ADSS 10.124 Filippo Bernardini (Switzerland) to Cardinal Maglione

ADSS 10.124 Filippo Bernardini to Cardinal Maglione

Reference: Telegram 232 (AES 1879/44)

Location and date: Berne, Switzerland, 30.03.1944; received in Rome 31.03.1944

Summary statement:  Request intervention for the Jews of Hungary who are in “grave danger”.

Language: Italian

Text: The Apostolic Delegate in Turkey (1) wrote in communication number 154.  Grand Rabbi (?) Herzog (2) by way of Jerusalem with ardent supplication pleading (?) the goodness (?) the Holy Father will again intervene for the salvation of the Jews in Hungary, who are in grave danger. (3)

Cross references: 

(1) Angelo Roncalli

(2) See ADSS 10.80

(3) See ADSS 10.133.  On the 23.03.1944 (telegram with no number) the Delegate to Cairo, Arthur Hughes, had reported to Roncalli asking him to approach Chaim Barlas, the Istanbul based representative for Jewish Agency of Palestine, on behalf of the Chief Rabbi “regarding certain category Jewish refugees in particular danger”.

ADSS 9.172 Maglione to Roncalli on Slovak Jews

The active intervention of the Pope through the charge d'affaires, Giuseppe Burzio, in Bratislava was having some effect.  Fears of the resumption of deportations was never far away, but there was hope that continued pressure applied to the Slovak government would give them cause for pausing.  In May 1943 the final outcome of the war was still uncertain, but the set backs on the Eastern Front were dimming hopes for a quick German victory.  Memories of Stalingrad were still very fresh and raw, but the Russian front was a long way from Slovakia.

The divisions within the Slovak government, between Tiso who appeared to have some residual sensitivity towards his priestly state and some sense of obedience to the pope, and his more antisemitic ministers, especially Adalbert Tuka and Alexander Mach, were showing.  Tiso still had sufficient authority and support within the government to exercise influence over the application of the anti-Jewish policies.  This document points to a widespread knowledge of the Slovak situation and an indication that similar strategies would be used with Hungary should a similar need arise.

At the bottom of the document is Maglione's note that Pius had approved the strategy.  The words "Seen / Approved by the Holy Father" appear often.  

ADSS 9.172 

Secretary of State, Cardinal Maglione to Angelo Roncalli, Apostolic Delegate, Turkey

Reference:  Telegram 153 (AES 2794/43)

Location and date:  Vatican, 04.05.1943

Summary statement: Steps taken by the Holy See for Slovakian Jews.

Language: Italian

I refer to your telegram number 99 and report number 4180. (1)

The Holy See has repeatedly made representations to the Slovak Government with special concern for non-Aryan young people. (2)

Because of the interest taken by [the Holy See] all transfer of Jewish residents in Slovakia is suspended.

Concerning the children you reported, the Holy See is prepared to intervene with the Hungarian Government when circumstances so require. (3)

Your Excellency will keep me informed.

Note of Cardinal Maglione:

Approved by the Holy Father.

Cross references: 

(1)  See ADSS 9.95 and 96.

(2)  See ADSS 9.81, 87, 176.

ADSS 9.324 Roncalli to Maglione

  9.324 Angelo Roncalli, Apostolic Delegate, Turkey to Cardinal Maglione.

Reference:  Report number 4344 (AES 6077/43)

Location and date:  Istanbul, 04.09.1943

Summary statement: Steps taken for Italian Jews; Delegate’s doubt as to the feasibility of Jewish emigration to Palestine.

Language: Italian

Text:

Following my report 4332 of 20 August 1943 I am sending other questions which have been submitted to me on behalf of the Jews.

The second of these means to obtain the intervention of the Holy See because it is able to facilitate the release of many Jews in Italian territory: and the other changes already mentioned in my earlier notes, numbers 1, 3, 4, 5. (2)

I confess that this directing by the Holy See of the Jews to Palestine, almost suggesting the reconstruction of the Jewish kingdom, starting by bringing them out of Italy, gives rise to some uncertainty within me.

Doing this is what their compatriots and political friends are involved in.  But I do not think it in very good taste that the exercise of the simple and noble charity of the Holy See, may offer the occasion of the appearance that could be recognised as cooperation, minimally and indirectly, to the realisation of the messianic dream.

All this is perhaps nothing but a personal scruple that I have not yet confessed.  Even so, it is quite certain that the reconstruction of the kingdom of Judah and Israel is a utopian dream.

Cross references: 

(1)  See ADSS 9.301.

(2)  Not published in ADSS.

