ADSS 1.257 Tardini, notes: Ribbentrop's visit

ADSS 1.257 Domenico Tardini, Sectretariat State

Reference: AES Germany 774

Location and date: Vatican, 11.03.1940

Summary statement: Two interviews with Ribbentrop.  Ribbentrop pleased with meeting with the Pope.   Maglione complained about persecution in Germany; Ribbentrop complained about ‘Polish atrocities’.  No progress on a Vatican rep in Poland.

Language: Italian

Text:

I came in a few minutes after von Ribbentrop had left the Holy Father. (1)  I said “Prosit [good health], Holiness”. He described Ribbentrop to me as a young man, but not too young, vigorous, and excitable like a fanatic when speaking. (2) He himself told the Holy Father that he was a wine merchant and had not previously been interested in politics: but because of the extension of his export business and of the consequent relations abroad he became Hitler’s advisor on foreign affairs.  He declared his belief in God, although not belonging to any church.  He was born a Protestant, but afterwards he abandoned Protestantism because the Church has not longer any strength, organisation or influence.  At this point the Holy Father pointed out to him that the Catholic Church, on the contrary, was very well organised in Germany and strong.  Von Ribbentrop admitted this adding that he (and the Fuhrer) are not enemies of the Church but of the political Catholicism of the clergy. The Holy Father remarked that the German clergy had always been very patriotic, as demonstrated by the Saar plebiscite.

Von Ribbentrop remembered having once et the Holy Father at a reception in Berlin.  The Holy Father replied he remembered his stay in Germany with pleasure, that loved the German people, that he knows and studies its culture. 

Von Ribbentrop remarked that Pope Pius XI had used excessively strong words against Germany.  His Holiness pointed out to him that he addressed kind and gentle words in a speech to a group of German pilgrims.  This – said von Ribbentrop – was noted with pleasure in Germany. The Pope added that no more German pilgrims were arriving.  This Holiness recalled also that he was careful in his Encyclical letter not to offend Germany, although his calling obliged him to speak the truth.  He added that the small country, to which he alluded in his Christmas address, was Finland (in Germany, on the other hand, it had been identified with Poland). 

Von Ribbentrop brought Hitler’s greetings to the Holy Father.  He insisted on telling the Pope that Germany is very strong, that half the world is open to them that they can get all the petrol they need from Rumania and that they will win the war before 1940. (4) He gave this assurance without any trace of uncertainty. (5)  He repeated this more than once, raising his voice and gesticulating.  He added that the entire nation – without exception – stands with Hitler. (6)

The Holy Father called his attention to the fact that, this being so, political Catholicism is non-existent – everybody being on Hitler’s side, without exception.  The Holy Father pointed out that although he did not want to doubt Hitler and Ribbentrop’s intentions, the facts were demonstrating that war was being waged against the Church.  And he cited various positive and clear exampled.  Von Ribbentrop gesticulated for a while … He replied that we are in the presence of a revolution and, compared with others, the National Socialist revolution has not caused so much damage to the Churches. To which the Pope replied that the damages, in fact, have been many – and continued to bring forth examples.

Von Ribbentrop pointed out that the State spends a lot on the clergy and the Church.

The Pope replied that a lot has also been taken from the Church, houses, educational institutions – chasing malo modo the rightful owners out of them at short notice.  The Holy Father has particularly insisted on the subject of schools. 

Von Ribbentrop spoke at length against Communism, saying that National Socialism has prevented the triumph of Communism in Germany.  During 1930-32 (when, von Ribbentrop says, the Pope had already left Germany) Communism was on the verge of triumph.  Hitler conquered it.  Otherwise not one church would have remained in Germany, as was the case in Russia, as Von Ribbentrop himself was able to ascertain de visu. His Holiness observed that it is impossible to say for certain what might have happened … His Holiness then asked if Germany had nothing to fear from its union with Communism.  Von Ribbentrop replied in the negative: the union is only an external one and for the war.  Hitler had declared to Welles: the goal of the war for Germany is peace; for Britain, the destruction of Germany. (7) Replying to the Pope, von Ribbentrop said that there must be an offensive. (8)

The audience lasted from 11.00 to 12.10.  The Pope says its tone was polite.  Von Ribbentrop started by saying that he would speak frankly and clearly.  His Holiness assured him that he would do the same.  He suggested to him also to allow the Holy See to send somebody to Poland to look after the religious situation, for example, Monsignor Colli. (9)

His Holiness mentioned to me that von Ribbentrop notified the Italian government of his return visit to Ciano only on the eve of the day he was going to see him. (10) Apparently there has been some friction.

After the audience the Holy Father received von Ribbentrop’s suite (seven people) to whom he addressed a few words in German.

In the antechamber people were saying that von Ribbentrop entered the Pope’s room with a trouble and nervous face: he came out with a satisfied air.

Let us hope that German bad faith will not take advantage of this visit for its own ends and that instead it will produce good fruits. (11)

Notes: 

(1) The audience began at 11.00 and ended at 12.10.

(2) See ADSS 1.252

(3) The Saar region was 75% Catholic.

