ADSS 1.271 Pacini to Maglione: Conversation with Polish Minister Beck

ADSS 1.271 Alfredo Pacini, Charge d’affaires, Polish Nunciature in Angers, France, to Luigi Maglione, Sec State.

Reference: Report 15/40 (AES 2954/40)

Location and date: Angers, 20.03.1940

Summary statement: Pacini reports on conversation with Polish Foreign Minister, August Zaleski who commented on Sumner Welles information:  Jozef Beck never consented to the return of Danzig to the Reich.  Pacini quotes the Polish ‘White Book’

Language: Italian

Text:

As I had the honour to inform Your Eminence whith my report No 14/40 of yesterday (1), M. Zaleski, Polish Foreign Minister (2), spoke to me about his meeting in Paris with Mr Welles at the occasion of Welles’ visit to the French Government. The Minister said: “As we do not want to keep anything secret from the Holy See, I wish to report the conversation I had with Mr Welles.

“Mr Roosevelt’s representative asked me only a few questions but insisted on knowing if it was true that Minister Beck (3) – during the visit paid by the Polish Minister to the German Chancellor in his residence in Berchtesgaden on 5 January 1939 – made concessions to Hitler regarding the return of Danzig and the Corridor to Germany”.

M. Zelseki replied: “From documents found in the Foreign Ministry and from other knowledge this information seems to be untrue.  When speaking with Chancellor Hitler, M. Beck used a formal phrase of courtesy, namely that there was always a way to reach an understanding on thorny questions without the necessity of letting it come to a serious conflict; he did not say clearly yes of no, and clarity would have been necessary.  But, at a meeting which M. Beck had in Munich on 6 January with the German Foreign Minister he took the opportunity to explain his ideas about these problems more clearly, saying that Poland would never agree to hand Danzig to Germany or to other requests regarding the extra-territorial status of a Corridor.

Mr Welles took notes on the subject and did not ask anything else of importance.

Minister Zaleski tells me that Mr Welles asked General Sikorski, President of the Council (4), his opinion on the military might of Germany and Russia and M. Sikorski made a report which was handed to Mr Welles while he was leaving London for Paris.

I note that the Polish “White Book” mentions the conversations which Minister Beck had with Chancellor Hitler and with the German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop in two documents: 48-49 and 78-79.  One can see from them, the manner in which very thorny questions, which then developed into a war, were dealt with.  The discussions were resumed in Berlin on 21 March (the “White Book” mentions them under No. 61) between the Polish Ambassador, M. Lipski and the German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, with the well known tragic results.

Notes:

(1) Report not published in ADSS.  Pacini provided information about giving the document to the Polish Minister.  See ADSS 1.248 note 1.

(2) August Zaleski (1883-1972), Minister of Foreign Affairs Polish Government in Exile 1940-47.

(3) Jozef Beck (1894-1944), Polish Foreign Minister 1932-39.

(4) Wladislaw Sikorski (1881-1943), Prime Minister Polish Government in Exile 1939-43.

(5) The Polish “White Book” was a collection of documents dealing with Poland’s relations with Germany and the USSR between 1933 and 1939.  It was published on 15.03.1940.

ADSS 1.219 Tardini to Osborne: Holy See and Poland - August 1939 - summary

ADSS 1.219 Domenico Tardini, Secretariat of State, to D’Arcy Osborne, UK Minister to the Holy See

Reference: AES 8223/39

Location and date: Vatican, 16.11.1939

Summary statement: Details of the approaches of the Holy See to the Polish government.  Jozef Beck’s reply.

Language: Italian and French

Text:

(Italian)

I have the pleasure of sending to Your Excellency the enclosed note regarding document No. 72 (p. 124) of the book: Documents concerning German-Polish relations and the outbreak of hostilities between Great Britain and Germany on September 3, 1939 (1).

As Your Excellency can see from the note, M. Beck (2) did not send the communication suggested by Mr H Kennard (3) to the Holy See.

Enclosure:

(French)

On 26 August the Cardinal Secretary of State communicated to the Nuncio (4) in Poland the following proposition, suggested to the Holy See by a responsible source: “that the Polish Government should declare its willingness utterly to reprove all ill treatment of Germans on Polish territory in return for a similar German undertaking with regard to Poles on German soil.” (5)

The Warsaw Nuncio received this telegram at 22.00 the same evening.

On 27 august the Nuncio replied as follows (19.00):

1. The Foreign Minister, M. Beck, fears that a declaration such as that being asked for would merely be used buy the German Government as an admission by the Polish Government of the alleged ill-treatment of the Germans in Poland.

