holy Father deigned to give me last Sunday (1) and the instructions given me by your Eminence on the same morning, I immediately asked for an interview with Count Ciano. (2)  As, on Monday night, Count Ciano’s father died, I was afraid I would not see him in time. In fact, however, yesterday afternoon, Friday (3), I was called to Palazzo Chigi.  As he afterwards told me himself, this was the first audience given by him after his return to the office.

The minister spoke at length about his father’s death.

After this preamble, I asked him if I could speak about official matters, and he said “I am here for this; in fact I take the occasion to confirm that the Albanian Catholic children I holiday camps are completely separated from the Muslim children.” (4)

I related then what your Eminence told me last Sunday regarding the approach made by his Excellency, Monsignor Cortesi to the President of the Polish Republic, following his (Count Ciano’s) hint, and the President’s reply; (5) then I added that the Holy See relied Italy to exert a moderating influence on Hitler, especially regarding the Danzig and the Corridor questions. (6)

The Minister replied word-for-word that there is no danger in his view  that the situation would deteriorate: the tension of the last few days is dying down and Hitler personally told him during the last visit (7) that Germany needs a long period of peace.

“In any case Germany will not make a move without our consent, and neither I nor Mussolini want war”.

I then went on to speak about the persecution of the Catholics in Germany and I told him what your Eminence said to me about the worsening of the situation, although the Holy See had exerted the utmost tact in not offending the German Government in any way and in avoiding any motive, even only apparent, for fear of reprisals.

I spoke to him about the book on Pius II by Piccolomini, and of its poster, which betrays its publicity aim, and also about the other poster with the Holy Father’s picture. (8)  I added that I had learned fro revered and sad expressions of the Holy Father himself that he had precise arguments to affirm than never before had the Catholic Church been attacked and hurt in Germany as in the last few months, that is just after his elevation to the throne of Peter.

The Minister did not deny these grace and authorised statements, but he assured me that, as always, he will do his best to induce the Reich Government to behave better.

At the end of the audience I met Mr Philipps, the United States Ambassador who was going to see Ciano after me. (9) I asked him if the situation had improved; he answered in the negative, and that, in his opinion, it was still very grace “because one never gets a satisfactory reply”.

The short encounter did not allow me to get more explanations.

Notes: 
(1) 25.06.1939.
(2) Galeazzo Ciano (1903-1944), Italian Foreign Minister 1936-43.
(3) 30.06.1939.  Costanzo Ciano (1876-1939), President of the Italian Chamber of Deputies 1934-39.  His son wrote about his father’s death in Diario I.119-25.
(4) See Bernd Jürgen Fischer (1999) Albania at War 1939-1945, chapter two “The Construction of an Italian Albania”.  The Italian government poured considerable money into Catholic institutions in order to strengthen pro-italian sympathy among Catholic Albanians.  Not surprisingly, the Albanian Catholic clergy rallied to the Italian cause.
(5) ADSS 1.64. Ignacy Mościcki (1867-1946), Polish President 1926-39.
(6) It was a widely held opinion that Mussolini did have a controlling influence over Hitler.
(7) Ciano had visited Berlin between 21-22.05.1939 to sign the Alliance announced in Milan on 07.05.1939.
(8) An allusion to some anti-Catholic pamphlets in Germany.

(9) William Phillips (1878-1968), United States Ambassador to Italy 1936-41.

Sunday, July 26, 2015

Jacques Kornberg "The Pope's Dilemma: Pius XII Faces Atrocities and Genocide in the Second World War"

Jacques Kornberg's book, "The Pope's Dilemma" (2015, University of Toronto Press) arrived on my desk a few weeks before the end of the second school term here in Australia. That meant it would have to wait until exams were marked, reports written and students sent home to their parents.  And what a wait it was.  I had read the table of contents, glanced through the introduction, made a note of scholars cited in the index and resolved to resist the urge to read until I had sufficient time to do so without interruption.  I am happy to write that I was successful.




This is a significant work that advances our understanding of Eugenio Pacelli in several significant ways.  