Pius XII and Palestine - May 1943

One of the tangential issues that emerged from the diplomatic efforts undertaken by the Holy See for the Jews in Occupied Europe, was the question of where rescued Jews would, should or could go.  Nearly all attempts to secure visas, however temporary, in neutral countries in Europe and states outside Europe had come to nought.  The Jews themselves made it clear that once out of Europe they wanted to go to Palestine.  For most of the period 1941-1944 the question was largely theoretical - Jews in Europe were for the most part trapped with no way out.

The Vatican worried that an influx of Jewish refugees into Palestine would create a situation that would be detrimental to the concerns of the Church.  Palestine was home to the holy places such as the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem, the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem and the Mount of Beatitudes in Galilee.  A Jewish majority in what was the British-governed Mandate was not desirable.  It would cause grave offence to Catholic piety and even worse, outshine Vatican efforts to help the Jews get out of Europe in the first place.  Pius XII understood the arguments and agreed with them.  He would not support a Jewish homeland in Palestine.

Between March and May 1943 there are several documents in ADSS 9 that show without any doubt the resistance to the idea of Palestine becoming a Jewish home.  There is agreement that the Jews should have a national home; as long as it was not in Palestine.  

On 12 May 1917 the Secretary of State, Cardinal Gasparri and the young Monsignor Pacelli met Nahum Sokolow, president of the World Zionist Organisation and listened to his ideas for a Jewish Homeland in Palestine.  Sokolow recorded the meeting as being positive and friendly.  Things changed less than six months later with the British announcement of the Balfour Declaration of 2 November 1917. Polite and cordial meetings in the Vatican between two sides that had no power to change the political realities of Palestine were one thing, the announcement of the British government to support a Jewish Homeland in Palestine and the political and military power that underpinned the statement, were quite another.  Pope Benedict XV was opposed to the idea of Jewish home for the reasons cited above.  Fear of Jewish domination and, worse, the fear of Jews having political power over Christians, led the pope to declare his, and the Church's official opposition to any attempt to create a Jewish state in Palestine.  The attitude was not change until well after the creation of the State of Israel in 1948.

Let us look at the documents in ADSS 9.

ADSS 9.94:  13.03.1943 The Apostolic Delegate in London, William Godfrey, sent news to Rome that the British government was willing to permit Jewish children passage to Palestine.  Notes made by Domenico Tardini included references to the Holy See's long known opposition to the creation of Jewish home and the bald statement that the Holy Land was more holy to Catholics than Jews!

ADSS 9.171  04.05.1943 Cardinal Maglione wrote to Godfrey to say that the Holy See has done and is doing everything to help the Jews.  However, as the Apostolic Delegate would well remember, the British government's pledge in the Balfour Declaration was not in the interest of Catholics who would be offended if Palestine was to be exclusively Jewish.

ADSS 9.191  18.05.1943 Maglione wrote to Amleto Cicognani, Apostolic Delegate in Washington with instructions to protest any and all attempts to create a Jewish homeland in Palestine.  The forceful language borders on the undiplomatic.  The idea of bringing a people back to a land after nineteen centuries makes no sense.  Catholics will be outraged.  The Holy See is doing everything it can to help the Jews. 

ADSS 9.324  04.09.1943 Angelo Roncalli, Apostolic Delegate in Turkey to Cardinal Maglione expressed his reservations over Jewish migration to Palestine as if they were going to reconstruct a biblical-like kingdom.  These were dreams and not realities.  Roncalli did confess that perhaps his reservations were personal scruples that he had not been able to disperse. 

There is an awful inference in these documents.  The Holy See was doing everything it could to help and rescue the Jews of Europe so the Jews should not seek to emigrate to Palestine and upset Catholic sensibilities.  And it was the pope who maintained the official stance opposing Jewish migration that had been adopted by his predecessor Benedict XV in late 1917.

Between January and March 1943 approximately 105,000 Jews were murdered at Auschwitz-Birkenau.  Between 1939 and 1945  73,764 Jews managed to reach Palestine.  The Vatican's fears of Jewish domination in the Mandate were at best nonsensical and at worst a manifestation of old fashioned supercessionism and Judeophobia.

ADSS 9.22 Proposals of Chaim Barlas to the Holy See

 In the last few posts I have added the continued exchange of documents over attempts to rescue the remnant of Slovakian Jewry.  Early in 1943 Angelo Roncalli, the Apostolic Delegate to Turkey, met Chaim Barlas who worked with Jewish groups in Turkey to try and save Jews trapped in Europe.  Reaching out to Roncalli Barlas made a series of suggestions asking the Holy See to intervene with the Germans, the neutral states and America to help get Jews out of Europe.  Barlas' final request was for a public statement on the radio telling Catholics that helping Jews was a good thing to do.