(4) Ribbentrop was referring to negotiations between Germany and Romania that culminated with the 27.05.1940 agreement.  Six months later Romania formally joined the Axis.

(5) Ribbentrop had brought a letter (written 10.03.1940) for Mussolini from Hitler which confirmed that Italy would enter the war on Germany’s side. See DDI Series 9, Volume 3, n492, pp415-23; DGFP Series 8, n668, pp871-80.

(6) Robert Lieber, Pius’ private secretary recounted Ribbentrop’s near hysterical response to any talk of peace.

When he [the pope] spoke of the war and of peace, von Ribbentrop shouted:  holiness, every conversation on this theme must end with the sure assumption , that France, and not only France, but Britain too, will beg Germany for peace during this year 1940.

Pius: This may be your view; what does the Fuhrer think?

Ribbentrop: The Fuhrer and I know that this very year France and Britain will beg for peace.

Pius: But what do the German people say about that?

Ribbentrop: The German people are convinced that this year France and Britain will beg us for peace.

Thereupon the pope changed the subject.

Pius XII, Stimmen der Zeit 163 (1958), pp 97-98.

(7) See ADSS 1.252 n1

(8) This was interpreted as a hint at German plans for the invasion of the West.

(9) Carlo Colli (1888-1947), counsellor in the Berlin Nunciature 1931-45.  He had been secretary to the Polish Nunciature 1925-31.

(10) Galeazzo Ciano (1903-1944), Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs 1936-43.  Diario I, pp233-35.  See Ribbentrop’s version of events – DGFP, Series 8, n667, pp894-96.

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(11) Tardini’s notes can be compared with Ambassador Alfieri’s repost on what the Pope told him about the visit (DDI, Series 9, Volume 3, n536, pp 466-68), with Benjamin Sumner-Welle’s report, also received by the Pope a few days later (FRUS, 1940, Volume 1, pp 107-08) and with the note written or dictated by Ribbentop in DGFP, Series 8, n668, pp 896-98.

ADSS 1.105 Pius XII to Venetian Pilgrims: peace initiatives

ADSS 1.105 Pope Pius XII to Venetian pilgrims

Reference: ASS Pius XII, 1939, pp8-9

Location and date: Castel Gandolfo, 19.08.1939

Summary statement: The Pope refers to his initiatives for peace

Language: Italian

Text:

We wish in the present circumstances above all to pray for peace, for Italy, for the peace of Europe and the world. The Great War broke the heart of that wonderful Pope [Pius X] whose revered and scared memory has been evoked today, as though he had a foreboding of all the horrors and massacres a world conflict was bound to let loose.  His successor, Benedict XV, of holy memory, yearned and prayed for peace, appealed for moderation in feeling and thought, for forgiveness in the interests of international peace.

Our immediate predecessor, Pius XI, of glorious memory, who at this moment comes to Our mind side by side with Pius X, made a gesture less than a year ago that moved the world when he offered his life to God.  In the present renewal of heartfelt anxiety We have tried from the first instant of our pontificate and made every effort to remove from the world the dangers of war, to contribute to the consolidation of a permanent peace based on justice, without prejudice to the honour and freedom of nations.  We have even, as far as the duties of our Apostolic ministry would permit, neglected other urgent tasks.  We have exercised a prudent reserve for fear of hampering the work of peace, conscious of whatever concerned the best interests of the Church and of the world.

We refuse to abandon hope of seeing feelings of moderation and equity putting off a conflict, which everyone can foresee as outdoing all material and spiritual destruction of the past.  We persist in believing that the nations’ rulers will, at the decisive moment, refuse to shoulder the tremendous responsibility of an appeal to arms.

But beyond human hopes as inspired by the wisdom and goodness found in men, Our eyes look to the Almighty, the Father of mercy and consolation, Who alone can inspire nations with His wisdom.  We state, on this memorable day, a wish in which we are united with you our venerable Brothers and beloved Sons, with all Catholics and with all others outside the Church whose prayers and good will count for so much and who all alike long for peace: We wish to beg of Him, Who holds in His palm the hearts and minds of all rulers, that in His infinite mercy He may stop all war at present raging and save us from worse conflicts.  May God becalm this troubled world with peace and fruitful concord between peoples and nations; for this We shall never cease fervently imploring Him: Da pacem Domine in diebus nostris. [Give peace in our time O Lord, Introit for Sunday XVIII after Pentecost]

Notes: 

Jacques Kornberg "The Pope's Dilemma: Pius XII Faces Atrocities and Genocide in the Second World War"

Jacques Kornberg's book, "The Pope's Dilemma" (2015, University of Toronto Press) arrived on my desk a few weeks before the end of the second school term here in Australia. That meant it would have to wait until exams were marked, reports written and students sent home to their parents.  And what a wait it was.  I had read the table of contents, glanced through the introduction, made a note of scholars cited in the index and resolved to resist the urge to read until I had sufficient time to do so without interruption.  I am happy to write that I was successful.

This is a significant work that advances our understanding of Eugenio Pacelli in several significant ways.  