Firstly, Kornberg is a master of the topic; his erudition is obvious from the opening pages.  This led me to believe I was in the hands of a well-informed, learned and balanced guide, who had a profound grasp of the various disciplines necessary to make serious comment on Pius XII. He demonstrates with clear and logical writing the arguments of the current historical arguments and debates as well as the claims of the "canonise him now" apologists. In order to this Kornberg has immersed himself into the available archival material, especially the Actes et Documents, as well as the latest current historical research from both sides of the debates.  And while the opening of the Vatican archives for the pontificate of Pius XII remains in the future, Kornberg, as do other historians, believes the reader has enough evidence upon which to make a sound judgement through use of the available material.

Secondly, Kornberg demonstrates a detailed familiarity with the vast literature on Pius, as well as his predecessors, Pius XI, Benedict XV and Leo XIII, and his successors John XXIII, Paul VI and John Paul II.  It was clear to see how Kronberg linked elements from Pius XII into broader papal politics and policies, following equally clear lines within Catholic theology and ecclesiology of the late-Tridentine era.  

Thirdly, Kornberg makes lucid and learned comment on the history of fascism, National Socialism, the relationship between the Catholic Church in Germany and the Nazi regime, the Concordat and the demise of the Catholic Centre Party.  Context is never sacrificed, and while at times, the reader might be tempted to skip a few pages here and there because of their familiarity with the subject matter, it is definitely worthwhile reading the whole text.

I believe Kornberg's most significant contribution lies in the explanation of a politics of consistency from Leo XIII through to Pius XI and then into the papacy of Pius XII. He challenges one of the consensus views of Pius XII, namely that he stood apart from other popes in his diplomatic approach to crises and his silence in the face of atrocities.  Surely Pius XI was a model of outspoken language that the more phlegmatic Pacelli sought to interpret and re-cast in more calming words?  A lengthy quote from page 186 established Kronberg's thesis.  I found it compelling.

At least until fairly recently the consensus was the Pius XII stood alone, that he brought baggage to the papacy that other popes did not, that his personality and training were ill-suited to the times ... Domenico Cardinal Tardini, Pius XII's undersecretary of state ... believed Pacelli's temperament made him a natural fence-sitter: he sought to "please everyone and displease no one" ... In keeping with this view of Pius XII, Michael Phayer argues that Pacelli's predecessor, Pius XI, far more passionate, forceful, and outspoken, would have responded differently to the destruction of European Jewry,  in keeping with the enormity of the crime.  These assessments of Pius XI are just beginning to change in the light of additional research.  Phayer later agreed with historians Gerhard Besier and Peter Godman that Pius XI was as diffident as his successor when it came to acting against "racism, totalitarianism, and Nazism."   ... I will argue that the foreign policies of modern pope just prior to Pius XII - Leo XIII, Benedict XV and Pius XI - in the face of war and even mass atrocities were all of a piece.

This chapter is the setting for the final chapters in the book that examine the priorities of Pius XII's action or inaction in the face of the mass murder and torture on unprecedented levels.  In his conclusion, Kornberg's assessment of Pius is chilling, but the process that brings him to this point is so clear and well-plotted, that I was hard pressed to find reason not to share his conclusion.

Pope Pius XII's responses, or lack of response, during the 1939-1945 war, were successful in his execution of his perceived role as Pastor Pastorum - shepherd of the shepherds -  and the visible head of Christ's church on earth.  He successfully defended the rights of the church in the face of the dangers of fascism, Nazism and Communism.  The institution survived the war; the hierarchy was still in place, churches were opened, clergy ministered to their people and the sacraments were celebrated.  However, Pius' non-defence of the moral norms and ethical principals that lie at the heart of Catholic Christianity are judged a failure.  Kornberg cites Pacelli's own words to lay the charge against him.  In his 1939 encyclical Summi Pontificatus, Pius said he would not and could not remain silent in the face of crimes against divine law.  His silence in the face of the mass-murder of Catholic Poles, Orthodox Serbs, Catholic and Orthodox Roma and Sinta, and then the genocide of European Jewry seals Kornberg's argument.

This is an important book that gives us possibly, the most important work to date on Pius XII within the contexts of the early twentieth century papacy and its relationship with the modern world.  It is a valuable complimentary volume to other works on Pius XII.  Professor Kornberg has done us a great service in his book. It is accessible to the professional historian well-versed in the study of Pacelli, and, more importantly, is accessible to the lay reader who wants to know more about a man, a pope, about whom there appears never enough said.


Emeritus Professor Jacques Kornberg