Was Barlas naive?  Possibly; but the desperate situation evidently compelled people such as Barlas to make dramatic demands.  The appeal of Catholic religious sister Margit Slachta in March 1943 is a similar example from a non-Jewish source.

What surprises most is the footnote mentioning a note sent from the British Ambassador to Washington, Lord Halifax echoing the rumour that Germany might let the Jews go.  Halifax's concern seems to lie more with the risk that Germany might flood other countries with "aliens".  This theme was to occupy more time later during the year in the Vatican.

The Pope was kept informed of developments throughout the Slovakian intervention and rescue proposals.  His responses were not made public outside of notes that Pius had seen notes and reports and expressed a continued sympathy for the Jews.  I believe the closest we come to a papal opinion is found in the responses made by Cardinal Maglione and Monsignori Tardini and Montini who repeated "the Vatican has done and is doing all it can".

 ADSS 9.22 Angelo Roncalli, Apostolic Delegate to Turkey to Cardinal Maglione

Reference:  Report number 4129 (AES 1036/43)

Location and date: Istanbul, 22.01.1943

Summary statement: Requests HS intervention in favour of Jews to be permitted to leave Germany and the occupied countries.  Attaches proposition of Chaim Barlas, Jewish Agency for Palestine given to Arthur Hughes, charge d’affairs, Ap Del Egypt who handed it to Roncalli in mid-January.

Languages: Italian and English

Text:

The other day I was introduced to Mr Bader (1) of the “Jewish Agency for Palestine”.  I thought it best to put him in touch with Father Hughes (2) who governs the Apostolic Delegation of Palestine and more so as this man only speaks English.  He understood and appreciated this and the result of that conversation is in the accompanying memorandum. (3)  I sent the manuscript to Father Hughes, upon whose recommendation I send it to your Eminence.  The report only contains Mr Bader’s comments and questions and no other.(4)

Questions to the Holy See, through Father Hughes, from Mr Bader of the Jewish Agency for Palestine. (5)

1)  We understand that the governments of neutral nations are willing to grant temporary asylum to Jews found in Nazi-occupied countries, if the United States would provide for their maintenance of the Jews and would guarantee that they would not remain in the host countries after the war;

2) We understand the German government is willing to grant permission to Jews to leave occupied countries (approximately 5,000 people and also 700 women and children currently in Poland could move to Palestine where they have husbands and fathers).

3) the a declaration made over the radio that the Church considered any help given to persecuted Jews is a good deed.

Attachment:

No number (ASS 1036/43)

Istanbul 20.01.1943

(English – as printed in ADSS)

It is with great pleasure that I heard of the expressing of your sympathy towards the Jewish victims of terror in Europe and that you are prepared to raise the question in High Quarters of the Holy Seat.  The facts are summarised in the joined declaration of the Allied Nations, which declaration ws announced by Mr Eden in Parlament on the 18.12.1942 (7) (the text published in “Informations de Palestine” of the 24.12.1942 is attached herewith). (8)

In this connection I beg to submit to your Eminence the following proposal:

1) In view of the terror and slaughter of Jews that goes on unintermittenly in the occupied territories, it would be of great importance to undertake an action to save the Jews before it is too late, with a veiw to enabling them to leave the countries of persecutions, where they are threatened to be wholly exterminated.  It would be, therefore, appreciated if an effort could be made to secure a temporary asylum for Jews from the mentioned countries in some of the neutral countries: Portugal, Sweden etc.  The suggestion has been made that the Vatican should be approached with a view to sounding the Governments of neutral countries, as to whether they would be prepared to admit a certain number of Jews from Nazi occupied territories, if the United States guaranty to provide for their feeding and gives an assurance that after the war they would not become a charge on these countries.  The conditions under which the refugees might stay in the neutral countries would, of course, depend on the decision of their respective Governments.  They might be put in refugee camps, such as Switzerland has set up for this purpose since the war, unless the Governments agree to more liberal terms.  This would mean that the neutral countries would not have to provide for the refugees anything beyond the air which the refugees breath and the soil on which their camps would be set up.  The financial side, the provision of food etc, would, of course, have to be borne by the Jewish Communities of the free countries, especially the United States.  It is anticipated that social and philanthropic bodies such as the International Red Cross etc, might be induced to give assistance on the technical side.

