ADSS 1.6 Maglione to Cortesi: keep Rome informed.

Relations between the Holy See and the Polish Government had undergone some strain through the last years of the 1930s.  Arguments over the placement and adornment of the tomb of Marshal Pilsudski had caused serious ructions between Church and State.  The arrival of the new nuncio Filippo Cortesi in 1936 helped relieve some of the pressure but tensions remained.  The language of Cardinal Maglione's telegram suggests something of the lack of dialogue between the government and the nunciature.  

For an appreciation of something of the context surrounding Vatican-Polish relations I have included an extract from Neal Pease's Rome's Most Faithful Daughter (2009).  The document mentioned in this extract was not included in ADSS.  I have highlighted the relevant section.  I do not know at this stage if Cortesi sent an account of the meeting to Rome, but it would have been unusual if he did not.  Had it been included it would be between ADSS 1.13-17. ADSS does contain significant documentation (ADSS 1 documents up to 170) that supports Pease's theory and I confess to being somewhat disappointed that he did not make mention of it.

ADSS 1.6 Luigi Maglione to Filippo Cortesi, Warsaw

Reference: Telegram 20 (AES 1528/39)

Location and date: Vatican, 01.04.1939

Summary statement: Request that Cortesi keep Rome informed.

Language: Italian

Text:

I have received your Report 202. (1) While I thank your Excellency, I ask that, in the case of other important news, you keep me informed by coded telegram.

Notes: 

(1) See ADSS 1.4.

Filippo Cortesi, nuncio and Alfredo Pacini, secretary, 

at a reception at the Nunciature in Warsaw, 1937.

(Image source: http://www.audiovis.nac.gov.pl/obraz/47697/)

"Pius XII hardly could have been blamed for fearing that the drastic deterioration of the European international order would require him to take on [the duty of peacemaker] sooner rather than later.  Germany had instigated the emergency by demanding that Poland agree to the incorporation of Danzig within the Reich, ominous concessions in the Polish Corridor, and effective relegation to the status of a vassal of Berlin.  Warsaw vowed to resist rather than bow to extortion, and received half-hearted pledges from Britain and France by the end of March 1939.  Hitler responded to this show of defiance by resolving to crush Poland by military force, and began to beat the drums of war as he had done to such unnerving effect in the run-up to the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia.  In its alarm, the Vatican reacted to the sudden intensification of the crisis in a babel of conflicting voices.  The Secretariat of State sostituto, Fr Montini ... assured a functionary of the Polish embassy that if Poland were to find itself forced to fight to defend its "rights and territory, it would be a just war", leaving the mistaken impression he was stating official policy, not his personal conviction.  His superior, Cardinal Maglione, told the Poles that trying to talk with Hitler was useless, and L'Osservatore Romano warned that if given Danzig, Germany would simply step up its campaign of strong-arming its eastern neighbours.  However, these signs to the contrary, the papal ambassador Archbishop Cortesi gave a more accurate indication of the thinking of theVatican in a gloomy mid-April conversation with Polish deputy foreign minister Szembek.  The nuncio voiced the opinion that a war over Danzig could not be localised, but must widen into a repeat of the calamity of 1914.  Noting that the population of the Free City was predominantly German, he wondered aloud whether "the world would understand why [Poland] would unleash the dogs of war for the sake of this non-Polish object ... and whether the world would stand by [her] side", and asked if Warsaw instead might consider attempting to meet Hitler halfway on Danzig.  Szembek said no, and Cortesi changed the subject, but it has been claimed that the Holy See continued to encourage suggestions along these lines through back channels. In any event, Cortesi had unveiled the idea that became the guiding principle of the counsels and actions Pius XII in the summer of 1939: that general war would be the worst of all outcomes, to be avoided at all costs, and that if necessary, Poland should make any concessions needed to keep the guns silent, both for her own sake that of European civilisation." (pp200-201.)

Pacelli, Tisserant and Poland 1938

Much has been made of a document written by Cardinal Pacelli, in May 1938 to Cardinal Eugene Tisserant, head of the Congregation for the Eastern Churches, ie, Churches that use one of the several Oriental rites and are in communion with Rome.  I have made mention of this before, but I think it timely to review what lies in the public domain.

What we have is a letter written by Pacelli to Tisserant in response to a news article that had been sent to Tisserant reporting on legislation before the Polish parliament that would outlaw traditional halachic - schechita - slaughter of animals. 

Firstly, let us place the text in its historical context.

1.  Pacelli, acting in accord with Pope Pius XI, had regularly protested anti-Jewish and antisemitic legislation through the networks of nuncios and other papal representatives.  The most well known are the dispatches Pacelli sent to the German nuncio, Archbishop Cesare Orsenigo ordering him to make formal protests to the German government over anti-Jewish persecution.  Further, Pacelli also ordered the nuncio to do whatever he could to help German Jews.  In reality, there was little more Pacelli could do; he relied on Orsenigo who demonstrated on more than a few occasions, a concerning lack of energy over Jewish matters.

