ADSS 1.269 Maglione to Orsenigo: conversation with Ribbentrop

ADSS 1.269 Luigi Maglione, Sec State, to Cesare Orsenigo, Germany

Reference: AES 2360/40

Location and date: Vatican, 19.03.1940

Summary statement: Maglione informs Orsenigo of his conversation with Ribbentrop.

Language: Italian

Text:

I take pleasure in sending Your Excellency, for your information and guidance , some notes on the two meetings – one in the Vatican and the other in the German Embassy to the Holy See – which the German Foreign Minister had with me on the 11.03.1940, soon after his audience with the Holy Father (1).

The Minister affirmed his pleasure, several times, in having been able to see the Holy Father and to talk with him about the religious position in Germany taking advantage of his time in Rome to settle a few questions with the Italian Government.

He also told me that he was able, during the audience, to note with great satisfaction that the Pope still has his heart in Germany, and a great wish to reach a firm and lasting agreement with Hitler.

He added that Hitler also wants a sound and lasting settlement.  He has already given proof of his goodwill by stopping, by the hundreds, the proceedings against the clergy.  But Hitler is a man with far-sighted plans and thinks more of the future than of the present.  We cannot therefore think that we can reach the desired settlement at present.  Germany is now engaged in a terrific struggle for its own existence and greatness. Hitler has all Germans on his side: their energy is devoted to the attainment of victory; it is not possible to think about other problems.  Afterwards we will negotiate.

I did not fail to point out to the Minister that religion is also concerned with the present and it is therefore not possible to set aside the current problems which hamper it and cause sorrow, pain and grace danger to souls.  Replying to one of his frequent allusions to the so-called political activity of the German clergy, I recalled to him the Holy See’s instructions on this subject, instructions which the German clergy, at least generally speaking, obey scrupulously.  If in some particular instance these instructions have not been obeyed, the only thing to do would be to inform the competent ecclesiastical authority which would immediately remedy it.  But it would be a grave error, I added, to see political motives in the overall activity of clergy and people.

From here, passing to more concrete points, I recalled the particular attention of the Minister to some of the many facts which the Church has lately been compelled to deplore: these have already been communicated to the German Embassy to the Holy See with our note of last July which so far has not been replied to, and in particular other more recent notes, as for example the closing down of Seminaries and Theological Faculties, without even informing the Holy See although this is a matter which comes under the Concordat.

Regarding Poland – as the Minister handed to me an official publication on the Polish atrocities against the Germans and mentioned the political activity of the Polish clergy – I told him that the Holy See wishes to be accurately informed and therefore they have several times asked Berlin for permission to send a trusted clergyman to Poland namely Monsignor Colli, Counsellor of the Nunciature in Germany, but until now they have not had a reply in the sense desired; and in the meantime, the various reports which circulate on the situation in Poland, some of which cannot be confuted, are becoming very distressing.  We can ask the Polish priests to abstain from creating difficulties to the occupying authority, but it is not possible to pretend that they should renounce their love of their own country.  The presence of the Holy See’s envoy, I added, would help in clearing misunderstandings and in assisting the priests in their undertaking to devote themselves exclusively to their pastoral ministry.  He could, by keeping in touch with the German authorities, give useful directives and good advice to help the Bishops to bring the religious situation back to normal.  But I only received a vague reply.

I spoke also of the necessity of helping the poor Polish population and I reminded him of the request already made for the consent of the Berlin Government for organising assistance under the control of the Holy See’s envoy in agreement with the occupying power.  But I did not get a satisfactory reply.

At Villa Bonaparte I spoke again of the advantage of having a representative of the Holy See in Warsaw, in the interest of Germany itself.  He replied that he would think about it but added explicitly that he could not promise anything.  He spoke again about Hitler’s goodwill (who is looking to the future) and about the necessity of setting aside particular questions.

Notes:

(1) ADSS 1.257, 258.

ADSS 1.72 Maglione to Valeri: Holy See and International Diplomatic Academy

Volume and Document Number: ADSS 1.72 Luigi Maglione, Sec State, to Valerio Valeri, France.

Reference: AES 3754/39, draft

Location and date: Vatican, 24.06.1939

Summary statement: The Holy See cannot participate in initiatives of the International Diplomatic Academy.

