ADSS 1.4 Filippo Cortesi, Poland to Cardinal Maglione: German Polish tension

ADSS 1.4 Filippo Cortesi (1), Poland to Luigi Maglione, Secretary of State.

Reference: Report number 202, (AES 1528/39)

Location and date: Warsaw, 18.03.1939

Summary statement: German-Polish tension; German note on their claims in Poland and Polish reply.

Language: Italian

Text:

Warsaw, and with it the entire nation, lives through days of great anxiety and earnest patriotism, following the uncertain and vague news of grave international events appearing in the Press and watching the extraordinary measures taken by the Government and the movement of the troops at the frontier.

The Government has not yet issued any official statement to the Press on the situation; but the fact that Parliament has been adjourned for 30 days and the various appeals to the country, inviting the people to stand together in disciplined calm, are signs that a serious danger threatens the nations.

I have been informed that the Government has today given in confidence to the principal Press representatives the following news which I hasten to send to your Eminence.

The Reich has sent to the Polish Government a Note (2) with the following demands:

1. Annexation of Danzig to the Reich, including the port of Westerplatte, the railway and other properties of the Polish Government included in the area of the Free Port.

2. Transfer of a strip of territory through Pomerania from Chojnice (German: Konitz) to Tczew (German: Dirschau), which links West Prussia with East Prussia.

3. German participation in the main Polish steel plants in Silesia.

The Government replied: Poland observes the Non-aggression Pact of 1934.  And being invited almost in the form of an ultimatum to clarify its position replied: Poland has no claim whatsoever on German Territory.

After this the Reich requested permission to send a military aircraft to Warsaw to remain at the disposal of the German Ambassador; the Government’s immediate reply was that as many as five aeroplanes could be sent.

It is to be noted that this bandying of words has taken place orally or by notes, between the German Ambassador and the Polish Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, although Minister Beck was in office in Warsaw. (3)

A state of tension, therefore, exists between the Reich and Poland, which could have the most serious consequences.  Undoubtedly, both Government and people are ready to defend the integrity, the rights and the liberty of Poland at any cost, and to stand fast in this resolve and to trust only in their own strength.  The proof of this is the enthusiasm with which people from every walk of life have accepted and willingly subscribe to a great national loan.

In political and diplomatic circles there is the feeling that in case of armed conflict Poland, who has received in the last few days a big loan from Great Britain to assist the manufacturing industries, could count on the help of the Western Powers.  It is also believed that Italy, long standing friend of Poland, will exert its influence to avoid an armed conflict between Germany and Poland.

Notes:

(1) Archbishop Filippo Cortesi (1876-1947) Nuncio to Poland 1936-47. 

(2) DGFP, D, VI, no. 61, pp 58-60 – Ribbentrop’s note of 21.03.1939 in which he claimed Danzig and a motorway link with East Prussia.

(3) Hans-Adolf von Moltke (1884-1943), German Ambassador to Poland 1931-39; Jan Szembek (1881-1945), Polish Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 1932-39; Jozef Beck (1894-1944), Polish Foreign Minister 1932-39.

ADSS 1.3 Cesare Orsenigo, Germany to Cardinal Maglione: report on Czechoslovakia

ADSS 1.3 Orsenigo, Germany to Maglione, Sec State.

Reference: Report 26,724 (AES 1283/39)

Location and date: Berlin, 18.03.1939

Summary statement: Details regarding the occupation of Czechoslovakia and public reaction in Germany.

Language: Italian

Text:

Further to my telegram number 316 of 15.03.1939 (1) I send the following details obtained confidentially from colleagues.

1. From many small sings, which now, in the light accomplished fact take form and gain clarity, it would be possible to say that not only the occupation of the Czech nation but also the method in which it was carried out, that is utilising German elements cleverly placed beforehand in the territory to be occupied, were planned a long time ahead.  In this light even the fact of having countermanded the transfer of the German Theological Faculty to Reichenberg (German Sudeten territory) and of keeping it instead in Prague alongside the Czech faculty, would be explained.

2. The conversation during the night between Mr Hácha (2), President of Czechoslovakia, and the Führer must have been very brief and consisted in posing the tragic dilemma: “Either the Czech nation entrusts itself into the hands of Germany or I will march into Prague.”

3. The instantaneous occupation of the airfields and of the frontiers and exit points from Bohemia seems to have been primarily for police reasons, to prevent the escape of the hated refugees, both German and Jewish, who for many years had spoken and written against the Third Reich and its Führer.