Firstly, Kornberg is a master of the topic; his erudition is obvious from the opening pages.  This led me to believe I was in the hands of a well-informed, learned and balanced guide, who had a profound grasp of the various disciplines necessary to make serious comment on Pius XII. He demonstrates with clear and logical writing the arguments of the current historical arguments and debates as well as the claims of the "canonise him now" apologists. In order to this Kornberg has immersed himself into the available archival material, especially the Actes et Documents, as well as the latest current historical research from both sides of the debates.  And while the opening of the Vatican archives for the pontificate of Pius XII remains in the future, Kornberg, as do other historians, believes the reader has enough evidence upon which to make a sound judgement through use of the available material.

Secondly, Kornberg demonstrates a detailed familiarity with the vast literature on Pius, as well as his predecessors, Pius XI, Benedict XV and Leo XIII, and his successors John XXIII, Paul VI and John Paul II.  It was clear to see how Kronberg linked elements from Pius XII into broader papal politics and policies, following equally clear lines within Catholic theology and ecclesiology of the late-Tridentine era.  

Thirdly, Kornberg makes lucid and learned comment on the history of fascism, National Socialism, the relationship between the Catholic Church in Germany and the Nazi regime, the Concordat and the demise of the Catholic Centre Party.  Context is never sacrificed, and while at times, the reader might be tempted to skip a few pages here and there because of their familiarity with the subject matter, it is definitely worthwhile reading the whole text.

I believe Kornberg's most significant contribution lies in the explanation of a politics of consistency from Leo XIII through to Pius XI and then into the papacy of Pius XII. He challenges one of the consensus views of Pius XII, namely that he stood apart from other popes in his diplomatic approach to crises and his silence in the face of atrocities.  Surely Pius XI was a model of outspoken language that the more phlegmatic Pacelli sought to interpret and re-cast in more calming words?  A lengthy quote from page 186 established Kronberg's thesis.  I found it compelling.

At least until fairly recently the consensus was the Pius XII stood alone, that he brought baggage to the papacy that other popes did not, that his personality and training were ill-suited to the times ... Domenico Cardinal Tardini, Pius XII's undersecretary of state ... believed Pacelli's temperament made him a natural fence-sitter: he sought to "please everyone and displease no one" ... In keeping with this view of Pius XII, Michael Phayer argues that Pacelli's predecessor, Pius XI, far more passionate, forceful, and outspoken, would have responded differently to the destruction of European Jewry,  in keeping with the enormity of the crime.  These assessments of Pius XI are just beginning to change in the light of additional research.  Phayer later agreed with historians Gerhard Besier and Peter Godman that Pius XI was as diffident as his successor when it came to acting against "racism, totalitarianism, and Nazism."   ... I will argue that the foreign policies of modern pope just prior to Pius XII - Leo XIII, Benedict XV and Pius XI - in the face of war and even mass atrocities were all of a piece.

This chapter is the setting for the final chapters in the book that examine the priorities of Pius XII's action or inaction in the face of the mass murder and torture on unprecedented levels.  In his conclusion, Kornberg's assessment of Pius is chilling, but the process that brings him to this point is so clear and well-plotted, that I was hard pressed to find reason not to share his conclusion.

Pope Pius XII's responses, or lack of response, during the 1939-1945 war, were successful in his execution of his perceived role as Pastor Pastorum - shepherd of the shepherds -  and the visible head of Christ's church on earth.  He successfully defended the rights of the church in the face of the dangers of fascism, Nazism and Communism.  The institution survived the war; the hierarchy was still in place, churches were opened, clergy ministered to their people and the sacraments were celebrated.  However, Pius' non-defence of the moral norms and ethical principals that lie at the heart of Catholic Christianity are judged a failure.  Kornberg cites Pacelli's own words to lay the charge against him.  In his 1939 encyclical Summi Pontificatus, Pius said he would not and could not remain silent in the face of crimes against divine law.  His silence in the face of the mass-murder of Catholic Poles, Orthodox Serbs, Catholic and Orthodox Roma and Sinta, and then the genocide of European Jewry seals Kornberg's argument.

This is an important book that gives us possibly, the most important work to date on Pius XII within the contexts of the early twentieth century papacy and its relationship with the modern world.  It is a valuable complimentary volume to other works on Pius XII.  Professor Kornberg has done us a great service in his book. It is accessible to the professional historian well-versed in the study of Pacelli, and, more importantly, is accessible to the lay reader who wants to know more about a man, a pope, about whom there appears never enough said.

Emeritus Professor Jacques Kornberg

David Kertzer Book Panel: The Pope and Mussolini ▬ February 26, 2014

Professors Kevin Madigan, Suzanne Steward-Steinberg  and Kevin Spicer join Professor David Kertzer in a discussion about "The Pope and Mussolini", at the Watson Institute. 

Professor Kertzer opened his presentation with a reference to the February edition of "First Things" and quoted from an article on Pius XI by Filup Mazurczak.  Mazurczak's article is a somewhat "rose-tinted glasses" view of the papacy of Pius XI.  The truth, as Kertzer reminded us, is somewhat more complicated.