2. He suggests rather that the Holy See should invite the two Governments to bring to an end the unrest being caused by the minorities question in their respective countries. (6)

Notes: 

(1) Documents concerning German-Polish relations and the outbreak of hostilities between Great Britain and Germany on September 3, 1939, HMSO, London.

(2) Jozef Beck (1894-1944), Polish Foreign Minister 1932-39.

(3) Howard Kennard (1878-1955), UK Ambassador to Poland 1937-39.

(4) Filippo Cortesi (1876-1947), Nuncio to Poland 1936-47.

(5) ADSS 1.133

(6) ADSS 1.136

ADSS 1.218 Sec State to British Legation: summary of August 1939

ADSS 1.218 Secretariat of State to the British Legation

Reference: AES 8223/39

Location and date: Vatican, 13.11.1939

Summary statement: Details of steps taken in August 1939 with Warsaw in favour of peace.

Language: Italian

Text:

Draft 1

Minister Beck (1), contrary to what had been suggested to him by Mr Howard Kennard, Ambassador of Great Britain to Warsaw (2), did not let the Holy See know that he was prepared to consider an exchange of populations and also to accept neutral observers in order to demonstrate that German accusations of maltreatments were unfounded; in fact M. Beck did not even accept proposals suggested by the Holy See on this subject:

In fact:

1. On 15 August, His Excellency, the Cardinal Secretary of State requested Monsignor Cortesi, Apostolic Nuncio in Warsaw, to ask the Polish Government if it thought that the Secretariat of State could make some approach and if so what, to precent the situation getting worse. (3) Mons Cortesi, spoke on this subject to the Foreign Under-Secretary (4) who was not able to give a precise answer, although he stated that there was the possibility of a peaceful understanding. (5)

2. On 26 August, His Eminence the Cardinal Secretary of State, having heard that it could be helpful if Poland, following an invitation from the Holy See, declared itself ready to prevent the alleged maltreatment of citizens of German nationality, if Germany, for its part, would make the same promise regarding the Polish people in German territory, instructed the Apostolic Nuncio in Warsaw to put this suggestion before the Polish Government asking if such a declaration on the part of the Polish Government could be brought to the knowledge of the German Government through the Apostolic Nuncio in Berlin. (6)

M. Beck, replying to the communication of Mons Cortesi, expressed fear that the Germans would take advantage of the above-mentioned Polish declaration as a confirmation of the alleged persecutions of the German minority, and suggested, as a better solution, the idea of an invitation of the Holy See to the Polish and German Governments to check the excitement created in their respective countries regarding the situation of the minorities (27 August). (7)

3. On 31 August the Cardinal Secretary of State instructed the Apostolic Nuncio in Warsaw to give the Polish Government the opportunity to accept an international control on the alleged persecution of the German minority. (8)

Owing to the outbreak of hostilities the proposal had no sequel.

Draft II

Concern of the Holy See to avoid the question of the minorities being used as a pretext for war between Germany and Poland.

1. On 14 August 1939, the Holy See received news that Germany was massing troops at the Polish border and that the situation was getting worse. (9) The Cardinal Secretary of State immediately instructed the apostolic Nuncio in Warsaw to ask the Polish Government if it thought that the Secretary of State could take some initiative and, eventually, to suggest one (15 August). (10)

Mons Cortesi conferred on the subject with the Foreign Under-Secretary, but the latter was not able to give a precise answer, although he affirmed that there was a possibility of a peaceful understanding (18 August). (11)

2. On 26 August the Cardinal Secretary of State received a communication from a reliable source that war was approaching and that it was opportune to make a new attempt for averting it: perhaps it might help if Poland, accepting suggestion of the Holy See, declared itself ready to prevent the alleged persecutions , and if Germany, for its part, undertook the same commitment regarding the Polish people in German territory. (12) Immediately, on the same day, the Apostolic Nuncio in Warsaw was instructed to submit the matter to the Polish Government asking if such a declaration on the part of the Polish Government could be made know to the German Government through the Apostolic Nuncio. (13)

Mons Cortesi immediately informed Minister Beck about the proposal, but the Minister expressed the fear that the Germans could take advantage of the possible Polish declaration as if it were an admission of the alleged persecutions of the German minority, and suggested, as another solution, the idea of an invitation by the Holy See to the Polish and German Governments to check the excitement created in their respective countries regarding the position of the minorities (27 August). (14)

3. On 28 August the idea was put forward to the Holy See to ask the German and Polish Governments what measure they thought was necessary to guarantee the situation of the minorities. (15)

The Apostolic Nuncio in Berlin was informed immediately about this proposal (29 August) (16), but he replied that he considered that the German Government thought it impossible to guarantee the protection of the minorities unless an international control was set up (30 August). (17)

4. Following this communication the Cardinal Secretary of State instructed the Papal (?) Nuncio in Warsaw to submit for the consideration of the Polish Government, the opportunity of accepting international control over the alleged persecution of the German minority (31 August). (18)

War broke out and the initiative was abandoned.