4. The Berlin diplomats, including those of the nations who had signed the Munich Treaty or were present when it was signed, were kept in the dark about every move: it is said that even the Italian Government was informed about this action only during the night of the 15^th. (3) Someone, such as the Polish ambassador, had tried on Monday and Tuesday to make inquiries at the Berlin Foreign Office but without results; all high officials were reported absent on Monday and Tuesday. (4)

5. The French Ambassador (5), who called at the Foreign Ministry after the occupation expected to receive some explanation.  When he said “You have violated the spirit of the Munich Treaty” he was rebuffed with the ferocious accusation that France:

a) had started an armament race just after the signing of the Munich Treaty;

b) had given money to Czechoslovakia – of which the Germans pretended to have proofs – for purposes not consonant with the spirit of the Munich pact.

6. One of the most effective “subversive” elements at the disposal of Germany was represented by the Slovak peasants who had been working in Germany.  When these rural workers were returned to their country and saw the state of misery which it was in and for which Prague was accused of being responsible they started to extol the well-being of German people to the point that in a few months the country became completely anti-Czech and pro-German.  The Fuhrer took advantage of this psychological situation to bring pressure to bear on the unfortunate Monsignor Tiso, President of Slovakia, who had not the foresight to resign in time. (6)

7. The last step taken by the Slovak Government, that is to ask again for German protection, nay lead to a so-called “protectorate” also for Slovakia.

8. Mr Mastny, the Czechoslovakian Minister in Berlin (7), who should have left his post, has been restrained from doing so by the German government, probably to give the impression, if need be, that Prague still has a diplomatic representative in Berlin.

9. It is said that all Czechoslovak Legations abroad have been ordered to deliver their archives intact to the German diplomatic representatives in the respective capitals.  Likewise the Foreign Ministry archive in Prague was one of the first offices occupied by the German police.  It is easy to imagine the nature and number of documents now under investigating Germany eyes.

10.  The reaction of the Berlin population is varied.  The Catholic people are silence; outwardly they are in unison with the rest of the population but feel the moral guilt for the aggressive practices and violation of treaties by their own Government.  The Protestants seem less sensitive in general to moral considerations and to approve more readily of political success; let us hope that their Pastors at least are less superficial.  The young people, members of the National Socialist or not, of all denominations, are exultant at the results of this action, which they praise for having been bloodless, but they feel no sympathy for the tears and humiliation of the entire Czech population, neither do they worry about the moral issue caused by the violation of treaties.  This is the result of the nationalist fanaticism of the new generation, erected a supreme standard for the life of the peoples.

11. It has been reported that in the plan elaborated between Berlin and Slovakia a coup d’etat to take place in Slovakia on 15 March was anticipated, when this state would have immediately declared its independence from Prague.  This plan came to the knowledge of the Czechs and caused the precipitate intervention of the Central Government in Prague who immediately deposed the Slovak Government presided over by Monsignor Tiso.  Germany took immediate advantage of this action by siding openly with Slovakia, maintaining that the only constitutional government was the one under Dr Tiso.  The Prague Government, frightened by the course of events, sought salvation by appealing to Berlin for help, and this was the trap into which they fell, because even as the President of Czechoslovakia was travelling towards Berlin to ask for help, steps had been taken here for the imminent occupation of Czechoslovakia.

Notes: 

(1) ADSS 1.2

(2) Emil Hácha (1872-1945), President of Czechoslovakia 1938-39.

(3) The Italian Foreign Minister, Galeazzo Ciano (1903-1944), claimed he was informed only on 15.03.1939 in a personal message from the Prince William of Hesse (1905-1942). (Ciano, Diaries, Volume 1, p 55).

(4) Józef Lipski (1894-1958), Polish Ambassador to Germany 1934-39.

(5) See DGFP D, IV, number 233, pp 238-39.  Note of the Secretary of State on his conversation with French Ambassador Robert Coulondre(1885-1959).

(6) Jozef Tiso (1887-1947), Catholic priest and President of Slovakia 1939-45.

(7) Vojtech Mastny (1874-1954) Czechoslovakian minister to Germany 1938-39

ADSS 1.2 Cesare Orsenigo, Germany to Cardinal Maglione - Germans have entered Czechoslovakia

ADSS 1.2 Cesare Orsenigo (1), Germany to Luigi Maglione (2).