2) The actual position with regard to the possibilities of emigration is that the Jews in Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland are not allowed to leave the country.  On the other hand there is no objection to Jews leaving Holland, Belgium and the Balkan countries.  The position in France is still undefinite.  That at least is the latest information in our possession. (9)

The Jewish Agency for Palestine have at their disposal a number of immigration certificates granted by the Government of Palestine, which would enable the entry of about 5,000 immigrants (including children) into Palestine.  Besides there are about 700 Jewish women and children, mostly in Poland, whose husbands and fathers respectively, are residing in Palestine.  For these families the Government of Palestine approved entry into Palestine to join their relatives.  We would appreciate it very much, if the High Authorities of the Holy Seat would agree to approach the German Government with a view to grant the exit permission for those Jewish immigrants, who have the opportunity of immigrating into the Holy Land.

3) The highly humanitarian attitude of His Saintety [sic] expressing His indignation against racial persecutions, was a source of moral comfort for our brethren.  May we venture to suggest that an opportunity should be found by radio, or as it may be deemed useful, to declare that rendering help to persecuted Jews is considered by the Church as a good deed.  This would, undoubtedly, strengthen the feelings of those Catholics, who, as we know and appreciate, render help to Jews doomed to starvation in the occupied territories in Europe.

In submitting these suggestions we do not underestimate the difficulties which are evident enough.  We feel, however, the position is so terrible, that anything that may offer an avenue of escape to even a fraction of the Jewish Communities in Europe will be considered as a great humanitarian action towards the Nation of Israel. (10)

Chaim Barlas

References: 

(1) Should read Chaim Barlas.

(2) Arthur Hughes (1902-1949), charge d’affaires of the Apostolic Delegation in Egypt was in Istanbul from 12.01 – 21.01.1943 on request from Cardinal Maglione in order to collect Vatican mail.  See ADSS 7.72, 90, 182.

(3) See the attachment.

(4) See ADSS 9.241

(5) See Peter Hebblethwaite, John XIII Pope of the Century,(Continuum, 2000), pp 91-92.

(6) See ADSS 9.270 & 352.

(7) See ADSS 8.578.

(8) Not published in ADSS.

(9) At the same time Viscount Halifax (1881-1959) British Ambassador in Washington DC (1940-1946) wrote to the State Department that there was a possibility at that time there may be a possibility of freeing the Jews.  “There is a possibility that the Germans or their satellites may change over the policy of extermination to one of extrusion and aim as they did before the war at embarrassing other countries by flooding them with alien immigrants”. (FRUS 1943, I, p134).

(10) See ADSS 9.60.

ADSS 9.96 Roncalli to Maglione: Jewish confidence in the Holy See

ADSS 9.96 Angelo Roncalli, Apostolic Delegate to Turkey to Cardinal Maglione

Reference:  report number 4180 (AES 2794/43)

Location and date: Istanbul, 13.03.1943

Summary statement: Jews have confidence in the intervention of the Holy See.

Language: Italian

Text:

I follow the dispatch [from earlier today] (1) with the Promemoria I made with Messrs Kaplan and Barlas of the “Jewish Agency for Palestine” as a summary of the conversation that took place in the Delegation here. (2)  Once again, the description of the sufferings their countrymen are subjected to is touching and tragic.  Needless to say their confidence in the beneficial intervention of the Holy Father is profound, and the abandonment of their spirit to this providence appears sincere.

They wanted me to add a copy of the letter they addressed to Fr Hughes and which may at this time, either in its text or contents, have reached your Eminence. (3)  I think it good perhaps to combine this argument that contains information useful in a compassionate study to relieve the sorrows of the unfortunate chosen people. (4)

References: 

(1) Error in text.  It should read “telegram”.

(2) The principle points made in the memorandum were: “… According to the information we have received, the rest of the Jewish population of Slovakia, about 20,000 souls, are in immediate danger of being deported before the end of this month to Poland.  The situation in Poland, where about two thirds of the Jewish population was wiped out in a cruel manner, requires no comment.

So we beg your Excellency, to present our petition to the Holy See to kindly intervene with the Slovak government to prevent these cruel measures which would mean the death of the remains of the Jewish community.

We reiterate as well our second petition, that the Vatican would take action with the Slovak government for approximately 2,000 children in Slovakia, for whom we have the possibility of granting immigration certificates to Palestine as part of the British government quota provided to us, which would allow the children to lodge in Slovakia until they are fit to continue their journey …

On this occasion we would give you the enclosed copy of a memorandum of 20.01.1943 addressed to the Reverend Arthur Hughes, Apostolic Delegate in Egypt and Palestine, Istanbul, where we set out the problem in general and by which we humbly pray the Holy See grant them a sympathetic attitude.

