Showing posts with label prospect of war. Show all posts
Showing posts with label prospect of war. Show all posts

Monday, January 25, 2016

ADSS 1.162 Kaldewey to Maglione: news from Romania


ADSS 1.162 Umberto Kaldewey (1), Charge d’affaires, Budapest Nunciature to Luigi Maglione, Sec State

Reference: Report number 2657/1939; AES 6348/39

Location and date: Budapest, 31.08.1939

Summary statement: Romania has proposed a non-aggression pact with Hungary without success; Hungary calls for a pact for the protection of minorities.  Hungarian press is silent on the German occupation of Slovakia.  Friendly demonstrations outside the German and Italian legations.

Language: Italian

Text:

Hungary also, naturally, takes the necessary precautions required by the present difficult situation, but the calm, order and discipline which prevails in Budapest and in the centre of the country is noted even abroad. Parliament is due to open again on 14 September when a Bill on agrarian reform will be introduced.

The Hungarian Government has expressed to the Rumanian Government its anxiety about the vast movement of soldiers taking place in Rumania.  The Bucharest Government replied that no aggressive intention should be seen in these activities: they are only concentrations of army units that are part of the autumn manoeuvres for exercise purposes.  In order to give proof of its peaceful intentions towards it neighbours, the Rumanian government has declared itself ready to sign a non-aggression pact between Rumania and Hungary.  The Hungarian Government replied that it was unable to accept this proposal; it does not object to the mobilisation, but it does not consider that the concentration of Rumanian troops along the Hungarian border is a friendly act.  The Hungarian Government, giving proof of its good will, proposed to the Rumanian Government that, instead, a treaty for the protection of the minorities should be concluded because in such a way the relations between the two nations could be improved; such a treaty, moreover, notwithstanding its political nature, could not be construed as a consequence of the mobilisation and the movements of the Rumanian army.

The news that German troops have entered Slovakia has not created any excitement here.

A small number of people with swastika emblems were able – notwithstanding the prohibition of the authorities – to set up a demonstration of sympathy in front of the Italian and the German Legations – as I informed you in my report Number 27 (1) The Hungarian newspapers have disapproved almost unanimously of this gesture, made more or less for internal political purposes, considering it offensive to Germany and Italy as if sympathy towards the two Axis partners in Hungary could be deduced from the action of a few swastika bearers.

Hopes unfortunately are every moment becoming frighteningly weaker; but the people anxiously follow the efforts which are being made to avoid war and especially, with profound gratitude, the noble efforts of the Holy Father in favour of peace.

Notes:
(1) Umberto Kaldewey, priest of the diocese of Rome, was Charge d’Affaires at the Hungarian Nunciature since at least 1928. 
(2) Not published in ADSS.


Tuesday, July 7, 2015

ADSS 1.59 Valeri to Maglione: discussion in Paris


ADSS 1.59 Valerio Valeri, France, to Luigi Maglione, Sec State.

Reference: Report 8415 (AES 3759/39)

Location and date: Paris, 10.06.1939

Summary statement: Meeting with Secretary Alexis Léger, who rejected the idea of the papal peace conference; pre-Munich borders of Czechoslovakia must be restored. For. Minister Bonnet has more moderate ideas; King Zog of Albania and Prime Minister Edward Benes appeal to the League of Nations.

Language: Italian

Text:

During the luncheon given yesterday at the nunciature here in honour of Cardinal Villeneuve (1), I had the opportunity of talking with M. Léger, Secretary General at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, whom your Eminence knows very well.

The conversation soon veered towards the present political situation and M. Léger made some statements on this subject that I think useful to report to your Eminence.

Substantially he is against any conference, meeting or even contact with the totalitarian powers.  According to him this would immediately give an impression of weakness and would diminish that moral, financial and military armour which France and Great Britain have been able to build up in their countries and which is becoming more formidable all the time.

“For this reason”, he said at a certain moment, “I think that the Holy See’s action should be carried out in a higher sphere without going into practical details.  I am sorry, in fact, that my Minister (that is M. Bonnet) (3) did not give your Excellency a more prompt reply to eliminate immediately any shadow of uncertainty when you made that approach.”

I replied that, no matter how one judged it, that approach was made very discreetly and it was not the Holy See who gave it publicity.

M. Léger added at this point that the internal situation in Germany is worsening all the time and even from the physical point of view a badly fed and sickly generation is coming up.  According to his opinion, should war break out, Germany would not go beyond general mobilisation.  He was completely sure, he said.  The German people are kept from rebelling only by the fear of the Reichswehr. (4)

“I do not think”, I observed, “that one should too easily believe in such eventualities.  About Fascism in Italy, it was said for a ling time that it would only last a few months …”

“But we do not wish the fall of Fascism in Italy”, replied M. Léger.  I was on the point of asking what was the French Government’s point of view regarding Italy when Cardinal Villeneuve got up and all started to retire.

M. Léger never spoke about Italy while he spoke all the time about Germany.  I had therefore mentioned it.  I think however, keeping in mind a conversation I had some time ago with M. Titulescu, (5), a friend of M. Léger, that Germany and Italy are now considered to be in the same boat and some people were rather inclined to make Italy, more than Germany, pay for the consequences of the present state of affairs.  It is true that at that moment they were trying to see the bear’s skin before they killed it.

In any case, the essential point, as I mentioned before, is this: no conference, at least – M. Léger in fact was specific about this – until; things had returned to the state they were before, which means the complete re-establishment of the Czechoslovakian nation.  Moreover, M. Léger mentioned also the Sudeten.