2.  This points to a series of obvious, but often overlooked, realities of Vatican diplomacy. 

a)  The pope and Pacelli could, and did, protest, but usually to little effect.  Bound by the conventions of concordats with states such as Germany and Poland, which they observed to the letter, Vatican protests could only raise issues with the government.  And the historical record is replete with examples of governments ignoring the Vatican.  The irony in this case is that Poland's identity in the inter-war years was, in no small part, built on a publicly proclaimed Catholicism, albeit of a Polish rather than Roman slant. Neal Pease's book Rome's Most Faithful Daughter goes far to dispel many of the myths of Polish Catholicism.

b) The pope and Pacelli could, and did, stir the local bishops through the nuncio and direct communication, but that too was limited.  The Vatican rarely ordered bishops to act on local matters outside of internal Church affairs, such as liturgy or appointments, preferring to trust that bishops would "do the right thing".  Given the murky and long history of Judeaphobia, to expect Catholic bishops in central and eastern Europe to rally to the Jews was unlikely.  It had, as historians such as Hubert Wolf, Emma Fattorini, Susan Zuccotti and Michael Phayer have pointed out, taken Rome decades in the modern era to come to a point where a condemnation of antisemitism was even feasible or desirable.  Nazi persecution focused attention precisely because it was qualitatively different to previous manifestations.

c) Evidence from ADSS and a host of other sources, such as the Akten deutcher bischofe  uber die lage der kirche 1933-1945, demonstrate that among the bishops of Germany and the rest of Europe, there was a wide diversity of opinion and attitude.  The German bishops were often unable to agree on a united strategy to counter National Socialism, and during the war found themselves unable to agree on a plan of action to assist the Jews.  The bishops of Poland generally accepted the teaching and effects of centuries of supercessionism and the theology of contempt towards Jews and Judaism, ensuring Jewish concerns would always be second to Catholic Poles.  During the war this proved to be catastrophic; Jews would always be "lesser victims" to everyone else.

3.  Poland 1938.

In the years following the death of Marshall Jozef Pilsudski (1867-1935), the Polish government had gradually introduced more restrictive anti-Jewish laws, building on a widespread social acceptance and approval that had long been a part of nationalist Polish self-identity.    In June 1936, the prime minister, Felicjan Slawoj-Skladovski (1885-1962) declared his support for an economic war against the Jews.  What had been an unofficial government policy that enjoyed considerable support from the Catholic clergy, now became official policy. 

Removing Jews from Poland's economic life received vocal support from the Cardinal-Primate, August Hlond (1881-1948), archbishop of Poznan and Gniezno, who declared that Jews would always be a problem for Poland, always at odds with the Catholic Church and always at the beck and call of godless Bolshevism.  A Poland without Jews would be a good thing.

The Sejm had already passed laws restricting and banning schechita - kosher slaughter - in 1923 and 1936. By 1938 the Sejm was also listening to calls not only for economic segregation but for physical segregation in the markets, housing, public transport, schools, universities, courts, and ultimately, forced emigration from Poland.  Much of this enjoyed the public support of many Polish bishops.

When Pacelli wrote to Tisserant in May 1938, many of the Jews of Poland were facing economic ruin and poverty.  They were, to use the title of Celia Stopnika Heller's book, On the Edge of Destruction. 

4. What was known in Rome, May 1938.

Although the principal preoccupation in the Vatican in May 1938 was Hitler's visit to Rome, news from Poland flowed into the Holy See as it did from all the other papal representatives around the world.  Pacelli's response demonstrates that the matter was noted and the nuncio to Poland informed.  There was an attached report from Poland to the original letter, but it has not been reproduced on any of the sites I researched. I doubt the matter raised any "red flags" in Rome, indeed by comparison with other issues facing Polish Jews, kosher butcher restrictions were probably not considered of urgent importance.  Indeed, it is of greater concern that the inflammatory statements made by more than a few of the Polish bishops appear to have gone unchallenged by the Vatican.  I admit that the last sentence is not based on a comprehensive study of the matter, but I have not come across any disciplinary statement or request for caution from Rome.

The text:

From the Vatican 21 May 1938

Secretary of State of His Holiness
Number: 1892/38
To be cited in response.

My Most Obedient, Eminent and Reverend Lord,

With the venerable letter of 6 April [1938] which your Most Eminent Reverence was please to make known to me the article in the newspaper to the effect that the Government of Poland has planned to introduce a law which would prohibit the “slaughter by jugular”, imposed by Israelite religious law, and therefore constitute a real persecution of the Jews. Your letter insinuated, therefore, the convenience of a gesture of the Apostolic Nuncio to prevent this measure.

I did not fail to pass on this information to His Excellency, Archbishop Cortesi, and I am now happy to give your Eminence, in the attached copy of his Report Number 89 on 7 May [1938], which contains precise information on the issue.

I gladly take the opportunity to express to your Eminence, the assurances of my profound veneration, and humbly kissing your hands,

I am your Reverend Eminence’s most humble, true and devoted servant,

E. Card. Pacelli

Addressee:
His Reverend Eminence, the Lord Cardinal Eugene Tisserant,
Secretary of the Sacred Congregation for the Eastern Church.

 
In 2008 Andrea Tornielli wrote an article on the document.  It is interesting, but does not examine the historical context in sufficient detail.  Further, Tornielli uses the document as evidence that Pacelli was not antisemitic.  I disagree.  The document is evidence that Cardinal Pacelli responded to a request from Cardinal Tisserant to help the Jews of Poland and protest at a proposed unjust law - which would add to a series of unjust laws that actively discriminated against Polish Jews.  The question of whether Pacelli was antisemitic or not is not applicable here.