At the heart of the book is an extensive examination of the role of the church in keeping Mussolini in power.  It is the stuff of cloak and dagger crime fiction, except it is assuredly historical fact.  Kertzer's 16,000 words of references, notes and archival file numbers dispells any notion of flights of anti-Catholic or anti-papal fantasy.  Kertzer writes history.

One of the many characters who emerge in this story is the Jesuit Pietro Tacchi Venturi, the pope's private messenger to Mussolini.  This man was obsessed with ideas of Jewish plots and, without the pope's knowledge, "kept hectoring Mussolini that he was under threat by the Jews and he better take action against them".  Pius kept Tacchi Venturi because of his access to Il Duce not because of his antisemitic paranoia that was certainly not shared by the pope.  Tacchi Venturi proved himself so useful that Pius XII kept him in his position of unofficial mediator with Mussolini.

By mid-1930s Pius XI had doubts about Mussolini, but he was surrounded by curial officials who were determined to preserve the relationship between the Church and fascist state.  The most disturbing reality that emerges is the Italian government's reliance on the Secretariat of State and, in particular, the Secretary, Cardinal Eugenio Pacelli to shape and steer Catholic opinion around the world in a pro-Italian fashion especially after the 1935 Italian invasion of Ethiopia.

Then there is the sad deal between Mussolini and the pope just before the passing of the first antisemitic laws in Italy.  In return for the silence of the Church over Italy's new anti-Jewish laws of July 1938, the regime would ensure a steady stream of benefits, gifts and privileges.

From the outset Kertzer underscored the importance of "triangulation" of archives in order to corroborate the thousands of documents from the ASV, Italian state archives and other sources.  No fact could be allowed to stand alone; it must be put into its context against other sources.  I interpret this to be David Kertzer's all too familiar experience with the tactics of those who seek, through thinly veiled smear campaigns, to impugn the academic and personal integrity of historians who set about to do their job, and do it well. It is a point that Kevin Madigan also makes.

The presentation of all speakers makes it clear that the historical narrative is far more nuanced and complex than the "official" narrative maintained by the Vatican and elements of restorationist and neo-conservative Catholic groups.  Kertzer's book makes for uncomfortable reading, and so it should.  However, if there is to be an honest and open discussion of the role of the church, the papacy and individuals within the Vatican, the acceptance of a less than perfect history must be the starting point.

At the end what David Kertzer's research has revealed is sadly simple.  Pius XI was a tragic figure, a man with a medieval world view, limited in his ability to respond and deal with the threat and seductive charm of fascism, who came to see too late in his life that he had indeed supped with the devil. 

Pacelli, Tisserant and Poland 1938

Much has been made of a document written by Cardinal Pacelli, in May 1938 to Cardinal Eugene Tisserant, head of the Congregation for the Eastern Churches, ie, Churches that use one of the several Oriental rites and are in communion with Rome.  I have made mention of this before, but I think it timely to review what lies in the public domain.

What we have is a letter written by Pacelli to Tisserant in response to a news article that had been sent to Tisserant reporting on legislation before the Polish parliament that would outlaw traditional halachic - schechita - slaughter of animals. 

Firstly, let us place the text in its historical context.

1.  Pacelli, acting in accord with Pope Pius XI, had regularly protested anti-Jewish and antisemitic legislation through the networks of nuncios and other papal representatives.  The most well known are the dispatches Pacelli sent to the German nuncio, Archbishop Cesare Orsenigo ordering him to make formal protests to the German government over anti-Jewish persecution.  Further, Pacelli also ordered the nuncio to do whatever he could to help German Jews.  In reality, there was little more Pacelli could do; he relied on Orsenigo who demonstrated on more than a few occasions, a concerning lack of energy over Jewish matters.

2.  This points to a series of obvious, but often overlooked, realities of Vatican diplomacy. 

a)  The pope and Pacelli could, and did, protest, but usually to little effect.  Bound by the conventions of concordats with states such as Germany and Poland, which they observed to the letter, Vatican protests could only raise issues with the government.  And the historical record is replete with examples of governments ignoring the Vatican.  The irony in this case is that Poland's identity in the inter-war years was, in no small part, built on a publicly proclaimed Catholicism, albeit of a Polish rather than Roman slant. Neal Pease's book Rome's Most Faithful Daughter goes far to dispel many of the myths of Polish Catholicism.

b) The pope and Pacelli could, and did, stir the local bishops through the nuncio and direct communication, but that too was limited.  The Vatican rarely ordered bishops to act on local matters outside of internal Church affairs, such as liturgy or appointments, preferring to trust that bishops would "do the right thing".  Given the murky and long history of Judeaphobia, to expect Catholic bishops in central and eastern Europe to rally to the Jews was unlikely.  It had, as historians such as Hubert Wolf, Emma Fattorini, Susan Zuccotti and Michael Phayer have pointed out, taken Rome decades in the modern era to come to a point where a condemnation of antisemitism was even feasible or desirable.  Nazi persecution focused attention precisely because it was qualitatively different to previous manifestations.

c) Evidence from ADSS and a host of other sources, such as the Akten deutcher bischofe  uber die lage der kirche 1933-1945, demonstrate that among the bishops of Germany and the rest of Europe, there was a wide diversity of opinion and attitude.  The German bishops were often unable to agree on a united strategy to counter National Socialism, and during the war found themselves unable to agree on a plan of action to assist the Jews.  The bishops of Poland generally accepted the teaching and effects of centuries of supercessionism and the theology of contempt towards Jews and Judaism, ensuring Jewish concerns would always be second to Catholic Poles.  During the war this proved to be catastrophic; Jews would always be "lesser victims" to everyone else.