The conclusion to be drawn form what is said above, is that M. Beck did not accept the suggestion put forward to him by Mr Howard Kennard, Ambassador of Great Britain, on 27 August, that is, to inform the Holy Father that he was prepared to consider an exchange of populations and to accept neutral observers with the aim of demonstrating that the German accusations regarding the persecutions had no foundation in truth. (See Documents concerning German-Polish Relations and the outbreak of hostilities between Great Britain and Germany on 3 September, 1939, p124, number 72) (19)

Notes:  

(1) Jozef Beck (1894-1944), Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs 1932-39.

(2) Howard Kennard (1878-1955), British Ambassador to Poland 1937-39.

(3) ADSS 1.95

(4) Miroslaw Arciszewski (1892-1963), Polish Under-Secretary Foreign Affairs 1938-39.

(5) ADSS 1.102

(6) ADSS 1.133. Cesare Orsenigo (1873-1946), Nuncio to Germany 1930-45.

(7) ADSS 1.136

(8) ADSS 1.161

(9) ADSS 1.94

(10) ADSS 1.95

(11) ADSS 1.102

(12) ADSS 1.123

(13) ADSS 1.133
(14) ADSS 1.135

(15) ADSS 1.141

(16) ADSS 1.146

(17) ADSS 1.150

(18) ADSS 1.168

(19) Published London, HMSO 1939 (http://www.allworldwars.com/The%20British%20War%20Blue%20Book%201939.html).

Sir H. Kennard to Viscount Halifax (received 5:05 p. m.).

(Telegraphic.) Warsaw, August 27, 1939.
Your telegrams of 25th and 26th August.[Nos. 70 and 71.]
I discussed questions of exchange of populations and neutral observers with M. Beck this morning.
2. As regards first, he said that in principle he saw no objection and was prepared to convey to German Government that he was ready to consider such a proposal, possibly not directly to State Secretary, but in such a manner that he was sure it would reach the highest authorities.
3. As regards question of neutral observers, he had again consulted President of the Council, but he would let me know his decision in the course of the day.
4. As he told me that the Pope had during the night, through the Nuncio, asked if there was anything he could do, I suggested to M. Beck that he should inform His Holiness that he was prepared to consider an exchange of populations and also use of neutral observers in order to demonstrate that German accusations of maltreatment were completely without foundation. The Pope could then communicate these proposals to the German Government with approval of Polish Government. M. Beck seemed to consider this favourably and promised he would give it his immediate consideration. I warned him that there was no time to lose.
5. As regards Danzig, M. Beck did not from his latest information anticipate fait accompli there to-day or in very immediate future. For the moment all was quiet there as far as he knew.
6. I again emphasised to his Excellency importance of his giving sufficient warning to His Majesty's Government of any action which Polish Government or army contemplated taking as result of any fait accompli at Danzig. His Excellency again promised to do this, though he made reservation that situation might arise where immediate action would be necessary.

ADSS 1.181 Cortesi to Maglione: War has started

ADSS 1.181 Filippo Cortesi, Poland, to Luigi Maglione, Sec State.

Reference: Telegram number 38, (AES 6054/39)

Location and date: Warsaw, received Rome 03.09.1939.

Summary statement: Min For Aff, Joseph Beck wanted to publish Nuncio’s communication.  Cortesi declined.  War has started; plans to remain in the capital.

Language: Italian

Text:

Minister Foreign Affairs (1) called me and made brusque request … he wanted to publish communication made by me according to coded message 46 (2), expressing his disappointment.  I answered that confidential nature … evident the confirming attitude (?) and reason already explained … and he made different suggestions adding Holy See knows that last night Hitler replying to British mediation said Poland unleashed war.

With Holy Father’s approval I plan to remain in Warsaw spending the night in religious house (outside) town.

Postal communication interrupted, I shall avoid sending delicate (?) news about war, which Your Eminence can obtain, from other sources.

Notes: 

(1) Jozef Beck (1894-1944), Polish Foreign Minister 1932-39.

(2) Given verbally in an interview on 01.9.1939. See ADSS 1.170.