Language: Italian

Text:

I have duly received the careful report of your Excellency, Number 8415.179, of 10 June, regarding the proposal of an international diplomatic meeting. (1)

I thank your Excellency for having diligently reported what M. de la Barra and M. Frangulis have expressed regarding the initiative they wish to take to protect peace.

This can certainly prove to be an excellent initiative: but as you have already so well explained to the two gentlemen, the Holy See must preserve its moral independence, in order to be able to exert5 with some hop of success, in an atmosphere so troubled by political passions, its providential conciliatory action amongst nations.

Notes: 

(1) ADSS 1.60

ADSS 1.3 Cesare Orsenigo, Germany to Cardinal Maglione: report on Czechoslovakia

ADSS 1.3 Orsenigo, Germany to Maglione, Sec State.

Reference: Report 26,724 (AES 1283/39)

Location and date: Berlin, 18.03.1939

Summary statement: Details regarding the occupation of Czechoslovakia and public reaction in Germany.

Language: Italian

Text:

Further to my telegram number 316 of 15.03.1939 (1) I send the following details obtained confidentially from colleagues.

1. From many small sings, which now, in the light accomplished fact take form and gain clarity, it would be possible to say that not only the occupation of the Czech nation but also the method in which it was carried out, that is utilising German elements cleverly placed beforehand in the territory to be occupied, were planned a long time ahead.  In this light even the fact of having countermanded the transfer of the German Theological Faculty to Reichenberg (German Sudeten territory) and of keeping it instead in Prague alongside the Czech faculty, would be explained.

2. The conversation during the night between Mr Hácha (2), President of Czechoslovakia, and the Führer must have been very brief and consisted in posing the tragic dilemma: “Either the Czech nation entrusts itself into the hands of Germany or I will march into Prague.”

3. The instantaneous occupation of the airfields and of the frontiers and exit points from Bohemia seems to have been primarily for police reasons, to prevent the escape of the hated refugees, both German and Jewish, who for many years had spoken and written against the Third Reich and its Führer.

4. The Berlin diplomats, including those of the nations who had signed the Munich Treaty or were present when it was signed, were kept in the dark about every move: it is said that even the Italian Government was informed about this action only during the night of the 15^th. (3) Someone, such as the Polish ambassador, had tried on Monday and Tuesday to make inquiries at the Berlin Foreign Office but without results; all high officials were reported absent on Monday and Tuesday. (4)

5. The French Ambassador (5), who called at the Foreign Ministry after the occupation expected to receive some explanation.  When he said “You have violated the spirit of the Munich Treaty” he was rebuffed with the ferocious accusation that France:

a) had started an armament race just after the signing of the Munich Treaty;

b) had given money to Czechoslovakia – of which the Germans pretended to have proofs – for purposes not consonant with the spirit of the Munich pact.

6. One of the most effective “subversive” elements at the disposal of Germany was represented by the Slovak peasants who had been working in Germany.  When these rural workers were returned to their country and saw the state of misery which it was in and for which Prague was accused of being responsible they started to extol the well-being of German people to the point that in a few months the country became completely anti-Czech and pro-German.  The Fuhrer took advantage of this psychological situation to bring pressure to bear on the unfortunate Monsignor Tiso, President of Slovakia, who had not the foresight to resign in time. (6)

7. The last step taken by the Slovak Government, that is to ask again for German protection, nay lead to a so-called “protectorate” also for Slovakia.

8. Mr Mastny, the Czechoslovakian Minister in Berlin (7), who should have left his post, has been restrained from doing so by the German government, probably to give the impression, if need be, that Prague still has a diplomatic representative in Berlin.

9. It is said that all Czechoslovak Legations abroad have been ordered to deliver their archives intact to the German diplomatic representatives in the respective capitals.  Likewise the Foreign Ministry archive in Prague was one of the first offices occupied by the German police.  It is easy to imagine the nature and number of documents now under investigating Germany eyes.

10.  The reaction of the Berlin population is varied.  The Catholic people are silence; outwardly they are in unison with the rest of the population but feel the moral guilt for the aggressive practices and violation of treaties by their own Government.  The Protestants seem less sensitive in general to moral considerations and to approve more readily of political success; let us hope that their Pastors at least are less superficial.  The young people, members of the National Socialist or not, of all denominations, are exultant at the results of this action, which they praise for having been bloodless, but they feel no sympathy for the tears and humiliation of the entire Czech population, neither do they worry about the moral issue caused by the violation of treaties.  This is the result of the nationalist fanaticism of the new generation, erected a supreme standard for the life of the peoples.