Reference: Telegram 316 (AES 1037/39)

Location and date: Berlin, 15.03.1939

Summary statement: Entry of German troops into Czechoslovakia

Language: Italian

Text:

German troops have occupied Prague, and it appears that they will occupy the entire Czech territory during the course of today. (3)

Hitler and Foreign Minister have already left for occupied territory. (4)

Nothing is known regarding future settlement; Slovakia will be granted autonomy; Czechs may be absorbed but Anchluss not yet proclaimed.

Notes:

(1) Archbishop Cesare Orsenigo (1873-1946), Nuncio to Germany 1929-45.

(2) Cardinal Luigi Maglione (1877-1944), Secretary of State to Pope Pius XII 1939-44.

(3) Hitler summoned Czech president Emil Hacha (1872-1945) to Berlin on 14.03.1939 and delivered an ultimatum that Czechoslovakia surrender to Germany or endure invasion.  Hacha suffered a heart attack during the meeting and was kept awake until he accepted Hitler’s terms.  Hitler had earlier met with Slovak leader, Jozef Tiso and promised Slovak independence. 

(4) Hitler arrived in Prague on 16.03.1939 and proclaimed the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.  Joachim Ribbentrop (1893-1946) was foreign minister 1938-1945.

ADSS 1.1 Pope Pius XII - Message to the World

ADSS 1.1 Pope Pius XII message to the world

Reference: AES 2210/39; Acta Apostolicae Sedis XXXI (1939), pp 86-87.

Location and date: Vatican, 03.03.1939

Summary statement: A greeting to the entire world, Catholic and non-Catholic, with solemn undertakings in the cause of peace. (1)

Language: Italian.

Text:

In this moment when the very heavy responsibility of the Supreme Pontificate (which God, in the hidden wisdom of his providence has placed upon our shoulders) moves us to the depth of our being and well night breaks our spirit, we feel ourselves driven by the necessity, as we turn in spirit, to turn also in fatherly speech to the whole Catholic world.

We salute, with all possible good will, each and every one of our venerable brethren of the episcopate.  We bless the priests, ministers of Jesus Christ and stewards of the Mysteries of God, and We bless also the men and women of the religious orders and all those who assist the hierarchy in its apostolic role, whether they devote their energies to the missions by which the kingdom of Jesus Christ is on all sides extended, or whether, led by their bishops, they strive in Catholic Action.

We finally implore all heavenly gifts and the divine consolation for all our children, wherever in the world they dwell, and especially for the poor and for those whom pain and sorrow afflict.

Our minds turn also to all those whose life is passed beyond the limits of the Catholic Church, and who, we are sure, will gladly hear that, in this solemn hour, we beseech the Almighty and all merciful God to send them his divine assistance.

To this our fatherly message we desire to add an invitation to, and indeed an augury of peace. (2) We speak of that peace which our predecessor of pious memory tried to inspire in men and for which he uttered such fervent prayers, offering his own life to God for the restoration of concord among men; peace, the fairest of all God’s gifts, that passes all understanding, the peace that all men of feeling cannot but strive for; the peace, in fine, which arises from justice and charity.  This is the peace to which we exhort all, the peace which brings new warmth to those already joined in friendship with God, which moderates and tempers private interests with the sacred love of Jesus Christ, the peace which joins nations and peoples through mutual brotherly love, so that each race, by a feeling common to all, by friendly helping alliances, strives with God’s inspiration and aid, for the greater happiness of the whole human family.

Moreover, in such anxious times as these, while so many difficulties, such grace difficulties, seem to prevent that true peace which all so earnestly desire, and to keep it at a distance, we humbly pray to God for all who are placed in authority over states, upon whom falls the heavy burden and the high distinction of leading their peoples to prosperity and to civic progress.

Such, Eminent fathers, Venerable Brothers, and most dear children, is the first desire with which God has inspired our father’s heart.

The very serious ills that afflict men everywhere do not escape our gaze, those ills which, though we be resourceless, save in the aid of the Most High, in which indeed we place all our trust, it is our office to heal.  Borrowing the words of St Paul we urge all, “Receive us”.  We take courage in our trust that you, brethren and most dear children, will be the last to fall short in all that belongs to the work of forwarding this desire of our heart, the peaceful reconciliation of mankind.  After the help of God, it is in your prompt and eager goodwill that our confidence chiefly lies.

May Christ our Lord “of whose fullness we have all received” (John 1.16), harken from heaven to this our desire, that it my be spread through all the world, an augury of comfort and well being, and may the Apostolic Blessing also be a like augury which we most lovingly impart.

