ADSS 1.271 Pacini to Maglione: Conversation with Polish Minister Beck

ADSS 1.271 Alfredo Pacini, Charge d’affaires, Polish Nunciature in Angers, France, to Luigi Maglione, Sec State.

Reference: Report 15/40 (AES 2954/40)

Location and date: Angers, 20.03.1940

Summary statement: Pacini reports on conversation with Polish Foreign Minister, August Zaleski who commented on Sumner Welles information:  Jozef Beck never consented to the return of Danzig to the Reich.  Pacini quotes the Polish ‘White Book’

Language: Italian

Text:

As I had the honour to inform Your Eminence whith my report No 14/40 of yesterday (1), M. Zaleski, Polish Foreign Minister (2), spoke to me about his meeting in Paris with Mr Welles at the occasion of Welles’ visit to the French Government. The Minister said: “As we do not want to keep anything secret from the Holy See, I wish to report the conversation I had with Mr Welles.

“Mr Roosevelt’s representative asked me only a few questions but insisted on knowing if it was true that Minister Beck (3) – during the visit paid by the Polish Minister to the German Chancellor in his residence in Berchtesgaden on 5 January 1939 – made concessions to Hitler regarding the return of Danzig and the Corridor to Germany”.

M. Zelseki replied: “From documents found in the Foreign Ministry and from other knowledge this information seems to be untrue.  When speaking with Chancellor Hitler, M. Beck used a formal phrase of courtesy, namely that there was always a way to reach an understanding on thorny questions without the necessity of letting it come to a serious conflict; he did not say clearly yes of no, and clarity would have been necessary.  But, at a meeting which M. Beck had in Munich on 6 January with the German Foreign Minister he took the opportunity to explain his ideas about these problems more clearly, saying that Poland would never agree to hand Danzig to Germany or to other requests regarding the extra-territorial status of a Corridor.

Mr Welles took notes on the subject and did not ask anything else of importance.

Minister Zaleski tells me that Mr Welles asked General Sikorski, President of the Council (4), his opinion on the military might of Germany and Russia and M. Sikorski made a report which was handed to Mr Welles while he was leaving London for Paris.

I note that the Polish “White Book” mentions the conversations which Minister Beck had with Chancellor Hitler and with the German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop in two documents: 48-49 and 78-79.  One can see from them, the manner in which very thorny questions, which then developed into a war, were dealt with.  The discussions were resumed in Berlin on 21 March (the “White Book” mentions them under No. 61) between the Polish Ambassador, M. Lipski and the German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, with the well known tragic results.

Notes:

(1) Report not published in ADSS.  Pacini provided information about giving the document to the Polish Minister.  See ADSS 1.248 note 1.

(2) August Zaleski (1883-1972), Minister of Foreign Affairs Polish Government in Exile 1940-47.

(3) Jozef Beck (1894-1944), Polish Foreign Minister 1932-39.

(4) Wladislaw Sikorski (1881-1943), Prime Minister Polish Government in Exile 1939-43.

(5) The Polish “White Book” was a collection of documents dealing with Poland’s relations with Germany and the USSR between 1933 and 1939.  It was published on 15.03.1940.

ADSS 1.268 Maglione, notes: Sumner Welles in Rome

 ADSS 1.268 Luigi Maglione, Sec State, notes.

Reference: AES 2494/40

Location and date: Vatican, 18.03.1940

Summary statement: Sumner Welles in Rome.  Meeting at Vatican – Allies want a sound peace; imminent offensive expected; Papal peace initiative likely to fail; Italian neutrality.

Language: Italian

Text:

Mr Sumner Welles, United States Foreign Under Secretary, came to see me after the audience granted to him by the Holy Father (1)

He expressed his satisfaction, indeed his joy, at having been able to confer with His Holiness.

He spoke then about the talks he had had in Italy, Germany, Britain and France with Government people. In Berlin he was able to note that Hitler and his Government are convinced that the Allies (France and Britain) want the destruction of Germany (2) while he knows – and he was able to see this clearly in London and in Paris – that the allies want to reach a sound peace with a lasting settlement of all matters and want to be sure than other war will not start in twenty years’ time.