3.  Poland 1938.

In the years following the death of Marshall Jozef Pilsudski (1867-1935), the Polish government had gradually introduced more restrictive anti-Jewish laws, building on a widespread social acceptance and approval that had long been a part of nationalist Polish self-identity.    In June 1936, the prime minister, Felicjan Slawoj-Skladovski (1885-1962) declared his support for an economic war against the Jews.  What had been an unofficial government policy that enjoyed considerable support from the Catholic clergy, now became official policy. 

Removing Jews from Poland's economic life received vocal support from the Cardinal-Primate, August Hlond (1881-1948), archbishop of Poznan and Gniezno, who declared that Jews would always be a problem for Poland, always at odds with the Catholic Church and always at the beck and call of godless Bolshevism.  A Poland without Jews would be a good thing.

The Sejm had already passed laws restricting and banning schechita - kosher slaughter - in 1923 and 1936. By 1938 the Sejm was also listening to calls not only for economic segregation but for physical segregation in the markets, housing, public transport, schools, universities, courts, and ultimately, forced emigration from Poland.  Much of this enjoyed the public support of many Polish bishops.

When Pacelli wrote to Tisserant in May 1938, many of the Jews of Poland were facing economic ruin and poverty.  They were, to use the title of Celia Stopnika Heller's book, On the Edge of Destruction. 

4. What was known in Rome, May 1938.

Although the principal preoccupation in the Vatican in May 1938 was Hitler's visit to Rome, news from Poland flowed into the Holy See as it did from all the other papal representatives around the world.  Pacelli's response demonstrates that the matter was noted and the nuncio to Poland informed.  There was an attached report from Poland to the original letter, but it has not been reproduced on any of the sites I researched. I doubt the matter raised any "red flags" in Rome, indeed by comparison with other issues facing Polish Jews, kosher butcher restrictions were probably not considered of urgent importance.  Indeed, it is of greater concern that the inflammatory statements made by more than a few of the Polish bishops appear to have gone unchallenged by the Vatican.  I admit that the last sentence is not based on a comprehensive study of the matter, but I have not come across any disciplinary statement or request for caution from Rome.

The text:

From the Vatican 21 May 1938

Secretary of State of His Holiness
Number: 1892/38
To be cited in response.

My Most Obedient, Eminent and Reverend Lord,

With the venerable letter of 6 April [1938] which your Most Eminent Reverence was please to make known to me the article in the newspaper to the effect that the Government of Poland has planned to introduce a law which would prohibit the “slaughter by jugular”, imposed by Israelite religious law, and therefore constitute a real persecution of the Jews. Your letter insinuated, therefore, the convenience of a gesture of the Apostolic Nuncio to prevent this measure.

I did not fail to pass on this information to His Excellency, Archbishop Cortesi, and I am now happy to give your Eminence, in the attached copy of his Report Number 89 on 7 May [1938], which contains precise information on the issue.

I gladly take the opportunity to express to your Eminence, the assurances of my profound veneration, and humbly kissing your hands,

I am your Reverend Eminence’s most humble, true and devoted servant,

E. Card. Pacelli

Addressee:
His Reverend Eminence, the Lord Cardinal Eugene Tisserant,
Secretary of the Sacred Congregation for the Eastern Church.

 
In 2008 Andrea Tornielli wrote an article on the document.  It is interesting, but does not examine the historical context in sufficient detail.  Further, Tornielli uses the document as evidence that Pacelli was not antisemitic.  I disagree.  The document is evidence that Cardinal Pacelli responded to a request from Cardinal Tisserant to help the Jews of Poland and protest at a proposed unjust law - which would add to a series of unjust laws that actively discriminated against Polish Jews.  The question of whether Pacelli was antisemitic or not is not applicable here.

Emma Fattorini: Hitler, Mussolini, and the Vatican

A number of weeks ago I posted a link to Richard Bosworth's review of Fattorini's book published on the Times Higher Education on 20 October 2011. 

Bosworth's review is generally positive with a number of cautions and criticisms.  He asserts that Fattorini needed to go deeper into issues and that she has not been served well by the translation of the Italian into English. However, what Bosworth does not make clear is Fattorini's attempt to give a global portrait of the pontificate of Pius XI and place Germany and Italy within that context.  This is, I believe, her strength.  Nonetheless, I do agree with him that she needed to work more on Eugenio Pacelli and provide greater analysis of his role as Secretary of State. 

Book titles can be deceptive.  The Italian title - Pio XI, Hitler e Mussolini - is better, and Fattorini's work would have been better served by retaining it.  And yet, her work encompasses much more than this. 