Unfortunately the situation in the occupied countries has worsened since then, so the content of this memorandum is still current.

We would appreciate it if you would kindly draw the attention of the Holy See on the untenable situation of the Jewish communities in Europe and ask it to intervene as it deems best.

(3) See ADSS 9.22, attachment.

(4) See ADSS 9.172.

ADSS 9.95 Roncalli to Maglione

ADSS 9.95 Angelo Roncalli, Apostolic Delegate to Turkey to Cardinal Maglione

Reference: Telegram 99 (AES 1584/43)

Location and date: Istanbul, 13.03.1943 @ 1439 hours, arrived Rome @ 1850.

Summary statement: Requests intervention for Slovakian Jewish children to get to Palestine.

Language: Italian

Text:

The Jewish Agency for Palestine representative, Mr Kapl (sic) asked me to communicate the following: some 20,000 Slovak Jews run the risk of deportation to Poland by the end of March (2).  They appeal to the Holy Father to intervene with the government to prevent this measure … to get 1,000 (?) Jewish children for emigration to Palestine in accordance with the authorisation of the English (3) … and allow them transit through Turkey.  They ask the indulgence of the Slovak government and Hungary as well to grant essential temporary stays for the children.  The Jewish Agency will provide everything; urgent intervention.(4)  Report to follow. 

Micossi’s trip to Beirut continues on Monday.(5)

Cross references: 

(1) It should read “Kaplan”.  Eliezer Kaplan (1891-1952) was head of finance for the Jewish Agency for Palestine.

(2) See ADSS 9.85 & 87.

(3) See ADSS 9.94.

(4) See ADSS 9.172.

(5) Giuseppe Micossi (1909-2009), secretary of the Apostolic Delegation in Beirut.

ADSS 9.86, 87, 89, 95, 96: the remnant 20,000 Slovak Jews

The belief that the remainder of the Slovak Jews, about 20,000, were in imminent danger of deportation, prompted a number of telegrams and reports sent to and from Bratislava, Istanbul and Budapest to Rome.  What is of particular interest is the level of knowledge the Vatican possessed at this point - March 1943.  Reading the documents one notices that it is accepted or presumed knowledge that hundreds of thousands of Jews, especially Polish Jews, are dead at the hands of the Germans.  It is also presumed knowledge that "deportation" would mean eventual and certain death.


The situation in Slovakia had raised hopes among Jewish organisations as well as some active Catholics that the Vatican could influence Tiso's government through direct appeal.  The Holy See knew from Giuseppe Burzio's earlier report (ADSS 9.85) of 07.03.1943 that a significant number of clergy were opposed to the government's anti-Jewish laws and actions and one bishop at least had called for Tiso to be removed from the priesthood.  Over the next week pressure continued to build.


ADSS 9.86  Margit Slachta, the Hungarian foundress of the Sisters of Social Service came to Rome to plead for the Slovakian Jews in the first week of March before going to Switzerland to appeal to the Red Cross.  Her visit on 08.03.1943 was met with the standard response that the Vatican was doing all it could, even though in the notes taken the writer observed that Sister Margit did not appear satisfied.  Slachta worked tirelessly for the rest of the war working to save Jews.


ADSS 9.87  Cardinal Maglione wrote to the charge d'affaires in Bratislava on 09.03.1943, Giuseppe Burzio urging him to take all necessary steps to prevent the deportations should the rumours prove true.


ADSS 9.89 Burzio wrote to Maglione on 11.03.1943 that the deportations would most likely still go ahead but not at the moment.  More information was not possible because government officials were "evasive" in their answers to Burzio's questions.


ADSS 9.95-96  On 13.03.1943 Angelo Roncalli, Apostolic Delegate in Turkey wrote on behalf of Eliezer Kaplan, from the Jewish Agency for Palestine appealing for the help of the pope to get two thousand Jewish children out of Slovakia and on their way to Palestine via Hungary and Turkey.  Roncalli had been assured that the Agency possessed British approved certificates for Palestine.  Confirmation of British permission for Jewish children to go to Palestine had been telegraphed to Rome less than an hour before Roncalli's first message arrived. (See ADSS 9.94)


The outcome of the appeals from the Vatican were mixed.  Deportations were suspended indefinitely, but appeals for Jewish children came to nought.  Cardinal Maglione cabled Roncalli on 04.05.1943 to say that the Holy See had intervened several times, especially for Jewish children.


