Some thoughts from reading "Rome's Most Faithful Daughter"

I have finished reading Rome’s Most Faithful Daughter by Neal Pease. Having had some time to think about the entire work and what it adds to our understanding of the role of the Catholic Church and, in particular, the popes, during the inter-war period and the immediate outbreak of war in 1939, I have some reflections based on Pease’s study.



1. Pease underscores the horrible dilemma that confronted the Vatican and its diplomatic strategies in Poland and the rest of Europe. Confronted with Hitler whom both Pius XI and Pius XII hoped could be contained and, perhaps, even reasoned with and Stalin who was beyond the pale by any standard, the Vatican engaged in an increasingly frantic series of attempts to prevent war. It would appear that throughout the last months of peace, Pius XII believed that peace at any price was better than war.


2. By mid-1938 Rome was certain there would be another war and that Germany would be responsible for it. Vatican policy was therefore shaped to do all it could to prevent this. Rome also knew with reasonably certainty after he had reclaimed all “legitimate” German territories Hitler's next demand would focus on Danzig and the “corridor”. Vatican opinion seems to have been divided on whether Poland should surrender the Corridor or not. Certainly by August 1939, opinion had moved towards putting pressure on Poland to let Danzig and the Corridor “return” to the Reich.


3. The Vatican was probably Europe’s best “listening post” as far as diplomats were concerned. Ambassadors and envoys sent messages, often veiled and obtuse, knowing they would be passed along and circulated among the corridors of Europe’s foreign ministries. This proved a useful means of testing the waters and probing different states to gauge reactions to possible directions in policy. The Holy See, desperate to prevent another war, passed along all information no matter how trite it may have appeared.


4. Pius called an international peace conference in May 1939, but apart form Italy, no one else was particularly interested. Germany made statements to the effect that German-Polish differences could be settled amicably and without conflict. Britain and France had pledged to support Poland if Germany attacked and saw little relevance in a Vatican sponsored set of talks. Various Vatican officials made statements on and off the record to the effect that the Holy See supported Poland and believed her cause (to defend her borders) to be just. Polish government officials were slow to use these statements to their advantage. Foreign Minister Beck had still not replaced the Polish ambassador to the Holy See since 1937, and so lost a valuable opportunity to broadcast Polish concerns to a wide audience via the Pope. A Polish ambassador, Casmir Papeé, was appointed in the early summer of 1939.


5. With the prospect of a German initiated war growing more likely, Pius XII started sending messages to the Polish government through the Nuncio, Filippo Cortesi, urging Warsaw to consider acceding to Hitler’s demands to prevent war. Rome believed a German accommodation of the Soviet Union was also likely and Poland had to face reality if it was to save itself. Not surprisingly, Poland was not sympathetic to Pius’ suggestions. When the Russian-German non-aggression pact was signed on 21 August 1939, Pius’ efforts to persuade Poland to surrender the Corridor became frantic. (ADSS Volume 1 demonstrates this quite clearly.)


6. 24 August 1939. Pius broadcast his famous appeal “In this grave hour” and pronounced what may have been the most famous words of his pontificate: "Nothing is lost with peace; all may be lost with war”. At the same time British and French diplomats were urging Pius to make a clear statement on the situation and defend Poland against Germany. The pope refused, saying he had to be father to all Catholics in all countries.


7. The last days of peace brought renewed calls from the Vatican via the nuncio in Warsaw to surrender the corridor. Rome’s greater fear was the potential of a Soviet move westwards. “Better to suffer pain today, than lose your life tomorrow” seems an apt way to summarise the Vatican’s position on Poland on the eve of the war. Foreign minister Beck’s final rejection of the papal proposal was made just after Germany launched the invasion on 1 September 1939.


8. Pius refused to name either the victim or the aggressor in any public statement at any point throughout the war. This caused enormous pain to Poles and eroded much respect towards the papacy that was not restored until the advent of communist rule later in the 1940s.


9. The Soviet invasion of Poland on 17 September 1939 was the fulfillment of the Vatican’s worst nightmare scenarios for Christian Europe. But, Pius still clung to the hope, however faint, that he could act the part of a mediator in some peace conference that would end the war before more harm could be done. I find it difficult to understand how such a well-educated man, who knew his enemies so well, could have thought that Hitler or Stalin would stop at Poland.