I found her greatest strength in the recognition that any fruitful study of the papacy and the Vatican has to be seen through the matrix of religion and religious identity.  This is something I argued forcefully in my own work.  Pius XI was first and foremost a religious leader.  He viewed the world through the Tradition of Catholic Christianity, through his life-long religious practices and his strong devotion to Therese of the Child Jesus (1873-1897) the Discalced Carmelite nun from Lisieux he canonised in 1925.  The "little way" of Therese profoundly marked the religious life of Pius XI.  Her "Autobiography of a Soul" published shortly after her death taught that the spiritual path consisted not in doing great things, but in serving God in the ordinariness of everyday life, and doing the little things well.  Serving Christ in those around her, pondering on his life in the Gospels and remaining faithful to her religious duties in the Carmel, was Therese's antidote to a popular religious piety that often drew people away from the core essentials of the faith and ran the risk of becoming superstitions.  Pius saw in Therese's spirituality a pattern for Catholic Action - the movement that would empower lay Catholics to engage in the world around them, a world often hostile to institutional religion - and be a tool for the re-evangelisation of Europe.  This became part of the way the pope sought to provide Catholics with tools to combat anti-Catholic movements of the right and the left from the early 1920s.  Along with the very deliberate creation of the feast of Christ the King to demonstrate that the loyalty of the Catholic church was to Christ first and foremost, Pius XI endeavoured to lead the Church through a "rebirth of Christian Society" (title of Chapter 1).

Pius XI's relationship with Cardinal Pacelli is described clearly as that of two opposites who respected each other enormously, were close workers and who shared a common vision of the Church and a passion for the faith.  They were also two men marked by two very different ways of approaching issues.  Pius was forthright, blunt and spoke his mind forcefully without fear of favour.  He was known to have a fiery temper and was not above displaying his emotions, even in public. He was a deep thinker, read widely in many disciplines, especially theology, social justice and history, had a considerable grasp of world affairs, discussed strategies with Pacelli, but at the end of deliberations, he made decisions and acted accordingly.  He was also pope and expected his decisions to be obeyed. 

Pacelli was reticent, guarded and spoke his mind only after long considerations and usually in complex and highly refined diplomatic language.  He rarely lost his temper or showed emotion, and never in public. He was a deep thinker, read widely in many disciplines, but remained conservative in his opinions, had a phenomenal grasp of world affairs, discussed strategies with the pope, but found decision making to be an agonising process.  He was the servant of his master, the Vicar or Christ, and executed the pope's decisions faithfully.

Together Pius XI and Pacelli made a partnership between 1930 and 1939 that served the Catholic church well. 

Fattorini's use of the material from the Archivio Segreto Vaticano is detailed and covers a considerable part of the pontificate of Pius XI.  The use of recent projects such as Hubert Wolf's digital presentation of the Pacelli nunciature reports from 1918 and contemporary scholarship makes this book an important addition to our understanding of this period.

It is the use of archival material that provides another strength to Fattorini's work.  Her survey of the complex realities within the Roman curia, and the role played by the "black pope", the General of the Jesuits, Ledochowski, helps bring into perspective the responses of the Vatican to the "proffered hand" of the French communists, the Spanish civil war and then to Italy and Germany.

The chapters on Germany and Italy are the heart of the book.  But, they are enhanced through the survey of Vatican diplomacy from 1918 onwards and especially the awareness of realpolitik shared by Pius and Pacelli as well as the treatment of France, Spain and Mexico.

I share the conclusion that Fattorini makes about Pius' planned speech on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Lateran Accord.  It was looking more and more certain that Pius was convinced that a "show down" with Hitler and Mussolini was inevitable and he was more than ready for it.  The pope's death literally hours before he was to speak is one of those moments which tempt us with a "what if" speculation.  Pacelli's destruction of the speech is both testament to his obedience to papal protocol in his role as caretaker after Pius' death as well as a piece of circumstantial evidence pointing to a hope for a new direction.  It would be presumptuous to think that Pacelli hoped or believed he would be elected pope, so his actions as caretaker cannot be construed as a pre-emptive papal strike.

At the end of the book I had a far better understanding of Pius XI and a greater admiration for this pope who worked tirelessly to steer the Church without compromising to the dictators of whom he had a clear and accurate understanding.

I always begin reading a book with a quick look at the chapter headings, a glance at the index, and then go to the notes.  Here is where one finds evidence of scholarship.  There are 33 pages of detailed notes at the end of the text.  Of 380 notes, 94 or 25%, are references to Vatican archival material.  Many of the archive notes are accompanied by further details.  Fattorini is an historian who knows the importance of archives and also knows of their importance to other historians who wish to delve further into aspects she has opened up.

Does Fattorini add to the body of knowledge?  Much of the "big picture" is already well known.  Fattorini does what other historians do, and deepens our understanding of aspects of the period under study.  There is more work to be done on Pius XI.  Emma Fattorini has helped us come to a more complete appreciation of this highly significant man and his forceful voice that was heard between 1922-1939.  It is a book well worth reading.

"Catholic in America" video - viewer beware!