He asked me then if I thought that the Germans, although they declared themselves certain of an overwhelming victory within a year, have not manifested some intention of talking peace.  Mussolini confirmed that the Germans are preparing a vigorous offensive within the next few days of weeks.  The fact that this is impossible to avoid is heart rending.  He asked me what I thought about a new attempt in favour of peace.

I replied that at the present time neither of the two parties in conflict believe in the possibility of, nor are they willing to help in the success of any such attempt: both declare they are certain of complete victory and will fight: both energetically refuse any proposal of peace.,  Any effort in this direction would, in the present circumstances, be doomed to failure and would compromise any future move which could be resumed at a more opportune moment.

Mr Welles told me that he agreed with me fully and added that he had already telephoned the President accordingly.

He then asked my opinion about the Italian situation and said that he thought that during the meeting between Hitler and Mussolini fixed for this morning at the Brenner Pass the relations between Italy and Russia would be discussed to see if there was any possibility of improving them as Hitler desired.

I replied that the Italian people are against the war but Mussolini’s mind is not clear.  He leans towards Germany but there is hope that he would take the nation’s mood into account and in consequence restrain himself, being a realist, from throwing Italy into an adventure in which it could run mortal risks.

The Allies, who would gain by Italian non-belligerency, should do their utmost not to antagonise Mussolini, etc.

In the margin: It should be noted that Italian and German interests in the Balkans are opposed to a Russian thrust in the Balkans.

Welles told me that those were exactly his own thoughts.  Although until a short while ago relations between the United States and Italy were not very cordial, President Roosevelt has already suggested that the Allies be cautious and friendly towards Italy, and try not to upset them with measures and policies which are unacceptable.  Recently, regarding the coal question, he said “In Washington we took the same line as followed by Your Eminence here”. (Welles knew that I had approached the French Ambassador and the British Minister on this subject) (3).

I did not fail to remind Welles that the Unites States can do a lot and that all here have great confidence in President Roosevelt’s good offices.

Welles told me very courteously, but with obvious sincerity, that the United States in turn have great confidence in the influence of the most high and august moral power which the Pope can have in the present circumstances and that the President will be most pleased to unite his efforts to those of the Holy Father.

Notes:

(1) FRUS 1940 Volume 1, pp 106-08 for Sumner Welles report.  The audience began at 10.00 and lasted 50 minutes.  The conversation he later had with Maglione in French, is also reported in FRUS, pp 108-10.

(2) FRUS 1940 Volume 1, p49 for Sumner Welles meeting with Hitler.

(3) ADSS 1.250

ADSS 1.264 Notes of the Secretary of State: conversation with Myron Taylor and Maglione

ADSS 1.264 Secretary of State, notes

Reference: AES 2466/40

Location and date: Vatican, 15.03.1940

Summary statement: Conversation of Myron Taylor with Maglione.

Language: Italian

Text:

The Ambassador thanked His Eminence for all the courtesies shown to him on his arrival in Rome (1).

Speaking then about Mr Sumner Welles’ next visit to Rome, the Ambassador asked His Eminence to submit the wish to the Holy Father that the honour of an audience with the Holy Father be granted to Mr Welles.  If possible, Monday would be perfect, as Mr Welles is also engaged during Saturday and Sunday with M. Mussolini and Count Ciano; furthermore it would be proper that the last conversation which Mr Welles had in Europe would be with His Holiness “thus Mr Welles’ mission would be concluded in a worthy manner and he could return to America with this thoughts elevated on to a spiritual plane” (2).

At the end of the audience Mr Welles would like to introduce Mr Moffat, Chief of the Western European Affairs Section at the American Department of State, to the Holy Father, and Mr Johnson, private secretary to Mr Welles. (3)  Ambassador Taylor expressed the wish to be present during the Audience for the prestige of his own mission’s sake.  He kept on insisting on this point.

Mr Taylor then went on to propose two points to His Eminence on which he would like to have the Holy See’s advice.

1. His Excellency, after having obtained information from all sides, is firmly convinced that for the moment everybody believes that nothing can be done regarding an initiative in favour of peace.  He would like to know if the holy See, in order to prevent the extension of the war or at least to confine it, could make a useful suggestion to be taken by the President alone, with the support of the Holy Father, or by a group of neutral states, in particular the American ones.

