ADSS 1.207 Maglione to Valeri: Acknowledgement of report

ADSS 1.207 Luigi Maglione, Sec State, to Valerio Valeri, France

Reference:  AES 6443/39

Location and date: Vatican, 22.09.1939

Summary statement: Thanks Valeri for the information sent to him.  Requests more information.

Language: Italian

Text:

I am very grateful to Your Excellency for the interesting and accurate information sent with the reports Numbers 9062, 9100 and 9104 of 9, 13 and 15 September about the international situation. (1)

I read with particular interest this last report relating to the conversation you had with M. Bonnet during which you were able, very opportunely, to draw attention to the work done by the Holy See and which it will keep on doing to limit the present conflict.

I shall be grateful to you if you would continue to keep me informed on this grave subject.

Notes: 

(1) Of the three reports on the first one has been published in ADSS – 1.196 – the other two were concerned with information on the attitude of the newspapers about which the Nuncio had spoken with the Minister.

ADSS 1.203 Valeri to Maglione: French Government re-shuffle

ADSS 1.203 Valerio Valeri, France, to Luigi Maglione, Sec State

Reference: Report 9104/302, (AES 6564/39)

Location and date: Paris, 15.09.1939

Summary statement: Changes in gov’t.  Daladier goes to For Aff; strong war cabinet predicted, exerting pressure on neutral countries; Italian neutrality relied upon but eventual pressure could lead to war; Daladier does not trust Mussolini.

Language: Italian

Text:

I had already submitted my report Number 9100/298 of 13 September (1) when the news was broadcast of a change in the Government.  The most important change concerns the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  M. Bonnet leaves the Quai d’Orsay to take over the Justice Ministry (2) and is replaced by the Prime Minister.(3)   His assistants will be M. Champetier de Ribes, President of the Democratic Popular Party (4), M. Léger (5) and Ambassador Coulondre (6), who becomes the Chief of his Private Cabinet.

The rumour that M. Bonnet was to leave the Quai d’Orsay because of a disagreement with M. Daladier was current for some time, but then it was said that things would remain as they were.  The change, however, has taken place and its importance will not escape Your Eminence.  To perceive it, on the other hand, it would be sufficient to read M. Georges Bidault’s article in this morning’s edition of Aube (enclosed) (7) concerning the neutral countries.  The Press of the same political colour as the Aube, for example L’Epoque and others, regrets that a proper and complete War Cabinet has not yet been set up but anticipate it by the end of November when the special powers, given by Parliament to the present government expire.

We must anticipate, therefore, that under the influence of Britain strong pressure will be exerted on the neutral countries so as to force them to declare themselves for or against the Allies.  As for Italy, the Press continues, at least so far, to report everything, which shows M. Mussolini’s clear intention to keep out of the conflict.  Well-informed circles are sure that Italy has no intention of bargaining away her neutrality, as it was asserted, but intends to stay out because this corresponds with her own interests and the interests of the entire world.

But how likely are those people who follow certain ideological currents, or believe that an eventual participation of Italy in the war would be favourable to the Allies because it would give them the opportunity to report some great success or force Turkey and the Balkan nations into the conflict, to take reality into account?  It is impossible to foresee this at present and, on the other hand, a number of emergencies and very difficult moments are bound to develop.  How many problems would be raised, for example, if tomorrow one or more German submarines should succeed in entering the Mediterranean?

But let us hope that God will limit the conflict preventing a general conflagration.

Attached (copy)

I continue my Report 9104:

M. Daladier has never attempted to conceal his profound aversion for Mussolini. 

He says that Mussolini deceived him at Munich giving him to understand that when the Sudeten question was settled, Hitler would only be concerned with peaceful projects.

Notes: 

(1) ADSS 1.199

(2) Georges Bonnet (1889-1973), French Minister of Foreign Affairs 1938-39; Justice Minister 1939-40.

(3) Édouard Daladier (1884-1970), French Prime Minister 1938-40; Foreign Minister 1939-40.

(4) Auguste Champetier de Ribes (1882-1947), French Senator 1934-40.

(5) Alexis Léger (1887-1975), Secretary General French Foreign Ministry 1932-40.

(6) Robert Coloundre (1885-1959), French Ambassador to Germany 1936-39; Chief of the Private Cabinet of the Foreign Ministry 1939-40.

(7) Georges Bidault, “Les Neutres”, l’Aube, 15.09.1939: “If neutrality is not imposed on someone who is resigned to it because he is aware of his impotence, it is only the conclusion of stupid ignorance or faint-hearted calculations …”

ADSS 1.199 Valeri to Maglione: French hopes for Italian Neutrality

ADSS 1.199 Valerio Valeri, France, to Luigi Maglione, Sec State.

Reference: Report number 9100/298, (AES 6563/39)

Location and date: Paris, 13.09.1939

Summary statement: Meeting with French Foreign Minister, George Bonnet (1889-1973).  Italian neutrality appears secure.