I came across this video in one of the news services I subscribe to.  It's headline title catches the attention - The Church vs The Nazis.  However, that's about it. 

The organisation Catholic Tube defines itself thus:


Catholic Answers is an apostolate dedicated to serving Christ by bringing the fullness of Catholic truth to the world. We help good Catholics become better Catholics, bring former Catholics "home," and lead non-Catholics into the fullness of the faith.





As I watched I found myself growing more and more unhappy with the "stuff" being pedalled.  The two speakers and priest host (all unnamed, so no idea of qualifications etc) make so many half-baked assertions, use mismatched images and quotes and seem to be blissfully unaware of the decades of solid historical work done by historians and researchers over the years, that it is truly worth watching if only to see how history is not done.

The first speaker talks of a written order from Pius XII to the bishops (of Italy?) ordering them to open the convents - where is this text and why has it not been published?


The image that follows has a cover with a quote from Cardinal Pacelli but the photo is of the nuncio to Germany, Cesare Orsenigo meeting Hitler at a reception (no date given). As doyen of the Diplomatic Corps it was Orsenigo's duty to greet the head of state in the name of the all the diplomats. His address was vetted by Pacelli and Pius XI well in advance. Nonetheless, the image could be misleading - it is not Pacelli.

Next - the Swiss Guard story - evidence please. I have read numerous primary and secondary sources and this is news to me.


Next: Image of Pius XII over "wrote 1937 encyclical" - he co-edited it with the German cardinals - Faulhaber of Munich, Bertram of Breslau and Schulte of Cologne. The pope had the final word. Of course, Pacelli was not elected pope until 3 March 1939, so the problem with a misunderstanding over the image and quote could arise again.

Forging documents: the illustration used is the Vatican passport for Enrico Galeazzi who was sent on a personal mission by Pius XII to FDR to plead for the City of Rome. The great irony is, if the pope could send a representative during war time across German-occupied Europe to plead for Rome, could he have not done the same for the Jews of Europe who were dying in their hundreds of thousands? Galeazzi's trip is published in Actes et Documents Volume 7 - http://paulonpius.blogspot.com/2010/10/story-of-enrico-galeazzi-1943.html

Again - evidence of the forgeries please.

The use of Einstein's 1940 quote is fine, except it must be placed in context. It was made before the mass killing of Europe's Jews had started and made by a man who spoke of what he had witnessed in Germany up until his departure in 1933. Using Rabbi Zolli is something of a "red herring" because his abandonment of the Jewish community in Rome still leaves a host of unanswered questions. To suggest that he would not have become a Catholic if he had seen "moral flaws" in the Church is a nonsense. Clearly the priest commentator does not know his history either.

In summary - no evidence, no references, no context, disjointed timelines and images ... Not a very helpful video on the subject of the role of the Church during the Holocaust.

From Stand-Off to Confrontation: Pope Pius XII and Mussolini, 1938-1943

I posted one of Schnitker's earlier articles in August. This article is a very good summary of the situation that confronted the Church in Italy during the 1930s. The title might be a bit misleading, unless it this is the beginning of a series since it is more related to Pius XI than his successor. Schnitker's grasp of the "big picture" is clear and coherent. I look forward to reading more of his series.



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The relationship between the Catholic Church in Italy and the country’s Fascist regime began seriously to unravel in the year 1938. Until then, two important considerations had mitigated the short-comings of Mussolini in the eyes of the Church: the signing of the Lateran Treaty and the Concordat. The first had ended years of strife between the Church and the country that had been the host of the Throne of St. Peter since the first century; the second had created Italy in the Church’s image, at least to some extent.

As noticed previously, since the Concordat, Catholicism had become Italy’s state religion, the Church supported financially by the state. All schools, and not just Catholic ones, taught Christianity from the Church’s perspective, and marriage had become reserved for the Church. Little wonder many in Italy’s Church believed Mussolini to have been ‘a man of Divine Providence’, for the contrast with Liberal Italy between the 1860s and 1929 could not have been greater.

The Church had paid a price, however, and the size of the payment grew as the years of Fascist rule accumulated. The first, and arguably greatest, price was the abolition of the Catholic political party. This had been a major factor in Italian politics and its sacrifice had been deemed to have been of lesser importance than the Lateran Treaty and Concordat. Of course, one needs to be aware that not all Catholics had welcomed the bargain: Italy’s Church contained Catholics with varying views on the world, with many emphasizing the cause of economic justice set out in the Encyclical Rerum Novarum, a cause which underpinned the Catholic Party in the Italian Parliament.

Others were first and foremost social conservatives, whose main concern was with the authority of the Church and with the prestige of Italy as a nation state. Some of these have been termed ‘clerico-fascists’. To Pope Pius XI, this cleavage presented a serious challenge: he wished for a unified Church and resented the incursion of political arguments within the ranks of the Church. In the Pontiff’s view, these squabbles detracted from what truly mattered, the Church’s task of spreading the Gospel. This task had been impeded by the rise of Liberal, Nationalist Italy, and the removal of that obstacle took precedence in Pope Pius XII’s eyes.