However, there was another problem emerging.  Making appeals to governments to stop the deportation and murder of Jews was one thing; supporting the emigration of Jews to Palestine even if that would clearly save lives, was another.  Even in the middle of the Holocaust, concerns that supporting Jewish emigration to Palestine would eventually create new problems with regard to access to the Christian holy places were not far from the surface.  I shall return to this later.(See ADSS 9.136)


I will post the documents in the next several posts.

Reflections on ADSS Volume 11

I finished reading my way through the "conventional" war as recorded in the Actes et Documents.  Volumes 1, 4, 5, 7 and 11 cover the diplomatic activity of the Secretariat of State of Pope Pius XII throughout the 1939-1945 war.  What follows are a series of thoughts.  They are ruminations rather than any form of academic exercise.

As the editors attempted to find a way through the millions of documents they found that they it would be easier for the purposes of presenting a portrait of the activities of Pius, Cardinal Maglione, Monsignors Tardini and Montini, to name a few, if they divided the material into two distinct sections.  The volumes cited above describe the diplomatic activities of the Holy See, its engagements with governments and government agents: Allied, Axis and Neutral.  The remaining volumes deal with the letters of the pope to the German bishops (2) and Poland and the Baltic States (3 parts 1 and 2).  In order to deal with the Vatican's relief attempts and the growing awareness of the murder of European Jewry, the editors collated their selection of documents in volumes 6, 8, 9 and 10.

What did I learn through a close reading of the "diplomatic war" in Volume 11?

The volume opens in January 1944 and the focus remains firmly centred on Rome until several weeks after liberation in June.  Preoccupation with having the city declared "open" takes up many documents as does the energy spent on enlisting support throughout the Catholic world in the media.  There are some references to the Via Rasella partisan action in March 1944 and hints that point to knowledge of the vicious German reprisals carried out in the Ardeatine Caves.  As the days of German occupation drew to their close, the Vatican was keen to ensure that the departure of the Germans and the arrival of the Allies was orderly.  Apart from the quite reasonable and pastoral concern to preserve the city and its people, there was the fear that communist partisans would take advantage of the confusion and chaos and attempt to seize power.  Pius did not want that to happen.

Once Rome was liberated stories of the French colonial Moroccan troops, the Goumiers, began to circulate.  The Goumiers had a reputation for hard fighting and, more darkly, for taking seriously their belief in their right to rape, loot and pillage.  Thousands of Italian women and girls were savagely raped in the months up to June 1944.  Pius's plea to General Mark Clarke to keep "coloured" troops out of Rome only makes sense if it is a reference to the Goumiers.

Volume 11 also refers to the exit of the Allied diplomats immured in the Vatican and their replacement by the Axis ministers.  Some members of the German embassy were not quick enough leaving their residences in Rome and were arrested by the Allies and interned in Taormina, much to the impotent fury of Berlin.

In August, Cardinal Luigi Maglione, the pope's secretary of state died of heart disease.  Pius took over Maglione's role personally for the rest of his pontificate.

There is mention of the Warsaw uprising in August 1944, always coloured by the growing fear of the Red Army's march westward.  The fear of communism is never far away and it grows in intensity as the war neared its end.  News from Poland, the Baltic States, Hungary, Bulgaria, Slovakia and the eastern provinces of Germany is nearly always "bad".

As France is liberated the nuncio in Vichy, Valerio Valeri returns to Paris to find General de Gaulle is determined to cut all ties with bishops who, in his opinion, collaborated with the Vichy regime of, the now German held, Marshal Petain, including Valeri himself.  Rome attempts to calm de Gaulle to no avail.  When the nuncio in Argentina, Giuseppe Fietta, declined the move to Paris, the role fell to the Apostolic Delegate to Greece and Turkey, Monsignor Angelo Roncalli who sped to France towards the end of 1944.

Gustavo Testa, the representative of the Holy See in Athens, sent several reports describing the descent into civil war once the Germans had left Greece.  It makes for incredibly sad reading.

The last months of the war are described through documents that show the Vatican sensitive to the peace-feelers put out by some Germans and Mussolini's rump-fascist Salo Republic.  There is the positive response to FDR's call for an international body that would work for peace in the world, the genesis of the United Nations.  Pius expressed his happiness to cooperate in such a venture.

Finally, as communication with much of central and eastern Europe ends because of the collapse of nearly all social order, Pius expresses his deep personal sorrow to Eleanor Roosevelt on the death of FDR in mid-April 1945.  The last documents are the pope's telegrams expressing his joy at the liberation and return of peace to Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg - echoing his telegrams to the heads of state of each country in May 1940 when Germany invaded them.