Language: Italian

Text:

The day before yesterday, 11 September, I asked for an audience with Minister Bonnet (1) to talk to him about various difficulties that members of this Diplomatic Corps were experiencing on account of the recent security measures, when they were away from Paris.  Many of them, in fact, go to and fro having found accommodation outside Paris.

I took advantage of this meeting to talk to him about other things.  This I reminded the Prime Minister to see that steps were taken to protect the members of religious orders at least.  M. Bonnet promised he would deal with this immediately.  I also spoke to him about those missionaries in the republic of Haiti, on whose behalf you have given me instructions, and who are in danger of being called up.  On this point too the Government will try to satisfy the wishes of the Holy See.

We went on to talk about the international situation and especially about Italy.  M. Bonnet has seen M. Poncet (2) before me and told me that the news received form him was good.  He told me that Minister Ciano had called him by telephone on 31 August to inform him about the attempt made in extremis by Mussolini (3) to call a Conference, and on that occasion he had noticed the cordial tone of the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The French Government, it seems, already realise on an assured Italian neutrality, on this subject M. Bonnet suggested I should pay no attention to what people here, who do not know the facts, are saying, namely that it would be better if Italy entered the war. (4)  “The French and British Governments are of a completely different opinion” he affirmed.  He also said that the French Government was always ready to lend a friendly ear to the requests or wishes of Italy.

For my part, I assured him that the Holy See had done and would keep on doing everything in its power to limit the conflict, as, unfortunately, it had been impossible to prevent it and that the Holy Father considered it very important that good relations exist between France and Italy.  Then, as I pointed out the possible difficulties that might have to be overcome on account of the military pact between Germany and Italy, M. Bonnet replied he did not believe that there would be any difficulties in this respect, as, from information received from well informed sources during the Salzburg talks, M. Mussolini had sustained the view that a war need not be started for three years and that, in any case, Italy would have to agree to this. (5)

I have in fact received from other sources rumours that confirm the optimistic outlook of M. Bonnet.  Nor should we forget that Italy’s intervention, which would also affect Germany’s interests, would immediately be followed by Turkey’s entry into the war, as the Turkish Ambassador gave me to understand.  Hungary also wishes to remain neutral and her Minister here would like this to be known.

Before taking me leave, I asked M. Bonnet – who in the meantime was telling me that Marshal Petain had brought very good news from Spain and that France, Spain and Italy, if united could in the future carry out a great mission – if every hope had to be abandoned of stopping the conflict already in progress.  The reply did not leave me any illusions.

Notes: 

(1) George Bonnet (1889-1973), French Foreign Minister 1938-39.

(2) Andre Francois Poncet (1887-1978), French Ambassador to Italy 1938-40.

(3) According to Ciano Diario I, pp154-57, and of reports contained in DDI, Series 8, Volume 13, pp 407, 412, it appears Lord Halifax was the person to whom Ciano communicated the plan for a conference and the official information was given by the French and British Ambassadors.  On 2 September Ciano had a telephone conversation with Bonnet, this time to launch Mussolini’s plan afresh.

(4) See DGFP, Series D, Volume 7, n438.

(5) Ibid.

ADSS 1.164 Valeri to Maglione: time running out

ADSS 1.164 Valerio Valeri, France, to Luigi Maglione, Sec State.

Reference: Telegram number 126; (AES 5878/39)

Location and date: Paris, 31.08.1939

Summary statement: Public opinion believes next 48 hours will be decisive.  A delay of 15 days would help.  Perhaps Franco could help.

Language: Italian

Text:

After Polish mobilisation political circles here believe the next forty-eight hours will be decisive. (1)

The Minister of Foreign Affairs (2) tells me that it would be providential if the parties in conflict accepted a delay of ten or fifteen days to try and find a solution.

He mentioned to me the possibility of the intervention of His Holiness and General Franco.  Perhaps if the Holy Father did not think it opportune to intervene, he could influence Franco.

Notes: 

(1) The order for General Mobilisation in Poland was given the day before, 30.08.1939.

(2) Georges Bonnet (1889-1957), French Foreign Minister 1938-39.

ADSS 1.84: Valeri to Maglione: views on current tensions from France

ADSS 1.84 Valerio Valeri, France to Luigi Maglione, Sec State.

Reference: Report 8616/216 (AES 4412/39)

Location and date: Paris, 04.07.1939

Summary statement: French public opinion has understood the Pope’s approach for peace.  Nuncio has spoken to For Off about articles in the French press critical of the Pope; expresses opinion that France and UK are not recommending moderation to Poland.  Military preparations continue in France.  France and UK had informed Germany of their intention to defend Poland.