11. It has been reported that in the plan elaborated between Berlin and Slovakia a coup d’etat to take place in Slovakia on 15 March was anticipated, when this state would have immediately declared its independence from Prague.  This plan came to the knowledge of the Czechs and caused the precipitate intervention of the Central Government in Prague who immediately deposed the Slovak Government presided over by Monsignor Tiso.  Germany took immediate advantage of this action by siding openly with Slovakia, maintaining that the only constitutional government was the one under Dr Tiso.  The Prague Government, frightened by the course of events, sought salvation by appealing to Berlin for help, and this was the trap into which they fell, because even as the President of Czechoslovakia was travelling towards Berlin to ask for help, steps had been taken here for the imminent occupation of Czechoslovakia.

Notes: 

(1) ADSS 1.2

(2) Emil Hácha (1872-1945), President of Czechoslovakia 1938-39.

(3) The Italian Foreign Minister, Galeazzo Ciano (1903-1944), claimed he was informed only on 15.03.1939 in a personal message from the Prince William of Hesse (1905-1942). (Ciano, Diaries, Volume 1, p 55).

(4) Józef Lipski (1894-1958), Polish Ambassador to Germany 1934-39.

(5) See DGFP D, IV, number 233, pp 238-39.  Note of the Secretary of State on his conversation with French Ambassador Robert Coulondre(1885-1959).

(6) Jozef Tiso (1887-1947), Catholic priest and President of Slovakia 1939-45.

(7) Vojtech Mastny (1874-1954) Czechoslovakian minister to Germany 1938-39

ADSS 9.433 Salvatore Asta notes on Padre Benedetto

ADSS 9.433 Fr Salvatore Asta (1) notes on Padre Benedetto.

Reference:  ASS Guerra Varia 43/10

Location and date:  Rome, 19.11.1943

Summary statement: Information on the activity of Fr Marie-Benoît for the Jews.

Language: Italian

Text:

 Dr Carlo Carapelle, Commissioner for Immigration – in Via Romagna – told me in confidence, that he had been instructed to denounce some people, including Padre Maria-Benedetto, Capuchin, because they have forged his [Carapelle’s] signature and the stamp of his institution, in order to obtain ration cards for approximately 300 foreigners. (2)

He wishes to save Padre Benedetto who is considered to be an appointee of the Vicariate or the Holy See. (3)

It seems that in the meantime, the said religious, has made an effort to help these poor unhappy people obtain ration cards, believing that the agency had granted the appropriate permissions.

It would be necessary to prevent the lodging of the denunciation, and also to prevent the people, almost all Jewish, who have received the ration cards, from being handed over to the German authorities.

Dr Carapelle promises his support and that to help them reach their goal it would be a good idea to have a word with Commissioner De Dominicis from the same office.

Dr Carapelle, the Commissioner for Migration and Colonisation, ensures that as long as the current situation with regard to the Jews exists, he will suspend the lodging of the denunciation against the people who have forged his signature and the High Commission’s stamp.

20.11.1943: Note of Angelo Dell’Acqua

I told Padre Benedetto repeatedly, (and the last time in a very clear manner), to use the utmost caution and prudence in the interests of the Jews …:  It seems, unfortunately, that he did want to listen to the humble advice offered to him … (4)

Note of Cardinal Maglione:

But is there anything that can be done now?  I do not think so.

Notes: 

(1) Salvatore Asta (1915-2004), worked in the Secretariat of State

(2) The organisation was Padre Benedetto’s Comitato Assistenza Profughi – Committee of Assistance for Refugees.  See ADSS 9.264, 267, 412, 415

(3) The “vicariate” refers to the administration of the Diocese of Rome.  The pope is the bishop of Rome, but the administration of the diocese is entrusted to the pope’s vicar, hence the term vicariate. Vatican City State is not included in the Vicariate of Rome.  Governorship of the Vatican City is overseen by the Governor of the Holy See, an office held at the time by Marchese Camillo Serafini (1864-1952) and the Pontifical Commission for Vatican City State.

(4) The editing of this note could be open to suggestion that the editors decided to omit something less than positive in Dell’Acqua’s comments.