What do these documents show?  On their own, they demonstrate the high volume of accurate information arriving in Rome and being responded to by the Vatican.  They were very well informed.  The texts also show that Rome seized every opportunity to save Rome from the fate that had befallen other European capitals and cities while also demonstrating that no talk of peace from either side would be dismissed.

There are levels of unreality throughout.  The phobia about communism in the west and particularly in Italy was without foundation.  The fear of communism in the east had an historical basis but ignored what was happening in reality.  The Polish bishops quite often found that the Soviet-backed Lublin government needed the help of the Church to rebuild the country for the simple reason that it was the only social institution that had survived five and half years of German occupation.  What the long-term aim of the Lublin politicians was going to be cannot be surmised from these texts and we must be wary of hindsight.  I am not saying the communists were well-intentioned towards Catholicism (or Orthodoxy for that matter) but Stalin did see a difference between the system in Russia and the need for some adaptation outside Russian borders.

There are also developments in understanding as well.  At the beginning of the war, Rome was still suspicious of liberal, popular democracy.  By war's end, democracy was seen as a force for good in the world.  This was no doubt helped through the positive relations Pius enjoyed with FDR and the lived experience of liberation by the United States Fifth Army.  Pius' embrace of the idea of the United Nations was also a major step forward in the Vatican's understanding of its place in the world and its relations with "the world".

All this must now be placed alongside the next phase of my study of ADSS - the victims.  My generally positive assessment of the Vatican's position in liberated Europe in the early summer of 1945 needs to be weighed against its role in working to help and save the millions of people displaced by the war.  This next part of the story will be far more complex and shaded in more hues of grey than the diplomatic war.

Some thoughts from reading ADSS Volume 7

I was emailed earlier today by a colleague who had some questions about how the Vatican Secretariat of State worked and how involved the Holy See was in the collapse of the fascist regime in Italy in 1943.  What follows is the substance of my response. 

The response is based on my reading of ADSS Volume 7 Le Saint-Siège La Première Guerre mondiale et Novembre 1942 - Décembre 1943 (1973).  The volume contains 506 documents with footnotes and index.  It also contains an introductory essay of 67 pages that is, in effect, a summary of the volume.  The volume deals with the "conventional war", not with the atrocities, although there is some mention.


One example is contained in Document 282 (p 473) dated 8 July 1943 of Angelo Roncalli, Apostolic Delegate to Turkey, to Giovanni Montini, Secretariat of State, Rome.  Roncalli relates a private meeting with the German ambassador, Franz von Papen during which mention is made of "the Katyn affair" (discovery by the Germans of the mass graves of Polish officers murdered by the NKVD in 1940 on the orders of Stalin).  von Papen then went on to say:

 ...  with a sad smile that it was necessary first of all to forget the millions of Jews expelled and suppressed in Poland, and that in any case this was a good chance for the Reich to make a change in its treatment of the Poles. (p 474) 

The document was an account of a meeting, written with a minimum of detail, but with what I can only imagine from what we know of Roncalli, an exceedingly heavy heart.  It is also a reminder to see what the document says, not what it does not.  An historical argument cannot hang on one document, however unpleasant.




Now to my thoughts from my reading of ADSS 7.

The daily workings of the Vatican Secretariat of State mirrored any number of other agencies of like nature, with the one glaring exception, it was a supra-national identity that sought to promote its agenda through an extensive, but ultimately powerless, group of diplomats. The powerless aspect was what I believe forced Vatican diplomacy to master the craft of diplomacy to an almost perfect degree. Stalin's remark "how many divisions has the Pope?" sums it up. Pius had not way of enforcing his will - it was done entirely through connections, argument, moral persuasion and old fashioned, gentlemens' agreements.




From what I have read in ADSS follows a familiar pattern. The Cardinal Secretary of State and his office received dozens (probably more) pieces of information throughout the day. Most of the ADSS documents record the form of the information - telegram, letter, memo, diplomatic correspondence, private mail from FDR to Pius (most of which has been published - 1947).




Cardinal Maglione, the Secretary of State, along with Monsignors Domenico Tardini and Giovanni Montini (later Pope Paul VI) sorted through the material, determined which would receive priority and would be shown to the Pope. It goes without saying that anything considered of top priority went to Pius' desk - many of the documents have a note at the end Visto dal Santo Padre or similar (see / shown to the Holy Father).


Often there are other notes with directions given by Pius, such as "instruct Nuncio X to do A, B or C", or "make no reply". There are also notes taken by one or other or the men mentioned, clarifying points of discussion with either the Pope or another figure, such as a representative of a foreign power etc. And there are drafts for letters, telegrams etc.


