ADSS 1.277 Notes of Giovanni Montini, Secretariat of State: news from France

 ADSS 1.277 Giovanni Montini, Secretariat of State, notes.

Reference: AES 3316/40

Location and date: Vatican, 08.04.1940

Summary statement: French Ambassador, Charles-Roux (1), has given assurance of the good intentions of the French government to the Holy See; but he has noticed a change in the Italian attitude; France prepared to negotiate.  Internal situation in France.

Language: Italian

Text:

His Excellency Charles-Roux, French Ambassador to the Holy See, returning to Rome after a short stay in Paris, says that he has see the Prime Minister, M Reynaud (2), who had assured him about the keeping of good relations with the Holy See and about ecclesiastical affairs.

He brings news about Cardinal Verdier who has had an operation and must shortly have a second one.  His condition however is good and there is no cause for alarm (3).

Regarding the political situation he also noticed a stiffening of tone in the Italian

Press; and he mentions particularly, the Regime Fascista which published a violent leader against France (02.04.1940) and the Popolo d’Italia, no less insulting but with more authority (05.04.1940).  He states that France is still ready to negotiate and to make a distinction between Fascism and Nazism, while Italy seems hostile to any discussion: Italy must already be planning to obtain from a vanquished or exhausted France those advantages which it is unable to obtain now through negotiations.  To my remark that the proofs of the good intentions of France towards Italy are not well know to Italian public opinion, the Ambassador agrees that France would do well to clarify these good intentions.

On the Government position: the Radicals are convinced that they have made a mistake in overthrowing their leader, Daladier.  It would be more logical, in fact, for the Socialists to join forces now with the other parties in an effort to get rid of Communism.  He believes that the Socialists will be more loyal to the nation’s interests than to the interest of their Party (5).

Notes:

(1) Francois Charles-Roux (1879-1961), French Ambassador to the Holy See 1932-40.

(2) Paul Reynaud (1878-1966), French Prime Minister, March-June 1940.

(3) Jean Verdier (1864-1940), Cardinal Archbishop of Paris 1929-40.  Verdier died the following day, 09.04.1940.

(4) Edouard Daladier (1884-1970), French Prime Minister and Foreign Minister 1938-40.

(5) Compare this with the message of Raffaele Guariglia (1889-1970) Italian Ambassador in Paris 1937-40. See DDI, Series 9, Volume 4, n47, pp 33-34.

ADSS 1.250 Maglione: notes on meeting with French Ambassador

ADSS 1.250 Luigi Maglione, notes.

Reference: AES 2271/40

Location and date: Vatican, 01.03.1940

Summary statement: Meeting with French Ambassador and expression of uneasiness over relations between UK and Italy

Language: Italian

Text:

I spoke with the French Ambassador (1) about the anxiety caused to me by the fact that the commercial negotiations between Italy and Great Britain had been broken off, with ensuing tension.  I pointed out to him that France should speak discreetly but persuasively to their allies, in her own interest.  It would not be advisable to push the blockade to its limits, and thus to excite tempers here in Rome.

The ambassador accepted my suggestion well.

02.03.1940

I also mentioned the matter to the Minister of Great Britain (2).

Notes: 

(1) Francois Charles-Roux (1879-1961), French Ambassador to the Holy See 1932-40.

(2) D’Arcy Osborne (1884-1964), British Minister to the Holy See 1936-47.

ADSS 1.227 Charles-Roux to Maglione: reasons France has rejected Christmas truce

ADSS.1.227 François Charles-Roux, French Ambassador to the Holy See, to Luigi Maglione, Sec State.

Reference: AES 9331/39

Location and date: Rome, 14.12 1939

Summary statement: Detailed explanation of the French government’s refusal to support the Christmas truce.

Language: French

Text:

In accordance with Your Eminence’s wishes, I hasten to summarise below what I had the honour of explaining to you verbally this morning.

The French Government, while rendering homage to the lofty sentiments which have inspired the Sovereign Pontiff’s initiative, would not be in a position, should the matter be referred to them officially, to give it favourable consideration. 

The project, which has been mooted to them by Your Eminence through me, meets with objections of a technical and military nature, of which, of course, I can only give here a few instances.

There is, for example, no means of preventing floating, drifting or magnetic mines, which have been laid profusely by the Germans, contrary to the law of nations, from exploding and causing catastrophes at sea during a period of two days of even of one day.  This is true with regard to the effects of such mines, not only on French and British ships, but also on neutral vessels, which are hit by mines just as often, if not more so.  No undertaking could give us an absolute assurance that the enemy submarines or even the enemy surface ships, which are now operating far from their bases and do not wish to divulge their positions, would receive an instruction not to attack our ships during two days or that they would strictly abide by such an instruction if it re ached them.  On this point to, neutral navigation, which is the object of frequent attacks by German submarines and cruisers under the pretext of counter-blockade, would not be more effectively covered than ours by a guarantee, which in certain waters might prove illusory.

On the other hand, it may be feared that Germany might take such an opportunity to intensify the insidious and, at times, pro-Russian propaganda of which she is the instrument and for which her airplanes and radios are often the vehicles.  In this respect, the initiative envisaged might not be without psychological consequences that would be difficult to estimate in advance.  Moreover, care must be taken not to give rise to illusions that could not materialise.