Language: Italian

Text:

Obeying the wish expressed by your Eminence with despatch number 4036/39 of 29 June 1939 (1) to keep you informed about changes in public opinion regarding the Holy See’s action, I am pleased to tell you that lately there have been no attacks or unfavourable comments against it.  Only on the occasion of the death of Minister Ciano’s father I noted that some leftish newspapers and even La Croix have reported a telegram in which it was said the first the Holy Father then your Eminence and lastly even the Apostolic Nuncio had expressed their sympathy.  The mention of the names and their sequence was not a mere coincidence.

In any case I think that the unrest created in the political circles and in some social sectors is quietening down completely.  From my side I have continued my work of necessary clarification.  So, not later than yesterday evening I was pointing out to M. Charveriat, Political Director at the Foreign Office, how unseemly and without foundation certain comments published in some newspapers were regarding the well-known steps taken by the Holy See.  I mentioned as well the articles of the Mercure de France on the conclave and on the Holy Father Pius XII (2).  The Minister told me he had read a summary of them without understanding who could have written or fostered them or what was their aim.  I told him then that we “unfortunately” knew their source; but, as it was obvious, although he wanted to know, I claimed it was a secret I was not entitled to divulge.  I hope, however, he more or less understood whom I meant from the way I expressed myself.  In any case, I think I must write agin on this point to give more details.

I have had occasion, too, to point out to Minister Champetier de Ribes with whom I travelled last Sunday to Sens, the incongruities and contradictions of M. Pezet’s speech at the Popular Democratic Party Congress (3).

Passing on to the international situation it is necessary that I tell your Eminence that seen from here it is still very grave and that the danger of an armed conflict is becoming more probable on account of the tension regarding the Danzig issue.  On this subject, in my conversations at the Quai d’Orsay, I have had the clear confirmation that neither France nor Great Britain intend to exert any action upon Poland to induce them to use moderation and to agree to negotiate with Germany.  It has been declared that the two great Western Powers are, therefore, ready to march alongside Poland when the latter, defending her threatened rights, decides to take arms against Germany.  France and England have, therefore, placed the determining of the casus belli in the hands of Poland.

The Government in the meantime continues to organise with increasing speed the military and material preparation of the nation.   Plans for the evacuation of frontier zones and of city centres are ready, especially those for Paris; M. Lozé, Head of Protocol at the Quai d’Orsay (4), told me yesterday, in confidence, that the Office of the President of the Republic, the Ministries, Parliament and the Central Administration of the State are to be transferred, from the first days of the declaration of war, to the region of Tours (about 160 kms from Paris).  M. Lozé showed me the plans which the Ministry was completing regarding accommodation and arrangements for the Diplomatic Corps accredited to the President of the Republic, and also mentioned to me in which castle (about 5 kms from Tours) the Ministry intended to accommodate the Nunciature.

As well as military preparations, attention is paid to the nation’s moral preparation, and the people now show that they are ready for the trial.  To this state of mind the Government’s attitude of not leaving any stone unturned to repeat that the situation is grave has been especially noticeable and everybody has been told to be ready for the greatest of sacrifices.

Certainly the moment could not be more delicate.  It is to be hoped, however, that the prayers of the good people, the action of the Holy See and the endeavours for peace of all well-meaning people could even at this stage avert the danger of a general conflagration.

PS:  Yesterday evening the Italian Ambassador (5), who came ot see me about a flattering speech on the Italian army given by a priest of the Archdiocese of Toulouse, told me that M. Bonnet (6) had notified the German Ambassador here, not only orally but also in writing, regarding the irrevocable decision of France an Great Britain to go to the help of Poland when this nation thought it was necessary. Notwithstanding all this, the German Ambassador himself, Count von Welczeck (7), thinks that in some circles near to Hitler many people still have illusions on the eventual attitude of the two Powers.

In this way Germany would repeat, and in a greater measure, the error of judgement about the British attitude as in 1914.

In any tragic situation there is also the comic or the almost comic element.  I was informed that recently there had been underhand dealings to sell to France the 1,400 aeroplanes taken from Czechoslovakia by Germany (8).  This, while it demonstrates the irresistible power of business, shows also the extreme necessity of Germany to get hold of foreign currency.

Notes: 

(1) Not published in ADSS.

(2) ADSS 1.68 n2. Emile Charveriat (1889-1964) Political Director, French Foreign Office 1937-40.

(3) ibid. Auguste Champetier de Ribes (1882-1947), Christian Democrat Deputy and Senator 1924-40.

(4) Maurice Lozé (??), Assistant Chief of Protocol of the French Foreign Office 1937-41.

(5) Raffaele Guariglia (1889-1970), Italian Ambassador to France 1937-40.

(6) Georges Bonnet (1889-1957), French Foreign Minister 1938-39.

(7) Johannes von Welczeck (1878-1972), German Ambassador to France 1936-39, DGFP, Series D, Volume 6, n602.  Note of the French Government, and ibid nn 603, 692-94.

(8) See DDI, Series 8, Volume 12, nn312, 361.  Ernst Weizsäcker denied any sale to France to Bernardo Attolico (1880-1942) Italian Ambassador to Germany 1935-39.