The footnotes indicate a lot of material that is not included in ADSS because it has been published elsewhere such as in the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS). However, in my own reading I have gone looking for additional material because there has been so much published since the last volume of ADSS was published in 1981. I have found a lot of detail on many of the people mentioned throughout and created an extensive list of names, dates and roles - largely through google searches. The footnotes also indicate that there is material the editors saw but chose not to use - the reasons for this are not clear. However, I am prepared to accept that in choosing documents for publication the editors were keen to get as wide a cross-section of Vatican activity as possible, so space is probably the main reason for leaving some material out. Although having said that I am surprised, (or aghast) that two seminal pieces of Holocaust related documentation never made it into ADSS - the Riegner Report and Richard Vrba's Auschwitz Protocols, both of which were known of. Indeed the Riegner Report is mentioned in footnotes.




My reference to the Vatican "being in the know" refers in this instance to the collapse of Italy from early 1943 onwards. It was an open secret that Galeazzo Ciano commented on in his diary that the Vatican was in league with other anti-fascist groups in Italy trying to find a way of getting Italy out of the war and keeping the Germans out of Italy. From early1943 many of the documents in ADSS 7 are concerned with 1) preventing the bombing of Rome, 2) getting Italy out of the war, 3) having Rome declared "Open City, 4) preserving the fiction of Vatican neutrality (ironic given the above), 5) convincing President Roosevelt (FDR) and, to a lesser extent, Churchill, that bombing Italian cities was counter-productive and only encouraging communist activities, 6) concerns for Sicily after the 9 July invasion and the prospect of an impending invasion of the peninsula, and 7) several other issues, but one that was growing in intensity - the fear of a Soviet dominated Europe.




How involved was Pius in all this? Knowing that no major decision was made without his direct input and often at his explicit direction, the simple answer is - the Pope was involved in every aspect of all the issues mentioned above. ADSS published a lot of the war-time correspondence between FDR and Pius, and much of that includes appeals to spare Rome. And when that did not work as well as the Vatican hoped, they went to the US bishops and appealed to them to whip up support among Catholics. It is also very interesting to note the change in direction in Vatican policy from mid-1941 with regard to the USA. Pius threw in his lot with the US from an earlier date than I suspect was believed in earlier work.


Why?

Pius had met FDR in 1936 and clearly liked the man. The liking was mutual. Both distrusted the politics of the left, although FDR was more pragmatic about it and when one mentions "left" politics in the US case it does mean something quite different to what a conservative Italian/European Catholic understood by the word. In any case, both men respected each other and believed both were working for the good of humanity. I think Pius' positive estimation of FDR convinced him, along with the loyalty of the American bishops who worked tirelessly supporting the Vatican cause (not surprising, many Catholics were horrified at the thought of Rome being bombed, and were more horrified at the thought of the Holy Father being held hostage by Hitler), and the economic and industrial power of America, that the US would be the only force able to defeat Germany. It is important to rremember that until mid-1943 the prospect of a German victory remained a very real possibility. From 1943 onwards Pius' relied more and more on appeals to FDR than to any other Allied leader.



The letters between Pius and FDR.

The published material is general in nature - lots of appeals for common values, respect for America as the guarantor of freedom for Europe etc.

It is the material that was not published that is far more revealing! Memos from Amleto Cicognani, the Apostolic Delegate in Washington to Maglione, Sumner-Wells and others in FDR's administration on issues such as the bombing of Rome and other Italian cities, the desire of Italy to get out of the war, calls for support Rome "Open City", the situation of the monarchy, and urging support for the new government after the deposition of Mussolini, point to a high degree of frank discussion and diplomatic "argy bargy". The amount of tooing and frooing between June and September 1943 is considerable. There is disagreement, frustration and sometimes a sense of desperation from the Vatican side as things appear to be going ahead and then be suddenly derailed.

The second bombing of Rome on 13 August is a case in point. I believe the Vatican had felt it had secured a deal from the US and the UK that Rome would not be bombed again after 16 July. The diplomatic seesaw to have the city declared "Open" took quite a while and then the Allies bombed the city again "striking military targets". On a global scale this might not seem all that much, but for the Vatican it was integral to the policy to preserve Rome and ensure that chaos did not ensue, the communists did not get active and the Germans remained on the sidelines. Of course, we see this with hindsight, but the tenor of many of the documents reveals very real fears.



Volume 7 deals with the "conventional" war, not with victims. At the moment I am up to late August - document 357 out of 506. I will be working on that side once I get through this volume and Volume 11 (which will take me up to the end of the war).