Lastly, it is a well-known fact that in the parts of Poland occupied by Germany acts of violence and oppression are committed.  This is to the detriment of a people allied to France and whose Government has its seat in France.  Any truce would be obviously inoperative for them.

It is therefore necessary to consider that the allied armies are fighting, not for selfish ends, but for the safety of principles of which the Holy See itself proclaims sacred and whose defence, which is becoming increasingly urgent, can brook neither remission nor truce.

Such are the argument, which I had the honour of explaining to Your Eminence this morning in compliance with the instructions, received from my Government.  My Government has requested that I reply to you in confidence to the overture sent to them by me from You.

Notes: 

ADSS 1.226 Maglione notes: French reject Christmas truce

 ADSS 1.226 Luigi Maglione, notes.

Reference: AES 9285/39

Location and date: Vatican, 13.12.1939

French Ambassador to the Holy See, Charles-Roux, reports the French gov’t will not support a Christmas truce.

Language: Italian

Text:

The French Ambassador told me verbally this morning that his Government does not think they are able to agree to a truce during Christmas for technical and psychological reasons.

1. The technical difficulties are enormous; they seem almost insuperable as far as sea hostilities are concerned: it is impossible to warn the submarines, mines cannot be removed etc.

2. If a truce is accepted there is the danger of everybody believing that the French Government would be prepared to accept peace at any price, etc, etc, and in consequence a decrease of effort, etc.

I observed that as far as the war on land and in the air was concerned it could b=not be said that real difficulties existed for suspending the war for two days, or for only one.

As for the war at sea, I was aware that a few days were necessary to pass on information to the submarines.  It was precisely for this reason that I insisted on the urgency of the decision.  I observed also, as far as the mines are concerned, that, unfortunately, nobody could ask for them to be removed for a two day truce.  One could ask, however, that no new ones were laid.

Regarding the psychological argument I observed that everybody, without exception, had properly understood that the truce had been proposed in order to celebrate the birth of Our Lord, to enable all families, to enjoy this holy festivity of the family, to have a little tranquillity, and comfort.  Nobody would think about what the Ambassador had mentioned. 

The Ambassador could not and would not reply to my arguments and ended by saying: Who could assure us that the truce would not be violated?

I replied that I believed that the Germans, having accepted the truce, would observe it loyally.  I did not know if they would accept it: but I believed that once they gave their word before the whole world, they would keep it.

The Ambassador, in reply to my request, promised that he would communicate my observations to the Government in Paris.  He promised me, also upon my request, to give in writing – confidentially – whatever reply to me that he received from his Government.

In the margin:

15 December 1939. Up to this evening I have not received the confidential letter that the Ambassador promised to send. (1)

Notes: 

(1) Domenico Tardini said the Pope was waiting for a reply to his truce initiative.  DDI, Series 9, Vol 2, n589, p450.

ADSS 1.225 Maglione to Ambassadors of Germany, France and UK - Christmas truce proposal

ADSS 1.225 Luigi Maglione, Sec State, to Ambassadors of Germany and France, and Minister of Great Britain (1)

Reference: AES 9119/39

Location and date: Vatican 13.12.1939

Summary statement: Papal appeal for a Christmas truce.

Language: Italian and French

Text:

[Italian]

As I had the honour to verbally inform Your Excellency (a) on 7 December (2) it is the Holy Father’s great wish that a truce, with complete suspension of hostilities, be proclaimed at Christmas.  On that occasion (b) I appealed for your kind assistance asking Your Excellency to sound your Government on this subject beforehand (3).

Because the date is drawing near, and in order to carry out the august direction of His Holiness I beg Your Excellency to give your help so that the truce suggested by His Holiness, interpreting the heartfelt wish of the peoples and confiding in the humane and generous feelings of their rulers, may be approved.

For the German Ambassador:

(a) verbal communication to the Counsellor of the Embassy (4)

(b) the occasion that I asked the Counsellor to kindly sound out the German Government on the subject

Attachments:

Draft of note [French]

As Christmas approaches the Holy Father feels most grieved at the thought that the belligerents as well as the civil population, should be forced to live, especially during these holy days under the fear of attacks on land, air raids and battles at sea.

His Holiness, certain of interpreting the deep aspirations of the people and trusting in the feeling of humanity and charity of those who rule their destinies, addresses a very ardent appeal to the Governments of the belligerent nations to welcome His appeal to suspend every kind of hostility on land, sea and in the air as from midnight of the 23^rd until midnight on 26 December.

Draft of Telegram [Italian]

Being certain of interpreting the deep wish of the peoples We appeal to the feelings of humanity and Christian charity of Your Majesty (Your Excellency) begging you to accept Our proposal that during Christmas festivities hostilities be completely suspended.

Notes: 

(1) Diego von Bergen (1872-1944) German Ambassador to the Holy See 1920-43; Francios Charles-Roux (1879-1961) French Ambassador to the Holy See 1932-40; D’Arcy Osborne (1884-1964) UK Minister to the Holy See 1936-47.

(2) ADSS 1.223

(3) Domenico Tardini had informed the Secretary of the Italian Embassy about his approach to the three Ambassadors.  See DDI, Series 9, Vol 2, n589, p450.

(4) Fritz Menshausen (1885-1958), Counsellor to the German Embassy to the Holy See 1936-45.