Notes: 

(1) Cardinal Eugenio Pacelli (1876-1958) was elected pope during the evening of 02.03.1939.  It was on the following morning, when the cardinals were assembled again in the Sistine Chapel, that the new pope delivered this message.  The pope spoke at about 11.30.

(2) The original Italian text shows more clearly than the Latin version the four kinds of peace, which are distinguishable: 1) spiritual peace; 2) family peace; 3) social peace within nations; and 4) international peace between nations.

Back to the beginning ...Pius XII, peace proposals and European realpolitik.

A couple of months ago I completed the history of the destruction of Hungarian Jewry as seen through ADSS.  It revealed yet again, the volume of information available to the Pope and his advisers, information that was accurate and timely.  A pattern of papal response emerges from 1944 that is markedly different to what had occurred in the years prior. Up to June 1944 Pius XII made generalised statements that could be read as condemnations of German atrocities against Jews even though Jews were never named as a specific victim group.  After the liberation of Rome, Pius was more free to speak than at any other time during the war.  His personal telegram to Admiral Horthy of Hungary urging an end to persecution of people on racial grounds was a breakthrough.  I believe Pius, who had arguably the best diplomatic and historical perspective in Europe of any leader at the time, was now caught between the "rock" of a certain German defeat and the "hard place" of an equally certain Soviet victory across Eastern and much of Central Europe.  His life-long aversion to Bolshevism was too entrenched to be swayed towards any form of compromise.  And yet, his statements could not deny what was arriving on the desk of the Secretariat of State, which from August 1944 after the death of Cardinal Maglione, was the pope's desk.

History is the account of what was, not what if.  I will not indulge in fantasies along those lines.  What I think is of importance is to go back to the available sources and examine them to see if we can come to a clearer understanding of why Pius refrained from explicit statements and the processes that were engaged in.

A couple of well-worn historical tools will help.  Michael Burleigh in his excellent Moral Combat: a history of World War II, emphasises the necessity to avoid the temptation to slip into hindsight history.  It is easy for me to sniff when I read Neville Chamberlain's name or damn Alexis Leger of the French Foreign Ministry and his craven attitude towards Hitler.  Chamberlain and Leger were astute politicians and skilled diplomats, and they were men of their time and had the all-too harrowing memories of the 1914-1918 war etched on their minds and memories.  If war could be avoided, it should.  Hitler's demands were not unreasonable surely?  It came as no surprise that the new Pope, elected days before the Germans broke another promise and entered Prague, made peace the first priority of his papacy.

The first six months of his papacy - March to September 1939 - were tense and frustrating. In Volume One of ADSS there are close to 40 documents that give us a very clear picture of a papal initiative that sought to prevent the outbreak of war.  Pius proposed a peace conference and offered the skills of the Holy See to help in anyway whatsoever.  I believe Pius wanted to believe that Hitler did not want to go to war.  Pius was under no illusions as to the sort of man Hitler was; he was not to be trusted.  However if the major European powers came together, might not this help to rein in the German Chancellor? 

All efforts for the conference came to nought, but not for want of effort on the part of the Pope.  I will post the documents related to the peace conference over the next few posts.  

Volume One of ADSS was published in 1965.  Since then there has been a lot more information made available.  I crave the reader's indulgence when reading the notes. I have erred, I hope, on the side of caution, in order to make the process easier rather than more difficult.

Haunting images of the Jews of Budapest in October 1944.

Posting document after document relaying the tragedy that struck Hungarian Jewry after the Arrow Cross Fascists seized power in October 1944 was one way the historian attempts to piece together the narrative and provide interpretation of events.  Angelo Rotta's detailed and accurate descriptions of the events engulfing the Jews of Budapest provide a powerful entree into the unfolding tragedy.

Another source of the tragedy that I have only come across recently are the photographic records made by official German photographers, officially sanctioned by the Ministry of Propaganda.  The German Federal Archive has engaged in a joint project with Wikipedia and made available thousands of images from the war years. On 6 December 2008 the archive made over 100,000 images available via Wikimedia Commons.

It is not hard to imagine that Angelo Rotta had scenes like this in mind when he sent his reports to Rome.  Images such as this have appeared before, but seeing it in the context of the dozens of photos taken it is even more evocative. It is the face of the little girl in the lower right and the anger in the face of the young guard on the left that caught my eye and reminded me yet again, that history is the story of human beings.

Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-680-8285A-25,_Budapest,_Festnahme_von_Juden.jpg

About the photographer, Faupel, we know next to nothing.  The collection can be viewed here.