2. In case nothing could definitely be done at present, how could President Roosevelt help to protect Italy from the danger of being dragged into war on Germany’s side?  The Ambassador thinks that Italy’s neutrality will be very important should the war last a long time, and he would like to work in this direction.

His Eminence will bring these two points to the attention of the Hoy Father and give his considered reply to the Ambassador.

Notes: 

(1) On 27.02.1940 Myron Taylor was received by Pius XII in “solemn audience” and he handed to the Pope a letter from FDR. See ADSS 1.264.  After the meeting with the Pope, Taylor had a meeting with the Secretary of State for 45 minutes during which the international situation was discussed.  See FRUS 1940 Vol 1, pp 126-27.

(2) See ADSS 1.268.

(3) Jay Pierrepont Moffat (1896-1943), Chief of European Affairs 1937-40.  Hartwell Johnson (1902- ?)

ADSS 1.263 Valeri to Maglione: Ribbentrop's visit to Holy See; end of war in Finland

ADSS 1.263 Valerio Valeri, France, to Luigi Maglione, Sec State.

Reference: Report number 1059/509 (AES 3112/40)

Location and date: Paris, 14.03.1940

Summary statement: Ribbentrop’s visit to the Vatican came as a great surprise.  Some see it as a peace plan devised by Hitler.  Peace imposed on Finland has disappointed public opinion; criticism of Allied inactivity.

Language: Italian

Text:

The journey of the Reich Foreign Minister, von Ribbentrop, to Rome has not failed, as Your Eminence knows, to give rise here in France to a great deal of comment.  His visit to the Vatican has caused great surprise and amazement.  The newspapers, however – excluding a few of clearly anti-Catholic tendency and a few more who do not have a large distribution such as the Petit Bleu which covers the interest of certain financial groups – have abstained from openly criticising the affirmative reply of the Holy See to the request of the Reich Foreign Minister to be received by the Holy Father.  On the other hand various hypotheses have been expressed as to the aims of this visit and the bitter sweet tone of the Press lets one feel that some displeasure has been created by this action which could be interpreted as a success for German diplomacy.

The Press, however, instead of criticising has tried to explain with more or less credible reports, that the visit of von Ribbentrop to the Vatican will not bring Nazism the advantages, which were anticipated.  Nor could it be otherwise, because the Hoy See could not support Hitler’s plans in favour of peace, if this peace is not founded on justice and the wrongs committed by the Reich against the conquered nations are not put right.  The newspapers have delved particularly into these points and some of them, like Populaire yesterday morning have again quoted the Christmas address of the Holy Father on the peace conditions.

People here think in fact that one of the principal aims of Ribbentrop’s visit to Rome was that of preparing a new German peace offensive which could be harmful to the Allies, by influencing public opinion in the neutral countries and in particular that of the United States of America and Mr Roosevelt’s decisions, while his representative is going to meet Signor Mussolini again in a few days (1).

I must add furthermore that the peace which Finland was forced to sign the day before yesterday with the Soviets, has been a blow to French public opinion, and they ask what the Allied Governments are doing (2).  M Daladier was obliged to answer a question in Parliament on this point during Tuesday’s session.  Parliament is in a bad mood regarding the trend that international political and diplomatic events are taking.  A rumour is going around that new ministerial changes will take place.

On the whole the situation is rather confused especially because France cannot break away form the decisions and dispositions of Great Britain.

Notes: 

(1) Reference to Benjamin Sumner Welles visit to Rome, Berlin and London in March and April 1940.

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(2) The Russo-Finnish war (13.11.1939-13.03.1940) ended with Finland signing the Treaty of Moscow.  Finland had held the Red Army at bay for over three months.  Britain and France pledged to send troops to Finland via Scandanavia.  Part of the Allied plan was to secure Swedish iron ore deposits and Norwegian coastal ports, especially Narvik, and deny them to Germany.  This would effectively end Swedish neutrality and Norway’s ambition to stay out of the war.  However, Norway, Denmark and Sweden announced in February 1940 that they would not give permission for Allied troops to pass through their territory.  The USSR took 11% of Finnish land space and about 30% of Finnish economic power.