ADSS 1.47 Cesare Orsenigo, Germany, to Luigi Maglione, Sec
State
Reference:
Report 27,333 (AES 2703/39)
Location
and date: Berlin, 17.05.1939
Summary
statement: Nuncio’s conversation with Ribbentrop. Discussion of papal proposal;
in the event of war Poland will be crushed; possible accommodation with USSR;
nuncio still hopes for a peaceful solution.
Language:
Italian
Text:
Following
my coded telegram 323 of 12.05.1939 and the subsequent report 27.282 (1) of the
following day regarding the proposal put forward by the Holy Father on behalf
of peace, I am today able to report:
His
Excellency von Ribbentrop (2) unexpectedly invited me to tell me what the
Secretary of State had already mentioned to me. (3) In a long conversation,
which lasted three-quarters of an hour, he said:
“In
the meeting I had in Milan with Minister Ciano, who had been instructed to
inform me of the Duce’s views on the Holy Father’s initiative, while I conveyed
to him the Führer’s thoughts, Italy and Germany seemed to be in perfect
agreement on all subjects, so much so that I am able to convey to you, also on
behalf of the Führer, Mussolini and Hitler’s thoughts as follows:
1.
The Führer as well as Mussolini are very grateful to the Holy Father for his benevolent
intervention on behalf of universal peace.
2.
However, considering all circumstances, they think that the moment is not yet
ripe for a conference which has as its object the outstanding issues between
Italy and and France and Between Germany and Poland;
3. Also they are afraid that such a noble
initiative, in the present circumstances, could fail; and in consideration of
the high office invested in the Holy Father, they would not like to see him
exposed to such a chance.
These
feelings – he concluded – I think have already been conveyed by Mussolini to
the Holy See.” (4)
After
having thanked the Minister and promised him that I would faithfully report the
present communication, I chanced to put forward a question to probe more
deeply, if possible, into the Government’s mind, especially as the echo of the
tension between Germany and Poland still persisted in the German newspapers,
and asked his opinion on the international situation and if he was aware that
the peoples of the so-called democratic nations were determined to go to war
and were impatient to start it, so strong was the aversion towards Germany.
At
this point Ribbentrop, with the intonation of one who feels certain of his
superiority, replied:
“We
do not want war, but we are not afraid of it for many reasons, which are also
known to Great Britain. There reasons
are:
1.
France and England will never cross our defence lines in the West; they are too
strong and would exact one million victims.
In attacking them the French would be meet with another Sedan, from
which they would hardly recover.
2.
If war really broke out, Italy, Spain, Japan would rally to our side
immediately. (I do not remember if he also mentioned Hungary; certainly he did
no mention Yugoslavia; although the visit to Berlin of the Regent of
Yugoslavia, Prince Paul, and of his Foreign Minister has been announced for 2
June);
3.
Poland, if she judged badly enough to provoke a war, will be crushed in less
time than it takes to say it. Poland, in
fact, although it has 34 million inhabitants, for its war effort can only count
on 18 million people because 8 million Ukrainians will not lift a finger to
help Poland; meanwhile the 4 million Jews will certainly do their utmost to
excite and to help the others who fight against Germany, but they, the 4
million of them, will not fight because the Jew is selfish and does not like
fighting … not even to bring Germany down.
There are also quite a sizeable number of Germans and Russians in Poland
to account for. Therefore only 18 million
of true Polish citizens remain prepared to fight. The Polish army is composed of a few very
good divisions, but the others have only a façade. In any case in a war against
a country like ours, with 85 million people, armed to the teeth, Poland will
have only very few days to fight; it will be immediately annihilated because it
will be attacked from ten different points at the same time.” (5)
The
Minister’s mention of the British inability to cross the Western fortifications
prompted my question: “and the British Navy?”
The
Minister replied:
“What can the Navy do? What can ships do
against our submarines? No British ship will ever be able to carry out a
landing on German soil.”
The
mention of the Russian minority in Poland gave me courage to ask the Minister
if it was possible to know Russia’s mind in case of a European
conflagration. He replied – and this is,
I think, the more important and the less prudent part of his speech.
“Russia
is not prepared to pull England’s chestnuts our of the fire. Britain’s game is to set themselves up
menacingly against Germany, but to send others to fight and keep a small door
always open to be able afterwards in case of defeat, to say that they were not
really responsible for what had happened; this game, I say, has not pleased
Stalin, and even Litvinoff had to go. (6) The situation is such now that we can
almost hope for a change of mind in Russia.
We have no quarrel with Russia except about Bolshevism, in other words
we do not want its perfidious propaganda for a world revolution; against this
we have the ‘anti-Comintern’ pact, but should Russia drop this propaganda
nothing prevents us from drawing closer together.”
Amongst
the European diplomats the conviction is growing that war will not break out
for at least some months; and they give the credit for this to the Holy
Father’s initiative. All of them report,
however, that their people think war inevitable, as it will be the only way to
escape from this universal decline.
Unfortunately this war psychosis is obsessing the people and the fear
that Germany might strike another coup,
bloodless but fatal, like the one which brought about the disappearance of two
nations, creates a state of uneasiness which hinders their normal life and
commercial relations.
In
Germany, however, I do not know whether as a reaction or in ostentation, there
is a semblance of normal life; the people, although they have to abstain from
certain foodstuffs, are not worried about war.
For this reason one is led to hope that if Poland avoids taking
imprudent steps it would be possible, little by little, to reach a certain
tranquillity, sufficient to allow negotiations between Germany and Poland;
negotiations that certainly will be hard, but could lead to a bloodless
solution.
The
Führer is always boasting of carrying out his plans without shedding blood and
maybe this boast will exert some restraint on his actions lest he should sully
his crown of a bloodless conqueror; I must add, however, that he loves to
conquer and to enter the chosen nations in triumph and this inclination of his
fans the suspicion that he is preparing one of his clever snare where guile,
interlaced with force and unclean diplomatic actions supported by an Army,
powerful but inert, leads almost inexorably to victory.
Notes:
(1)
See ADSS 1.40, 42.
(2)
Joachim Ribbentrop (1893-1946) German Foreign Minister 1938-45.
(3)
Ernst Weizsäcker (1882-1951) German Secretary of State, Foreign Office 1938-43.
(4)
See ADSS 1.36 n2 on the minutes of the Milan meeting and the reply of the two
Ministers regarding the Pope’s initiative.
(5)
Hitler had ordered planning for the invasion of Poland on 03.04.1939. By mid-May the Wehrmacht had the general
plans ready for “Case White” to be launched in the summer. Ribbentrop would have had some knowledge of
the planning which makes his comments to Orsenigo even more cynical.
(6)
Maxim Litvinoff (1876-1951) Soviet Union People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs
1930-39. Litvinoff was Jewish and in his
preparation for a deal with Germany, Stalin had him removed on 03.05.1939 and
replaced by Vyacheslav Molotov.
Litivinoff’s dismissal was interpreted by some French and British
diplomats as a sign that the USSR was coming to an “understanding” with
Germany. After the German invasion in
June 1941 Litvinoff was appointed Soviet Ambassador to the USA.
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