This did not mean that he embraced Fascism in the way that some of the clerico-fascists in the Church did, far from it. The Holy Father publicly described the Fascist oath as being incompatible with Catholic teaching, and this should have been a warning for the bishops and priests in the country whose patriotism overrode their sense of Catholicism. Pope Pius XII had finely-tuned antennae that picked up the merest whiff of ideologies that attacked the essence of the Gospel. In this series we have already seen that the Pontiff clashed with Mussolini over Catholic Action, the social organization that had remained in being after the abolition of the Catholic Party.

It was a clash that would repeat itself in 1938, as the dictator tried to move closer to the ideological world across the Alps in Germany. The two Fascist regimes had already found each other in Spain, where they supported General Franco’s nationalists. In 1938, two events removed the obstacles to greater co-operation and, finally, an alliance between Berlin and Rome. The first was the removal of Austria from the political map of Europe. To date, Italy had guaranteed the survival of the Alpine republic, where the regime mirrored the preoccupations of Rome. Yet Hitler was determined to incorporate what he saw as fellow Germans into his Reich.

To Mussolini, this was incomprehensible. After all, he had, correctly, described racism and the ideals of race as “a stupid mistake”. This was six years earlier, in 1932. The arrival of German troops on the Italian border made him nervous, for across that border lay southern Tyrol, a wholly German region which Italy had acquired as part of the Versailles Treaty in 1919. A previous German attempt to install a puppet Nazi regime in Vienna had failed precisely because Mussolini had opposed it. Now, however, the tables were turned. The Duce was convinced that Germany’s army could not be stopped by his troops, indeed, was no longer convinced this was desirable.

In the aftermath of the annexation in April 1938, the Catholic Church in Austria and in Italy, as well as the Papacy, all received a serious shock. Vienna’s Cardinal Innitzer and one or two of the Austrian bishops had urged the people to vote in favor of annexation. They believed that it would remove the threat of Marxism, and they believed Hitler would maintain the privileges of the Church as secured in the 1933 Concordat. They were sorely mistaken on the last count. Hitler closed all Catholic schools and silenced Catholic opposition. The final act was an open attack on Cardinal Innitzer’s residence, after the latter had fronted a demonstration against the Nazis.


One month later, Hitler was being fêted by Mussolini and the Fascists as he visited Italy. The shockwaves that emanated throughout the Italian Church could hardly have been more severe. True, there were still some clergy for whom nationalism played a more important role than their Faith, but their numbers were dwindling fast. The oppression of the Church in Germany had already caused Pope Pius XI to ask the man who was to succeed him, Eugenio Pacelli, to write the Encyclical Mit Brennender Sorge, in 1937. What had happened in Austria had served only to underline the threat that Nazism posed to the Church and her teachings. It was dawning on many just what the price-tag was for the promise of Fascism to ward off the Church’s enemies: Socialists, Marxists, Liberals and Freemasons. That price-tag was a new enemy, more ruthless than any except for the Russian Bolshevists.


Hitler’s visit to Italy in April 1938 brought that new menace very close to the heart of the Church. Indeed, the German dictator was received by the Italian king in the Quirinal, the former palace of the Popes in Rome. It was followed by a renewed Fascist crackdown on Catholic Action in Italy. Mussolini’s advisors were convinced by now that Catholic Action served as an incubator for a generation of militant Catholics, unreached by Fascist teaching. They were right, for this is exactly what the Pope had in mind when he had prevented Catholic Action from following the Catholic Party into oblivion. A secret service source reported that Catholic Action was a political party in waiting, prepared for when Fascism and monarchy were to topple. He was right. From it grew the Christian Democratic Party, which ruled Italy from 1945 to its demise in the late 1980s.

What caused most in the Church to abandon any remaining regard for the Fascists was Mussolini’s introduction of Anti-Semitic legislation in the autumn of 1938. Italy’s 70,000 Jews were amongst the best integrated in Europe, and had contributed to Italian life in all forms, from cuisine to politics. Amongst the founders of the Fascist party there had been many Jews, and one recalls Mussolini’s remarks on the stupidity of racism. In its early days, Fascism had been markedly free of Anti-Semitism, and the party had exempted the Jews from the rules of the Concordat, to the dismay of the more Anti-Semitic wing of Italy’s Church. All that came to an end with the stroke of the pen of a man desperate to ingratiate himself with Germany’s racist dictator.

Pope Pius XI’s reaction was typical of the man: he offered teaching posts to Jewish professors dismissed from Italian universities, and provided jobs for many other Jews. It convinced Pius that he had been wrong in seeing Mussolini as the man of Divine Providence; instead, he realized that the Italian strongman had been drawn into the vortex of Germany’s neo-pagan rulers. Of course, Mussolini’s own original dislike of the Church and the clergy resurfaced around this time, too. However, there were still those in the Church, true clerico-fascists these, who could bless the Italian army as it entered France in 1940, and some who remained staunchly supportive of the regime until its fall in 1943. Few went as far as the Archbishop of Palermo, who prayed for Divine intervention against possible British and American invaders, but many let their Italian hearts rule their Catholic heads, nonetheless.