He did not make any reference to Albania, but as I just said, I believe that he would consider this situation on the same level.

On the other hand, I have been told that at the last Geneva session two appears were accepted, one from M. Benes, the other from King Zog, but were not published because M. Avenol had raised a forma objection against the one presented M. Benes. (6) In fact, at the moment of the declaration of protectorate over Tchechia [sic] M. Benes had no more authority. (7)

In the light of the opinions reported above to your Eminence one is led to ask oneself if the latest statements of Lord Halifax and Mr Chamberlain are only, as the totalitarian states pretend, a diplomatic manoeuvre. (8)

It is true that M. Léger represents the extreme current in the Quai d’Orsay – M. Bonnet is more inclined towards moderate solutions – but of course M. Léger is very powerful and I think also that his ideas, on the international level, are in line with those of M. Daladier. (9)

PS: Today’s papers, the 11th June, announce that the Secretary General of the League of Nations has decided to publish M. Benes’ appeal mentioned above.

Notes: 
(1) Rodrigue Villeneuve (1883-1947), Cardinal Archbishop of Quebec 1931-47, had been sent to France as the papal legate for ceremonies in honour of St Joan of Arc in Domrémy organised by the Compagnons de Jeanne d’Arc.
(2) Alexis Leger (1887-1975), Secretary General of the French Foreign Ministry 1932-40.
(3) Georges Bonnet (1889-1957), French Foreign Minister 1938-39.
(4) While it may have been a misquote on the part of the Nuncio, the term Reichswehr had not been used in Germany since 1935 when the military was re-organised as the Wehrmacht.
(5) Nicolae Titulescu (1882-1941), a Romanian diplomat and former President of the General Assembly of the League of Nations 1930-32.  He was exiled from Romania in 1936 and spent the rest of his life in France.
(6) Edward Benes (1884-1948), Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia 1935-38, and in Prime Minister of the Government in Exile in Britain 1940-48; Zog I (1895-1961), President of Albania 1925-28, King 1928-39; Joseph Louis Avenol (1879-1952) Secretary General of the League of Nations 1933-40.  Avenol was keen to see Germany, Italy and Japan return to the League and censored criticism of them in the League Assembly.
(7) Reference to the creation of the German “protectorate” of Bohemia and Moravia in the wake of the final dismemberment of Czechoslovakia in March 1939.
(8) Edward Wood, Viscount Halifax (1881-1959), UK Foreign Minister 1938-40; Neville Chamberlain (1869-1940), British Prime Minister 1937-40.

(9) Eduard Daladier (1884-1970), French Prime Minister 1938-40.


Alexis Léger 1887-1975

ADSS 1.57 Tardini notes on Italian affairs.


ADSS 1.57 Domenico Tardini, notes on Italian affairs.

Reference: AES 3297/39, personal note

Location and date: Vatican, 06-07.06.1939

Summary statement: Mussolini believes war is inevitable.

Language: Italian

Text:

Fr Tacchi Venturi reports to the Secretary of State a conversation that he had with Mussolini.  The Holy Father had instructed Cardinal Maglione to hand to Fr Tacchi Venturi a note (1) in which Mussolini was invited to advise Hitler to restrain himself.

When receiving Fr Tacchi Venturi yesterday, Mussolini was in a pessimistic mood:  he said that war was no inevitable and would explode in August … or even before!  By order of my Superior (2) I go to report this reply to the Holy Father) as the Pope, who while waiting for it but before it had arrived had instructed Cardinal Maglione to call the Ambassador to send through him a similar message to Mussolini). (3)

His Holiness listened with attention, then said: It is terrible! Then he asked if Fr Tacchi Venturi had insisted pro pace, if he had asked what the Pope could do to avert the storm etc.  I replied that I was unable to tell him.  The Pope decided that Fr Tacchi Venturi should make a written report of the audience.

07.06.1939

In the early hours of the morning I wrote to Fr Tacchi Venturi to send a written report.

About noon Fr Tacchi Venturi sent me the report. (4) I read it: It says that Mussolini was in a very bleak mood: he affirmed that any intervention of his with Hitler would be useless (I don’t think it mentioned August, probably on account of haste), Is sent it immediately to the Holy Father.

In the Audience the Holy Father is serene.  He is even inclined to think that Mussolini tried to impress Fr Tacchi Venturi to push the Church to intervene.  I report on a conversation had yesterday by his Eminence with General Caviglia. (5)

The General said:

1. that only the Army really ready and prepared was the French;
2. that Italy cannot wage a war because it has not sufficient weapons, war material etc;
3. that the war would be a long one;
4. that Mussolini knows this better than any of us and therefore, unless he has lost his head, he would not go to war.

It is worth noting that in September 1938 – when we were on the brink of a war on account of the Sudeten question Mussolini, returning from a loquacious tour in the three Venetias, said to Fr Tacchi Venturi, “This time there will not be any way!”  In March of this year (or in another month, but certainly at the beginning of the year) he said to Fr Tacchi Venturi, answering a similar question: “Will there be a war?”  “I am afraid so”.

Notes: 
(1) ADSS 1.53.
(2) Cardinal Luigi Maglione.
(3) Dino Alfieri (1886-1966), Italian Ambassador to the Holy See 1939-40.
(4) ADSS 1.58

(5) Enrico Caviglia (1862-1945), Marshall of Italy from 1926; a known anti-Fascist.