10. Pius issued his first encyclical, Summi pontificatus, in October 1939. By this time it was all but too late to speak plainly. Poland no longer existed. A reign of terror covered the German-occupied part of the Polish lands, and a near-complete blackout of all news covered the Soviet-occupied territory. The future for the people of the now-dismembered Poland was bleak and fraught with fear. The voice of the Vicar of Christ was not heard to speak in their defence.


Pease’s closing chapter is tough reading. He pulls no punches in his assessment of Pius XII. He judges Pius to have failed to respond as Christ’s Vicar for the Polish people, even though he acted with all honest and honourable intention. “One may question whether Pius XII made the correct policies during the war, but he chose them with honourable intentions, and it appears that he was mainly ‘guilty’ of having been Pope at the wrong historical moment, and one ill matched to his talents and personality”. (Pease, 212) I find it hard to disagree with this assessment.

Hubert Wolf "Why did the Pope keep quiet about the Holocaust?"

Newspapers whether in print or electronic form create "hooks" to grab and keep the reader's attention.  In this case, my attention was well and truly grabbed by this rather dramatic headline.  This article appeared in the latest online edition of the US magazine Foreign Policy.  According to Wikipedia, Foreign Policy  describes itself as “a daily web magazine that is a must-read for anyone who cares about international affairs, … indispensable, insightful and as diverse as the subjects it covers, … serious but never stuffy.”

The magazine certainly lives up to its claims in this article. 

Hubert Wolf (b 1959), is a priest of the diocese of Rottenberg-Stuggart and a published historian who since 1999 has been on the faculty of Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität in Münster.  He has also worked in the archives of the Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith (Holy Office / Inquisition) as well as in the Secret Archives (ASV).

In 2008 he published "Papst und Teufel"  which will be released in English later in May under the title "The Pope and the Devil: the Vatican's archives and the Third Reich".

This article has an odd title considering most of it centres on the famous bishop of Münster, Clemens August Graf von Galen (1876-1946). 

And while this is interesting, it is the claim in the opening paragraph that I find disturbing:

How much did the Catholic Church hierarchy know about the Holocaust as it was happening? And why didn't it speak up? With the opening of the Vatican archives from the World War II years, we can finally explore these heated questions -- and German historian Hubert Wolf has dug through the files to find damning evidence that Pope Pius XII, known to critics as "Hitler's pope," made a conscious decision to pass on the issue, leaving it up to his bishops in Germany to protect the Jews and Catholics who were being killed. Even when directly confronted with the growing enormity of the situation, as in this story of a German bishop who did stand up for his morals, the pope avoided public action.

Firstly, the "Vatican archives from the World War II years" are not opened and will not be for at least another three years.  Secondly, I find it hard to believe that a scholar of Wolf's standing would have "dug through the files to find damning evidence" that Pius XII "made a conscious decision to pass on the issue, leaving it up to his bishops in Germany to protect the Jews and Catholics who were being killed".  Thirdly, I suspect that the editors of Foreign Policy thought it in keeping with their mandate to never be "stuffy" to play loose with the historical record. The readers of Foreign Policy deserve better.

Whatever one's position on Pius XII it must be, at least, based on the historical record and intellectual honesty.  If Hubert Wolf did not know of the introductory paragraph the editors have a moral imperative to clarify the ambiguity.  As the article stands it is an interesting piece on the Lion of Münster, but none of the war references are new - they have been in the public domain for decades, including the published documents of Acts and Documents of the Holy See (ADSS).

One last comment.  The cover of the English translation features a photo of Eugenio Pacelli during his time as Nuncio to Germany (1917-1929) entering the Presidential residence in Berlin.  It is similar to the image used on the cover of John Cornwall's 1999 "Hitler's Pope".  This is a not-so-subtle form of mischief making.  As any Year 12 history student would be able to say, the Nazis did not come to power until January 1933 when Pacelli had been gone from Germany for over three years.  Why use an irrelevant picture if not to sensationalise?

Fortunately the editorial review found on Amazon gives a more hopeful synopsis of Wolf's book. I have ordered it and look forward to reading it.